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Abstract 
Given the growth and pervasiveness of performance auditing in Australia, it is important to 
understand the nature of its impacts on stakeholders who are influenced and affected by such 
audits. Yet extant studies have focused on impact measurement without empirically addressing 
how performance audit impacts are defined and the factors conditioning such definitions. This 
study clarifies what multiple key stakeholder groups of performance auditing i.e. auditees, 
performance auditors, parliamentarians and journalists, understand as performance audit 
impact. Focused on performance audits reported in Victoria within 2009/2010 to 2015/2016, a 
sequential three stage mixed-method approach was adopted consisting of document analysis, a 
survey questionnaire and in-depth semi-structured interviews. Drawing on New Institutional 
Sociology informed by accountability dimensions as theoretical underpinning, this study 
demonstrates that managerial, political and public accountability relationships between key 
stakeholders affect their interpretations of impact. While not all stakeholders feel accountable 
to other groups, their interpretations of impact appear to be driven by the endeavour to obtain 
and maintain legitimacy from other key stakeholders for their operations. Empirical 
explanations have further disclosed that stakeholder interpretations of impact are dependent on 
their perceived usefulness of performance audits. As opposed to prior studies, this research 
shows that particularly complex and reform-like changes, if considered timely and necessary, 
are perceived as useful and therefore impactful. Findings also demonstrate that certain impact 
definitions provided by different key stakeholder groups are similar, whereas others vary. 
Besides the more detailed elaboration on previously defined impacts, this research contributes 
to performance audit literature by affording new definitions of impact and impact-facilitating 
factors. Providing a comprehensive understanding of the impacts of performance audits among 
key stakeholder groups, this study makes operational contribution to performance audit 
practice of Australian Auditors-General Offices and the way in which performance audit 
outcomes are administered by audited public sector organisations. 
Keywords: Public sector, performance auditing, performance audit impact, accountability 
relationships, New Institutional Sociology, Australia
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
A performance audit1 (PA) carried out by Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs)2 is an independent 
examination to assess whether public sector programs, systems, activities or entire public 
organisations are performing in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness (INTOSAI3, 2004; Parker and Jacobs, 2015). The concept of PAs emerged in the 
late 1980s/early 1990s as a response to an increasing emphasis on performance outcomes and 
performance accountability4 associated with the onset of New Public Management (NPM) 
(Parker et al., 2018; Parker and Jacobs, 2015; Leeuw, 1996; Hood, 1995). Until the 1980s, 
Auditors-General Offices (AGOs) in Australia carried out their oversight role through 
traditional financial audits (Gerald, 2015; Wanna et al., 2001; English et al., 2010). However, 
over the years it became increasingly clear that financial accounts showing how much was 
spent, did not adequately serve the accountability purpose of demonstrating how well it had 
been spent or whether value for money had been achieved (Glynn, 1985; Broadbent and 
Guthrie, 1992; Guthrie and Parker, 1999). Hence, a tool was needed to evaluate those 
responsible for spending public resources and to examine whether the public sector maximises 
potential outcomes for the money expended (economy), which government services and 
programs work well (efficiency), and whether stipulated objectives have been achieved 
(effectiveness) (Parker and Jacobs, 2015). This was particularly essential considering growing 
public and parliamentary demands for enhanced accountability, transparency and better public 
sector performance resulting from increased concerns about the wasteful use of public 
resources (Wanna et al., 2001; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Pollitt et al., 1999).  
By virtue of its potential to contribute materially to the enhancement of accountability and 
improvement of public sector performance, PA work has received increasing recognition in 
various countries and evolved and extended its scope since its early development (Broadbent 
and Guthrie, 1992; Hood, 1995; Parker, 1986; Dittenhofer, 2001). Today, PAs are an 
internationally accepted high-profile feature of public administration and have become a well-
established key element in the mandate of many SAIs throughout the Commonwealth of 
Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
European Union (EU) (Kells, 2011a; Torres et al., 2016; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Power, 
 
1 Interchangeable terms for PAs are value-for-money audits (Pollitt et al., 1999; Jacobs, 1998) and efficiency audits 
(Hamburger, 1989; Radcliffe, 1998). These terms share a common basic definition founded upon the concepts of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
2 SAIs are national agencies that are responsible for auditing government revenue and spending (World Bank, 
2001). In the Westminster system they are referred to as Auditors-General Offices (AGOs). 
3 The INTOSAI is an autonomous, non-political and non-governmental institution operating as an umbrella 
organisation for the external government audit community. At present the INTOSAI has 194 full members – 
including Australia – and five associated members. The INTOSAI is the publisher of the ISSAI, the fundamental 
principles according to which members are supposed to conduct audits of public organisations (INTOSAI, 2016).  
4 The notion of accountability is defined in detail in section 4.3. 
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2003a).5 Additionally, SAIs in several other countries have expressed their interest in adopting 
PA activities (Arthur et al., 2012; Torres et al., 2016).  
In Australia, PAs are conducted by AGOs. The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) at 
the national level and the AGOs of New South Wales (NSW), Queensland (QLD), Northern 
Territory (NT), Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Western Australia (WA), Tasmania (TAS) 
and Victoria (VIC) at the state level regularly undertake PAs (Parker and Jacobs, 2015; 
Hatherly and Parker, 1988).6 As argued by Parker and Jacobs (2015), the Australian AGOs’ 
PA function, institutionalised through the adoption of the NPM, has reached a mature stage, is 
widely accepted and regarded as central to the exercise of accountability as well as 
improvement of public sector performance. Australian AGOs are considered as leading 
practitioners in PA work (Parker and Jacobs, 2015; see also Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, who 
consider Australia as a leader in the adoption of reforms associated with the NPM). Although 
PAs in Australia are institutionalised, very little is known about their impacts (Parker and 
Jacobs, 2015; Hatherly and Parker, 1988; Barrett, 2010, 2012). However, since Australian 
AGOs have been conducting PAs for almost four decades, there is the opportunity to better 
understand and assess the impacts of PAs. Thus, it is timely that the public sector PA practice 
and its impacts receive further research attention. 
The volume of PA reports published in Victoria increased since 2000. In fact, compared to 
other Australian state level AGOs, the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office (VAGO) stands out 
as a major driver in PA work as it produced a significant majority of PA reports within the 
financial years relevant for this study, i.e. 2009/2010 to 2015/2016.7 Hence, this thesis 
concentrates on the well-established PA practice in Victoria, “for which it has received external 
commendation and recognition from its peers in Australia and overseas jurisdictions” (PAEC, 
2010a, p. 23). 
1.2 Problem statement and significance of this research 
Impact is the leitmotif of the International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAI), 
according to which the main objective of PAs is to constructively improve public sector 
organisations’ performance in terms of the so-called three Es, i.e. economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness (INTOSAI, 2004, 2012). Although having positive impact on public sector 
organisations’ performance is the common rationale of SAIs’ PA activities (Desmedt et al., 
2017; Kells, 2011b), various accounting scholars claim that PAs are often not as systematically 
valuable as has been anticipated by regulatory authorities (Power, 1997; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 
2015; Torres et al., 2016). As a matter of fact, Morin (2001, p. 116) comes to the conclusion 
that citizens and taxpayers could have reason to suspect that PAs sometimes serve strictly no 
purpose “except to lull them with illusions that things will improve and to swallow up more 
public funds”. The basic argument mounted by critics is that PAs are empty ritualistic forms 
 
5 Countries with a well-established PA function: Australia (Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Parker and Jacobs, 2015), 
Canada (Gendron et al., 2007), UK (Sharma, 2007), Scotland (Lapsley and Pong, 2000), US (Johnston, 1988), 
Israel (Milgrom and Schwartz, 2008), Estonia (Raudla et al., 2015), Netherlands (Weets, 2011), Denmark 
(Skærbæk and Thorbjørnsen, 2007), Sweden (Grönlund et al., 2011) and Norway (Reichborn-Kjennerud and 
Johnsen, 2018). 
6 The AGO of South Australia (SA) has to date not produced stand-alone PA reports (Parker and Jacobs, 2015; 
see Appendix 1). 
7 Appendix 1 provides a comparative overview of the PA report production across Australian AGOs. 
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of auditing (Power, 2003a), and hollow rituals of comfort (Power, 1997) that do not deliver 
added value for society (Bowerman et al., 2000; Braithwaite, 2008; Kells, 2011a). For Power 
(1996, 1997, 2000) PAs are just part of an explosion of audit activity that emerged from 
increased demands for transparency and accountability in the public sector, bearing the 
potential for stifling organisational innovation instead of fostering it. Lonsdale (1999, p. 172) 
adds that the capability of AGOs to generate positive impacts on public sector performance 
through PAs is “‘far less straightforward’ than a simple linear model of auditing might imply”.  
Against such contentions, there is a growing counter-claim that “performance auditing appears 
not to be a waste of time and has value” (Van Loocke and Put, 2011, p. 201). Barrett (2010), 
for instance, argues that PAs contribute to public sector performance by initiating 
improvements in audited organisations’ economic performance and their efficiency and 
effectiveness in providing public programs and services. However, in the accounting literature 
the scope and nature of PA impacts is poorly understood and often said to be difficult to define 
(Kells and Hodge, 2009; Morin, 2008). In fact, PA impact studies do not provide a 
homogeneous definition of impact. For this reason, scholars offer various broad classifications 
of impacts. Some authors base their impact definition on time dimensions, claiming that 
impacts can emerge immediately, during the PA (Kirkhart, 2000), but also take place shortly 
after the conclusion of the PA, or considerably later (Turtiainen, 2012; Desmedt et al., 2017). 
Further, impacts can emerge slowly and subtly (Morin, 2008) or quickly and more explicitly 
(Morin, 2014; Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen, 2018). Others argue that impacts may take 
direct or indirect forms, affecting only audited organisation, or also other organisations 
involved in the audited organisation’s activities (Van der Loocke and Put, 2011). In terms of 
the dimensions of PA impacts, it has been noted that sometimes PAs may have hardly any 
effect, whereas at other times they may result in palace revolutions, leading to step changes 
and reforms in the public sector (Morin, 2004; Milgrom and Schwartz, 2008). Moreover, 
impacts can be desired or undesired, may have intended and unintended consequences, and be 
perceived as more or less useful by stakeholders, which in turn, may potentially influence the 
contribution of PAs to the improvement of public sector performance.8 While the central debate 
in the literature has focused more on the timeliness and dimension of impacts, what relevant 
stakeholders consider as PA impact has only vaguely been explored and remains a contested 
issue (Trembley and Malsch, 2015; Desmedt et al., 2017; Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo, 
2017; Van Loocke and Put, 2011).  
Public sector programs and services continue to grow in magnitude and complexity, while 
citizens and taxpayers demand higher-quality services and more transparent, reliable 
information on how their money is spent (Dittenhofer, 2001). Therefore, improving the 
performance of the public sector and strengthening the accountability is an important issue 
(Nutley et al., 2012). As PAs may contribute to better services and programs, and more 
accountable and responsive governance of public resources, an increasing number of 
governments worldwide, including Australia, invest in the expansion of PA activities and the 
improvement of PA methodologies (Van Loocke and Put, 2011; Waring and Morgan, 2007; 
Parker and Jacobs, 2015). This development in conjunction with the unclear definition of PA 
impact gives rise to the question of the nature of PA impacts and highlights the strong need for 
in-depth empirical research on those impacts (Bowerman et al., 2000). This is further 
emphasised by Kells (2011b, p. 87) who contends that without the better understanding of the 
 
8 For an extensive overview of PA impacts as defined by previous academic research studies, see chapter 3. 
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nature of PAs and its impacts, “there is a risk that people will over or under-appreciate its 
usefulness as a mechanism of public sector scrutiny”.  
How auditees, Members of Parliament (MPs), performance auditors, and journalists perceive 
their accountability relationships in the PA context and what they consider as impacts, has not 
been subject of extensive research in previous PA literature. The significance of examining the 
views of multiple stakeholders is emphasised by the INTOSAI (2004, p. 19): 
“[I]n order to assess the impact […], it is in general always necessary to collect 
information not only on the audited institutions and their activities and interactions, 
but also on other stakeholders […]. This is of course of special interest when […] 
actions of other stakeholders may influence the impact.”  
As relevant stakeholder groups may actively partake in how other stakeholders view their 
accountability relationships and PA impacts (Justesen and Skærbæk, 2010), examining 
multiple relevant stakeholder groups’ perceptions and interpretations is necessary. This claim 
has further been highlighted by Desmedt et al. (2017) and Kells (2011a and b) who claim that 
it is essential to extend the unidimensional view applied by previous research studies, which 
have either examined the subjective perceptions of individual stakeholder groups, or focused 
on the relationship between performance auditors and auditees. This current research study 
adds a multiple-perspectives approach to the issue of PA impacts by examining how auditees, 
MPs, performance auditors, and journalists as relevant key stakeholder groups interpret impact 
and perceive their accountability relationships.  
1.3 Research objective and research questions 
This thesis aims to develop a conceptual map that explicates the nature and scope of PA impacts 
and their conditioning context based on key stakeholder groups’ accountability relationships. 
For this purpose, this thesis intends to provide insights into what key stakeholder groups, i.e. 
auditees, performance auditors, MPs, and journalists understand as impact. More specifically, 
this thesis provides (1) an empirical examination of the way in which key stakeholder groups’ 
accountability relationships influence their perceptions of PAs and (2) a multi-perspective view 
of PA impacts capturing key stakeholders’ interpretations. The conceptual map takes the form 
of a system structure that visualises impacts and impact-facilitating factors identified by key 
stakeholders and demonstrates how those are interlinked (Jabareen, 2009). The map 
summarises stakeholders’ perceptions and interpretations of impacts and provides a 
comprehensive understanding of the research phenomenon.  
By capturing multiple stakeholder groups’ perceptions and interpretations, this study 
challenges the views adopted by previous PA studies that focus either on individual stakeholder 
groups’ perceptions or on the dyadic relationship between performance auditors and auditees. 
Through the conceptual map, key stakeholders relevant for this study will be afforded an 
opportunity to gain a comprehensive mutual understanding of what the other groups interpret 
as impact. Thereby, stakeholder groups’ awareness of the needs and interests of other groups 
are increased. In examining the perceptions and interpretations of key stakeholders, this 
research study addresses three inter-related Research Questions (RQs): 
RQ1:  How do accountability relationships between key stakeholders influence their 
perceptions of performance audits? 
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An increasing number of accounting academics have argued that accountability relationships9 
between stakeholders may enhance or undermine the prospective impacts of PAs (Parker and 
Jacobs, 2015; Tillema and ter Bogt, 2010; Lonsdale, 2000). Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, 
few studies have examined PA impacts through an accountability lens. The necessity to provide 
more empirical evidence relating to accountability relationships and their effects in the PA 
context is emphasised by Bowerman (1996) who urges scholars to rediscover the accountability 
roots of PAs. As PAs form a part of a state’s “accountability apparatus” (Keen, 1999, p. 510), 
an examination of impacts through an accountability lens is arguably crucial. Bowerman’s 
(1996) argument is further underlined by Lonsdale (2008) who contends that different 
relationships may have varying influence as the status of some stakeholders may carry 
considerable weight. Given the complexity of accountability relationships between auditees, 
performance auditors, MPs and journalists (Mulgan, 1997, 2001; Sinclair, 1995; Luke, 2010), 
RQ1 is expected to disclose dominant accountability relationships. Building on the findings of 
RQ1, RQ2 elaborates on key stakeholders’ interpretations of PA impacts.  
RQ2: What do relevant stakeholder groups involved in performance auditing interpret 
as impact? 
Depending on what auditees as target of PAs interpret as impact and whether they consider 
PAs as useful, auditees may respond to PA outcomes accordingly (Power, 2000; Morin, 2001). 
This, in turn, may affect the perspectives and actions of the other key stakeholder groups. 
Hence, it is essential to investigate what the impacts of PAs are from auditees’ perspective. 
The roles of the other key stakeholders have gained more significance as previous studies found 
that their engagement and interaction are likely to affect PA impacts through accountability 
mechanisms (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen, 2018; Bovens, 2007; Parker and Jacobs, 
2015). MPs play important roles not only in terms of the accountability setting but also because 
they are authorised to undertake follow-up inquiries and summon auditees to appear at public 
hearings (Morin, 2008). Given the legitimacy-conferring status and statutory nature of the 
Parliament of Victoria, how MPs interpret impacts may significantly influence the 
accountability mechanism, auditees’ implementation of recommendations, and ultimately, 
PAs’ contribution to the performance improvement of the Victorian public sector. 
The media as an information provider and issue raiser is a conduit for reaching citizens and 
taxpayers. In the PA setting, Parker and Jacobs (2015) view the media as catalyst for attracting 
parliament’s attention to particular public sector issues. Following Alon (2007) and Blume and 
Voigt (2007), the media may not only be able to channel stakeholders’ interests but may also 
have the power to influence PA results. Nebenzahl (1975, pp. 22-3) calls the media “a desired, 
almost vital, supplement to the effectiveness of the audit”. Scholars’ observations of the media 
in the PA setting give reason to analyse what journalists understand as impact and how their 
media coverage of PA-related issues influences other key stakeholders.  
Although a stakeholder of PA activities in terms of the conduct of the audits, VAGO is not 
itself affected by the outcomes of its audits (Power, 2003b; Mulgan, 1997, 2000; Gendron et 
al., 2001). Nevertheless, performance auditors’ perspectives are important as they allow the 
researcher to contextualise the interpretations and perceptions held by other stakeholder groups 
in the PA setting in Victoria. The final RQ is concerned with key stakeholders’ perceived 
usefulness of PAs in terms of changes that resulted from PAs. Thereby, the view of the 
 
9 See sections 4.3-4.3.3.3 for a detailed explanation of accountability relationships and the different dimensions 
of those. 
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INTOSAI (2004, p. 57), that “[t]he proposed outcome [of performance audits] should be judged 
in terms of ‘usefulness’” is adopted.  
RQ3: To what extent have performance audits been perceived as useful by key 
stakeholders in terms of changes made to audited organisations? 
According to Hellman (2006) audits are useful when audit findings are perceived to present a 
strong argument for change within the organisation. Often described as the initiator or vehicle 
of organisational change (Power, 1999), PAs are supposed to bring useful changes to audited 
organisations that lead to performance improvements with regards to the three Es (Raudla et 
al., 2015). This, however, as argued in previous studies, is not necessarily the case (Van Loocke 
and Put, 2011). This thesis refers to audit usefulness as the value that key stakeholder groups 
attribute to induced changes in terms of improvements with due regard to the three Es (Wade, 
2008; Morin, 2004). Previous impact studies provide empirical evidence that auditees’ 
perceptions of the usefulness of suggested changes may be an indicator of the likely effective 
implementation of those changes (Raudla et al., 2015; Torres et al., 2016; Morin, 2014). 
Perceptions of the usefulness of recommended changes held by stakeholders other than 
auditees have, however, not yet been investigated, although findings from previous studies 
emphasise the importance of the media and parliament and the effects they have in terms of 
PA impacts (Reichborn-Kjennerud 2013b; Morin 2001, 2004). To understand the perceived 
usefulness of organisational changes, a serious effort is required to uncover and explore the 
ideas, beliefs, and values of relevant members of the PA network (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1993).  
1.4 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework applied to this research study consists of a macro theory, New 
Institutional Sociology (NIS), informed by different dimensions of accountability 
relationships. NIS as the core theory employed, shapes the boundaries of this thesis and 
enhances the key elements essential for this study. This study argues that PA work in Victoria, 
including its constituting regulatory framework and network of stakeholders is highly 
institutionalised10 and is therefore applicable for investigation through the lens of NIS (Fogarty, 
1996; Ritti and Silver, 1986). As the main focus of NIS is the organisational field level, where 
institutional actors interact (Scott, 2014; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2008; Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996), NIS allows for an extensive examination of key stakeholders’ accountability 
relationships (Dillard et al., 2004; Ryan et al., 2002). Embedding dimensions of accountability 
relationships within NIS helps the author to better understand the external factors that shape 
the formation of accountability relationships and how those accountability relationships 
influence key stakeholders’ perceptions of PA impacts. Accountability relationships are 
classified under the dimensions of political (Bovens, 2007), public (Mulgan, 1997) and 
managerial (Sinclair, 1995) accountabilities.  
1.5 Research design 
The primary objective of this research study is to gain comprehensive insights into key 
stakeholders’ perceptions and interpretations by exploring how and why they come to be held 
and by gaining understanding of the complexities of the conditioning institutional context that 
 
10 Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 341) define institutionalisation as the process through which “social processes, 
obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action”. 
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influences their formulation (Parker, 2008, 2012; O’Dwyer et al., 2005). Exploring the 
dimensions of accountability relationships and the nature and scope of PA impacts, this 
research adopts a three-phased sequential mixed-methods research design that is characterised 
by the dominance of qualitative methods (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009):  
1) in-depth analysis of publicly available documents, reports, and media articles 
(QUAL1); 
2) online survey questionnaire to auditees (quan); and 
3) in-depth semi-structured interviews with auditees, MPs and journalists (QUAL2). 
Each data collection phase focuses on stakeholder groups’ perceptions of accountability 
relationships and interpretations of PA impacts. 
1.6 Scope and limitations 
This research study limits its focus to the perceptions and interpretations of auditees, 
performance auditors, MPs and journalists, who experienced or were involved in PAs 
conducted by VAGO within the financial years of 2009/2010 – 2015/2016. Therefore, for 
QUAL1, the researcher only considers documents and reports related to PAs undertaken during 
the relevant time period. Further, survey and interview participants were selected based on the 
criterion to have been involved in PAs conducted within the relevant period under study. PAs 
undertaken after 2015/16 have not been included due to their recency and, hence, as yet limited 
likely impact. Given the generally high turnover of public sector officers in the Victorian public 
sector, expanding the study period further back in time would have made the identification of 
relevant and informed representatives of every key stakeholder group exceedingly difficult. 
Given the seven-year period of PA reports that the thesis covers, extensive effort was required 
to trace relevant officials, and even then, there was an associated limitation of employee 
turnover and the loss of organisational memory.  
1.7 Structure of the research study 
This research study is organised into ten chapters. Chapter one outlined the purpose of the 
research, the explicit statement of the problem addressed, and the significance of the study. 
Further, the research objective was presented as well as relevant RQs. The following chapter, 
chapter two, provides an overview of the setting for the research study, including the policy 
environment, the roles of relevant key stakeholders and their relationships. Additionally, the 
intended objectives of PAs are explained, and the audit process is outlined. Thereafter, chapter 
three reviews and critically evaluates previous literature on PA impacts and locates this study’s 
position in the literature. Building on these insights, this chapter also identifies areas for further 
inquiry into PA impacts, which this study seeks to explore. In the fourth chapter, the 
underpinning theoretical framework is outlined and relevant theoretical NIS concepts as well 
as accountability dimensions and relationships are presented. Following the overview of the 
theoretical lens through which the research topic is examined, chapter five summarises the 
research design and methods employed. The relevance and contribution of all three phases of 
the mixed-method approach are depicted. It is further explained how qualitative and 
quantitative data will be analysed. While chapter six presents findings from this study that 
address RQ1, which is concerned with stakeholders’ accountability relationships, chapter 
seven and chapter eight are dedicated to the presentation of results related to RQ2. More 
precisely, chapter seven outlines what key stakeholders define as impacts emerging from the 
formal PA process, while chapter eight focuses on impacts resulting from the interaction 
between relevant key stakeholder groups. Addressing RQ3, chapter nine reflects on key 
stakeholders’ perceived usefulness of organisational changes made to audited organisations. 
Chapter ten culminates in the illustration of the conceptual map. Moreover, conclusions drawn 
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in chapters six, seven, eight and nine are conclusively linked to existent perspectives and 
assumptions offered by academics of previous PA studies. Also presented in chapter ten are 
the contributions this study makes to the different literatures. Chapter ten completes by 
providing practical and theoretical implications, indicating limitations of this research study 
and proposing related issues for future research. 
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2 Insights into performance auditing in Australia  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the background to PA practice in Victoria. First, insights into PA 
activities in the NPM era are provided. Then, PA work is differentiated from other forms of 
auditing and PA objectives are introduced. After elaborating on PA activities in the context of 
the Westminster system, the PA process in Victoria is outlined. Finally, key stakeholders are 
identified and introduced and VAGO’s PA process is described. 
2.2 The role of performance auditing in New Public Management  
NPM, the public sector reform of the past decades, represents a paradigmatic shift from the 
traditional bureaucratic model of public administration towards a performance-focused 
managerialist approach (Hood, 1991; O’Flynn, 2007; Halachmi, 2002b and c; Barzelay, 2002). 
In the accounting literature, it is claimed that NPM is neither a well-defined term, nor a 
coherent set of ideas. In fact, NPM is said to have a hybrid character and generally serves as 
an umbrella term for a collection of implemented reforms in the public sector (Van de Walle 
and Hammerschmid, 2011; Wegrich, 2009). This is also reflected in the language used by 
international accounting scholars to describe NPM, for instance, as businesslike mechanisms, 
market-based public administration, managerialism, and entrepreneurial government (Hughes, 
1992; Ter Bogt et al., 2010; Barzelay, 2002). 
NPM places a new emphasis on more efficient and effective management and delivery of 
public sector programs and services leading to the gradual replacement of the rules-based and 
process-driven routines. Overall, NPM introduced more results-based accountability, with a 
focus on identifying desired outcomes, setting performance objectives, and measuring the 
extent of accomplishment of those objectives (Gerald, 2015). The key doctrinal components of 
NPM as argued by Leeuw (1996) are economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public sector 
organisations. Highlighting the changing accountability relationships following the adoption 
of the NPM model, Parker and Gould (1999, p. 110) add that in this ‘new world’,  
“public sector management has been transformed from being administrators and 
custodians of resources to being accountable managers empowered with greater 
delegated authority.” 
Accounting literature on the origins of PA work clearly illustrates that PAs emerged as a 
consequence of NPM (Guthrie and Parker, 1999). Barzelay (1997), for instance, considers the 
adoption of PA activities by AGOs as an action rationalised by NPM, while Cooper et al. 
(2012) agree that the greater emphasis on public sector performance has been the stimulus for 
PA activities. With regards to their PA mandate, Mulgan (2001, p. 28) considers AGOs as 
“enthusiastic advocates” and “allies” of the NPM system, that offer assistance to reorient the 
public sector towards a result-oriented concern focused on economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness, and away from a concentration purely on procedures and processes. Given the 
shared concern with economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public resources (Parker and 
Jacobs, 2015; Jacobs, 1998; Guthrie, 1987) and the government’s new accountability for 
outputs and outcomes (Waring and Morgan, 2007; Funnell, 2003), Leeuw’s (1996) claim that 
“NPM has goals that converge with the goals of PA” attests the link between NPM and PA 
activities. The strong link between PAs and NPM has been referred to by English and Skærbæk 
(2007, p. 239) as “mutual co-dependency”.  
Countries such as Australia, New Zealand and the UK – described by Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2011, p. 117) as the “core NPM group” – as well as many other nations, implemented NPM 
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in the late 1980s/early 1990s and onwards (English et al., 2005; Newberry and Pallot, 2005; 
O’Flynn, 2007). With the institutionalisation of PA work in Australia as part of the NPM model 
(Brignall and Modell, 2000; Clark and de Martinis, 2003), the number of PAs has increased 
over the past decades (Parker and Jacobs, 2015; Hoque and Thiagarajah, 2015). 
2.3 Public sector performance auditing: definitions and explanations 
The notion of PA defies a universally acceptable definition (Bawole and Ibrahim, 2016; 
Thomas, 2006). In general, PAs have been described as systematic, objective assessments of 
the accomplishment of a single or clearly identifiable group of activities, systems, programs or 
organisations for the purpose of determining and improving its effectiveness, economy, or 
efficiency (Parker and Jacobs, 2015; Pollitt et al., 1999; INTOSAI, 2004). At a practical level, 
PAs are of great significance for citizens, taxpayers, politicians and the media, allowing them 
to gain insights into the performance and outcomes of public sector operations (INTOSAI, 
2004), whereas, at a more abstract level, PAs are important for the health and vitality of 
democratic governance (Pollitt et al., 1999). PA work does not have its roots in private sector 
forms of auditing but is, in fact, “a distinct public sector function, with AGs the leading 
proponents of the discipline” (PAEC, 2010a, p. 23).  
While financial audits assess the accuracy and fairness of both the accounting procedures and 
the financial statements reported by the audited organisations, PAs are neither checklist-based 
nor limited to the examination of accurately reported financial transactions (Percy, 2001: 
INTOSAI, 2004). Instead, PAs are independent examinations carried out on a non-recurring 
basis to control selected issues at a given point in time (INTOSAI, 2004). Accordingly, 
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984, p. 165), characterise PAs as a “fire alarm” rather than a 
“police patrol”. In contrast to financial audits, PAs intend to solve complex and varied 
questions and go beyond neutral monitoring, with their results summarised in publicly 
available PA reports that contain recommendations for improvements (Funkhouser, 2011).  
Several PA studies have revealed that PAs are not unitary processes but rather heterogeneous 
(Pollitt, 2003), mutable (English and Guthrie, 1991), social (Jacobs, 1998), and constantly 
evolving (Power, 1997) mechanisms. Guthrie and Parker (1999) in their study on ANAO PAs 
argue that PAs are malleable social constructs, which are largely formed by their contextual 
surroundings such as the political, economic and social climate that play a significant role in 
shaping the dynamics of PAs. PA work as social construct changes over time as it is influenced 
by the perspectives and interactions of a range of stakeholders as part of a dramatic play 
combining actors and their social settings (Guthrie and Parker, 1999). 
Even though INTOSAI (2004) clearly states what PAs should entail, there is no standardised 
approach. Thus, the practical application varies from country to country and can even have 
different purposes and take diverse forms within countries (Öhman, 2015; Pollitt, 2003; 
Grönlund et al., 2011). Nichol (2007) exemplifies that in Australia one state audit law requires 
performance auditors to assess the efficiency and economy of public sector organisations’ use 
of resources, but excludes the assessment of the effectiveness, while under another state audit 
law, the focus is on all three aspects, i.e. economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Contending 
that SAIs have developed and shaped their PA practice in accordance with the needs of their 
specific environments, Jacobs (1998) and Lonsdale (2011) indicate that the nature of AGOs’ 
PA practice depends upon the legislative and institutional setting. However, it has also been 
found by Guthrie and Parker (1999) and English (2007) that despite PA legislation remaining 
unchanged over time, different sequential AGs interpreted the same piece of legislation 
differently and redefined the scope of PA practice. Although PA practice in various countries 
show similarities, it became clear that different approaches are used (Parker and Jacobs, 2015).  
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2.3.1 Objectives of performance auditing 
PA literature ascribes two main objectives to PA practice: primarily, PAs have a performance-
improvement purpose (Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Barzelay, 1996; Pollitt and Summa, 1997; 
Hossain, 2010). Accordingly, it is the objective of PAs to examine whether public sector 
organisations, their programs or services have been operated with due regard to the three Es 
and based on this evaluation, to encourage continuous improvement of public administration 
(Nutley et al., 2012; Lonsdale, 2000; Parker et al., 2018). 
Secondly, as a component of the state’s accountability apparatus (Keen, 1999), PAs seek to 
scrutinise public sector spending and to provide parliament and the public with assurance of 
the responsible and accountable management of public resources (Hossain, 2010; Waring and 
Morgan, 2007). These PA objectives are widely acknowledged and supported by the literature 
(Kells, 2011a; Johnsen et al., 2001; Bawole and Ibrahim, 2016). The following sections 
describe the elements of efficiency, effectiveness and economy in more detail and outline PAs’ 
accountability purpose. 
2.3.1.1 Economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
The concept of economy is predominantly concerned with inputs (Cooper et al., 2012). Inputs 
can be financial resources and physical resources like human resources (Waring and Morgan, 
2007; Lonsdale, 2011). Following Barzelay (1996) and Gray (1993), the concept of economy 
is about the elimination of waste and the minimisation of costs for resources utilised in the 
provision of services and programs. Thus, PAs of economy assess whether available resources 
have been used optimally, whether chosen inputs represent the most economical use of public 
funds, and if the quality and the quantity of inputs are suitably co-ordinated (INTOSAI, 2004; 
Gerald, 2015; English et al., 2010).  
The concepts of economy and efficiency are closely related. Following Barzelay (1996, p. 20) 
efficiency means “achieving an optimal process for transforming inputs into outputs”. 
Therefore, the central issue of the concept of efficiency concerns the relationship between 
resources deployed and the results of using those inputs (Cooper et al., 2012; Dittenhofer, 
2001). Efficiency is a measure of the success with which inputs have been utilised to produce 
the outputs essential to fulfil public sector objectives to achieve desirable outcomes (Cooper et 
al., 2012). The main question is whether inputs have been ideally used or whether similar or 
the same results in terms of quality of public services could have been achieved using fewer 
human, financial or other resources (Lonsdale, 2011; Gerald, 2015). English et al. (2010, p. 65) 
refer to efficiency simply as “spending well” while for INTOSAI (2004, p. 20) efficiency is 
“about getting the most or best output from available resources”. 
Effectiveness is considered as a goal-attainment concept concerned with the relationship 
between the intended and actual results of public spending (English et al., 2010; INTOSAI, 
2004). Cooper et al. (2012) distinguish between administrative effectiveness which depends 
upon processes that help public sector organisations to achieve their tasks, and program 
effectiveness, which assesses whether public programs successfully achieve stipulated aims or 
objectives. Performance auditors may assess the level of effectiveness of public services by 
comparing the outcomes with the goals set down in the objectives (Halachmi, 2002c; Lonsdale, 
2011). Various authors such as Pollitt et al. (1999), Barzelay (1996) and Grönlund et al. (2011) 
argue that the three concepts are interconnected, as illustrated by Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: The Three Es 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Pollitt et al. (1999); Grönlund et al. (2011); Barzelay (1996) 
Yamamoto and Watanabe (1989) for instance contend that efficiency includes economy as the 
concept of economy is concerned with the ratio of inputs to outputs. Further, claims were 
brought forward by Kells and Hodge (2009) that efficiency embraces effectiveness because 
efficiency includes the notion that the right mixture of outputs is produced. Given the dissent 
in the accounting literature on the definitions of the three terms, English et al. (2010, p. 66), 
contend that “what spending less, spending well and spending wisely means has to be defined 
in the context of a particular PA”. While a PA may not necessarily seek to reach conclusions 
on all three Es, the INTOSAI (2004, p. 19) argues that “it may be of limited benefit to examine 
aspects of economy or efficiency of activities in isolation without also considering, at least 
briefly, their effectiveness”.  
In studies of contemporary PA practice in Australia, Parker and Jacobs (2015) and Parker et 
al. (2018) discovered that PAs conducted between 2001 and 2012 have not always focussed on 
all three Es. Whereas AGOs in NSW, VIC, QLD, NT and TAS extensively refer to economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness in PA reports, AGOs in ACT and WA as well as the ANAO 
frequently reach conclusions on efficiency and effectiveness while employing the term 
economy to a much lesser extent. Acknowledging that all three Es have been observable to 
various degrees, Parker and Jacobs (2015, p. 6) discovered that in Australia the concept of 
economy has gradually received less emphasis, in contrast to efficiency and effectiveness that 
have become the prime foci for PAs. Recognising what Guthrie (1989, p. 56) refers to as the 
“varied usage of ‘performance auditing’ in practice”, the authors conclude that across 
Australian jurisdictions, PAs are subject to different concepts that they can encompass. The 
fact that the concepts of economy, efficiency and effectiveness anchored in the NPM are not 
always translated into PA activities in practice, emphasises Skærbæk’s (2009) call for more 
research on PA practice. Nevertheless, PAs encompass more than the assessment of the three 
Es (Glynn, 1985; Kells and Hodge, 2009). Following Lonsdale’s (2000) argument, PAs also 
intend to enhance accountability for performance.  
2.3.1.2 Accountability 
PAs are considered as a vehicle for improving accountability in the public sector as they 
scrutinise and evaluate how well those responsible have achieved predefined goals and met 
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other requirements that they are fully accountable for (INTOSAI, 2004; Lonsdale et al., 2011; 
Irawan, 2015; Barzelay, 1997). Furubu (2011) and Lonsdale and Bemelmans-Videc (2007) 
regard accountability as the main purpose of PA, with other outcomes, such as performance 
improvement, as positive side-effects. Mulgan (2001) and Guthrie (1989) suggest that holding 
individuals or organisations accountable for attaining reasonable levels of economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness is an appropriate strategy for optimising public sector performance. Hughes 
(1998) contends that it is this sense of accountability that is emphasised by advocates of NPM. 
ISSAI 300, Fundamental Principles of Performance Auditing (INTOSAI, 2012, p. 3), 
emphasised more specifically that the PA objectives of enhancing accountability and 
improving performance are interrelated: 
“Performance auditing promotes accountability by assisting those with governance 
and oversight responsibilities to improve performance. It does this by examining 
whether decisions by […] the executive are efficiently and effectively prepared and 
implemented, and whether taxpayers or citizens have received value for money.”  
Nevertheless, several authors are inconclusive on whether PA in practice can ensure both 
enhanced accountability and performance improvement (Leeuw, 1996; Halachmi, 2002a; 
Bawole and Ibrahim, 2016). PAs may help the accountability mechanism in the public sector 
by providing answers to “Was it done right?”, “Who is answerable to whom?”, “What must be 
reported and who decides it?” and “Who is superior to whom?” (Halachmi, 2002a, pp. 371-2). 
Such a process may, however, be perceived by auditees as discouragement to innovate and 
implement change and may therefore become an obstacle to innovation (Halachmi, 2002a; 
Barrett, 2011). Similarly, Dubnick (2005) argues that the idea of enhanced accountability 
improving public sector performance has been accepted without careful examination: several 
accounting scholars speak of an accountability paradox (Funkhouser, 2011; Bouckaert and 
Peters, 2002; Halachmi, 2002b; Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1994), which implies that more 
accountability may, in fact, diminish or impede organisational performance:  
“[i]ncreasing efforts to improve performance through accountability tend to have 
the opposite effect. Rather than acting as a driver for desired levels of improved 
performance, accountability tends to be a ‘breaker’ by either slowing down or 
stopping improvements.” (Dubnick, 2005, p. 396) 
Following Mayne (2007) and Perrin et al. (2007), this paradox can only be overcome if the 
accountability process is embedded in a mature debate about what has worked and what has 
not worked in the past, and what will be done differently in the future. That, following Perrin 
et al. (2007), implies organisational learning.  
2.4 Performance auditing in its relevant institutional context 
AGOs operate in different institutional environments (see section 4.2.2). Depending on the 
respective institutional environment, differences have emerged in views of the concept of PAs 
in theory and practice (Funnell, 2003). Situating PAs in the relevant institutional context is of 
great importance as regulations, laws and other frameworks anchored in the institutional 
environment shape AGOs PA mandate, which may affect potential impacts of PAs as well as 
accountability relationships between stakeholders (Parker et al., 2018; Parker and Jacobs, 2015; 
Torres et al., 2016).  
Australia, Canada, UK and New Zealand – referred to by Aucoin (2012) as the major 
Westminster systems – operate under the Westminster model of government named after the 
Palace of Westminster in London (PAEC, 2010a; VPSC, 2019). The Westminster system is 
characterised by three arms of government, the legislature (or parliament), the executive (the 
elected government as a group of Cabinet ministers) and the judiciary, which is independent 
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from parliament (PAEC, 2010a; VPSC, 2019).11 Reflecting Australia’s early historical 
development as a former British colony, all parliaments in Australia follow the Westminster 
system (Parliament of Australia, 2016; Parliament of Victoria, 2012). Under the Westminster 
model all authority for government activity ultimately stems from parliament (PAEC, 2010a; 
Cooper et al., 2012). The Westminster model prescribes that public sector organisations are 
accountable to parliament for the powers conferred on them by parliament, their use of public 
resources and the outcomes achieved through the delivery of public services (VPSC, 2019; 
VAGO, 2017c). It is an enduring and fundamental principle of the Westminster system that 
through parliament, public sector organisations are ultimately answerable and accountable to 
the public for governing in the best interests of all citizens and taxpayers (Funnell, 2003; Parker 
and Gould, 1999; Hughes, 1992). Given this multilevel system of political accountability (see 
section 4.3.3.1), which Parker and Gould (1999) refer to as chain of accountability, the 
Westminster system is often described as a ‘learning organisation’, which is built on a 
“retrospective cycle of discussion, evaluation, argument and blame” (Sutherland, 1996, p. 2).  
The Westminster system authorises parliament to scrutinise the performance of the 
government, for instance, in delivering programs and services, through various mechanisms 
(Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000; Stone, 1995; Day and Klein, 1987). For instance, parliament 
can seek independent assistance from AGOs.12 The Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) 
in Victoria describes the role and scope of responsibilities of the AG in the Westminster model 
in the following terms (DTF cited in PAEC, 2010a, p. 21): 
“The position of Auditor-General [AG] within this model is considered a crucial 
link in the process of accountability to the taxpayer on the utilisation of public 
funding. The principal role of the Auditor-General is to provide assurance to 
Parliament on accountability and performance of the Executive Government.” 
In 1990, the Victorian AG and his office received discretionary authority from parliament to 
conduct PAs (PAEC, 2010a; VAGO, 2010b). VAGO’s mandate is established by the Audit Act 
1994 (Vic), which constitutes the legislative framework for its operating powers as 
parliament’s auditor and identifies its responsibilities (VAGO, 2016a). Section 15(1) of the 
Audit Act 1994 empowers VAGO to regularly conduct PAs: 
“The Auditor-General may conduct any audit he or she considers necessary to 
determine – (a) whether an authority is achieving its objectives effectively and 
doing so economically and efficiently and in compliance with all relevant Acts; or 
(b) whether the operations or activities of the whole or any part of the Victorian 
public sector (whether or not those operations or activities are being performed by 
an authority or authorities) are being performed effectively, economically and 
efficiently in compliance with all relevant Acts.” 
Constrained only by the statutory requirement in the Audit Act 1994 not to question the merits 
of government policy, VAGO can conduct PAs on an unlimited range of topics addressing, for 
instance, social, environmental, health, infrastructure, safety and community issues (PAEC, 
2010a). The Audit Act 1994 also addresses VAGO’s relationship with the PAEC and outlines 
 
11 For a comprehensive overview of the Westminster system, see Parliament of Australia (2016). 
12 Other integrity and accountability bodies assisting parliament in its oversight role include the Ombudsman and 
Anti-Corruption Commission.  
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VAGO’s accountability to parliament (PAEC, 2010a). The relationships between relevant 
stakeholder groups are outlined in more detail in following sections. 
2.4.1 Key stakeholder groups and their relationships 
Referring to the PA function as a social construct, scholars conclude that multiple stakeholders 
play important roles in PAs (Parker and Jacobs, 2015; INTOSAI, 2004; Funnell et al., 2016). 
Applying the broad definition of stakeholder introduced by Freeman (1984) and Freeman and 
Reed (1983) in this research study, key stakeholders are those with a legitimate interest in the 
institution of performance auditing (Mitchell et al., 1997; see section 4.2.1). It is argued that 
auditees as the target of PAs (Morin, 2001), performance auditors as the initiators of PAs 
(Gendron et al., 2001; Desmedt et al., 2017), MPs as the recipients of PA reports and 
representatives of the public (Mulgan, 1997), and the media as the mediator and distributor of 
PA findings and the conduit for the public opinion (Bringselius, 2014), all have legitimate 
claims on the institution of performance auditing. The focus of analysis is therefore on the 
larger PA network (Justesen and Skærbæk, 2010). The following sections review key 
stakeholders’ roles and relationships. 
2.4.1.1 Auditees 
Public sector organisations in Australia are responsible for a variety of public services and are 
partly funded through taxpayers’ money (Barrett, 2001; Funnell et al., 2016). Therefore, the 
monitoring of their performance and accountability is essential (Kells, 2011a). Auditees, as 
representatives of audited public sector organisations, are the subject of PAs and therefore 
closely involved in the PA process. They directly interact with performance auditors (Parker 
et al., 2018; Power, 2000; Morin, 2014; Funnell et al., 2016; Justesen and Skærbæk, 2010). In 
practice, the conduct of PAs requires auditees to provide information requested by auditors. In 
this regard, Power (2000) emphasises the need for further empirical evidence of auditees’ 
perception of PAs and their impacts. This becomes more significant as auditees often tend to 
strategically respond to PAs through creative compliance as outlined by Van Loocke and Put 
(2011, p. 200):  
“Auditees could create an illusory world made up of beautiful plans, smart [capitals 
in original] objectives, indicators, procedures, and so on, […] while behind this 
formal façade everything goes on as it did before. ‘Decoupling’, ‘window dressing’, 
‘dramaturgical performance’, ‘impression management’, ‘gaming’ are all terms 
used to describe aspects of this phenomenon.”  
Depending on how auditees view their accountability relationships to other key stakeholders, 
what they interpret as impacts and whether they consider implemented changes as useful, they 
may attempt to manipulate PA outcomes according to their own needs (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 
2013b; Power, 2000). A total of approximately 550 public sector organisations in Victoria 
including state government departments, local government councils, public bodies, 
independent budget sector agencies, public hospitals and ambulance services, universities and 
other educational bodies, water authorities and catchment management authorities are subject 
to VAGO PAs (VAGO, 2017a). 
2.4.1.2 Members of parliament 
A well-accepted role of parliaments is to hold public sector organisations accountable for their 
performance (Friedberg and Hazan, 2012; Hoque and Thiagarajah, 2015). In the Westminster 
system, a primary means by which parliaments execute their accountability function is through 
Public Accounts Committees (PACs) as part of the parliamentary infrastructure of democratic 
governments. Mulgan (1997, p. 34) describes PACs as “agents of accountability” who publicly 
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criticise government and their ministers. Activated by their genuine concern for the public 
interest, PACs hold an oversight role in monitoring and scrutinising public sector 
organisations’ use of public resources and provide a powerful forum for holding auditees 
accountable through committee investigations (Mulgan, 1997, 2000; Hoque and Thiagarajah, 
2015; Griffith, 2005). Ian McPhee (cited in Hoque, 2015, p. xxi) emphasises the importance of 
the role of MPs by concluding that  
“[I]ndependent parliamentary oversight plays an important role in preserving the 
trust of citizens in the integrity of government, through public accounts committees 
that are effective, independent and transparent.”  
The membership of PACs is drawn from representatives of the main political parties. Hence, 
when the PAC speaks with one voice, it sends a powerful message to the government, 
especially because committee members’ views represent a cross-party position. Under these 
conditions, the government is much more likely to respond positively to PAC’s inquiries and 
recommendations (Hoque, 2015). PACs commonly hold a formal relationship with AGs to 
reinforce the communication and co-operation between parliament and AGOs (Hoque, 2015). 
According to the United Nations (2013, p. 33) 
“Parliaments need SAIs in order to be able to do their job of holding government to 
account and equally, SAIs depend on support from parliaments to ensure that their 
findings and recommendations are followed up and lead to corrective action.” 
Lonsdale (2000) concludes that PA work is usually channelled through PACs. In the same vein, 
Malloy (2006) considers PACs an important adjunct to AGOs’ audit functions arguing that 
PACs are able to complement and enhance the role of performance auditors primarily by 
providing public forum for further exploration of issues. The PAC relevant for this study is the 
Public Accounts and Estimates Committee (PAEC), a joint investigatory committee of the 
Parliament of Victoria. The PAEC obtains its legal status from the Public Accounts and Audit 
Committee Act 1951 (PAEC, 2016). It has a number of statutory responsibilities in relation to 
VAGO. In the PA context, the PAEC is required to execute the following tasks (PAEC, 2014a): 
▪ recommending the appointment of the AG; 
▪ reviewing the AG’s draft annual plan and, if necessary, providing comments on the 
plan to the AG prior to its finalisation and tabling in parliament; 
▪ adopting a consultative role in determining the objectives and scope of PAs and 
identifying any other issues that need to be addressed; and 
▪ adopting a consultative role in determining PA priorities. 
Under section 14(1)(a)(i) of the Parliamentary Committees Act 2003, the PAEC is authorised 
to “inquire into, consider and report to parliament on any proposal, matter or thing concerned 
with public administration or public sector finances”. Further, section 33(3) outlines that the 
PAEC may “inquire into, consider and report to the Parliament on any annual report or other 
document relevant to the functions of the Committee”. These sections legislatively empower 
the PAEC to follow-up on matters of efficiency, effectiveness and economy raised by PA 
reports and to take further evidence on the progress achieved by auditees on VAGO’s 
recommendations (PAEC, 2011; VAGO, 2014b and 2016b). With regards to follow-up 
inquiries, the PAEC (2014a) is authorised to make further recommendations for improvement 
where considered necessary. Due to its legitimacy-conferring status and statutory nature the 
Victorian Parliament can summon auditees to appear before the PAEC for further public 
scrutiny (Jones and Jacobs, 2009; Bovens, 2005). 
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2.4.1.3 Performance auditors 
AGOs are commonly denoted as watchdogs that assist parliament to exercise their supervisory 
function and help to hold auditees accountable (English and Guthrie, 1991). The United 
Nations (2013) refers to AGOs as an essential building block of the national accountability 
architecture. VAGO considers both roles as significant: while it is its vision to be “a catalyst 
for continuous improvement in the accountability and performance of the public sector” 
(VAGO, 2016a, p. 2), the office also intends to provide independent assurance to Parliament 
and the public on public sector performance. It is VAGO’s responsibility to provide 
independent assessments on whether public sector organisations, their programs and services 
have been operated economically, efficiently and effectively and to report findings from PAs 
to parliament in form of PA reports as illustrated by Figure 2 (VAGO, 2016a).  
Under the auspices of the Australian Westminster model, it is to parliament that VAGO is 
accountable through the PAEC (VAGO, 2016a). Traditionally, under the Westminster 
convention, the relationship between VAGO and the PAEC has been one of complementarity 
(VAGO, 2010a). Performance auditors provide key support to the PAEC in its role of holding 
auditees accountable (VAGO, 2010a). The most fundamental aspect of performance auditors’ 
activities is their independence13 (Kells, 2011a). VAGO performance auditors act as 
independent officers of parliament. However, as outlined by McGee (2002, p. 21), 
“independence does not mean insulation from the suggestions and persuasions of others”. In 
fact, AGOs must be sensitive to political and public interest and concerns, and it is perfectly 
legitimate, indeed essential, that those interests and concerns should influence on how AG 
structure their PA plan. 
Performance auditors intend to add value to audited public sector organisations by 
recommending ways to achieve performance improvements (Percy, 2001; Flesher and 
Zarzeski, 2002; Gendron et al., 2001). However, as outlined earlier, they are not authorised to 
question the merits of government policy objectives. They are, in fact, constrained by their 
status as independent officers of parliament and lack of executive power (Lonsdale, 2000; 
Hepworth, 1995). Funkhouser (2011, p. 221) emphasises that “auditors have no authority over 
any other party other than access to records, which is frequently contested”. As “knights 
without swords” (Torgler, 2005, p. 735), performance auditors are powerless when it comes to 
convincing auditees to adopt recommended changes (Morin, 2014). Although not authorised 
to impose formal sanctions on auditees (Hepworth, 1995), performance auditors can exert 
power through parliament, which often uses PAs to publicly blame auditees in parliamentary 
hearings (Bovens, 2007; Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005).  
 
13 The INTOSAI outlined principles for independence of AGOs in its Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence.  
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Figure 2: Key stakeholder groups involved in performance auditing in Victoria 
 
  Parliament of Victoria 
(PAEC)  
Parliament authorises 
state government 
spending and programs 
VAGO audits public sector 
organisations as independent 
officer of Parliament  
VAGO reports PA 
results to Parliament  
State government and local 
government 
State government 
accounts for spending 
public money 
Media as the arena for the public debate  
Sources: Gerald (2015); Cooper et al. (2012); Barrett (2001) 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Office 
(VAGO) 
Reports on VAGO’s 
work 
Reports on public 
sector performance and 
other issues  
Reports on political 
issues  
Citizens and taxpayers of Victoria (the public) 
Informs the 
public 
 
33 
VAGO’s independence and discretion in the exercise of its PA function is enshrined within the 
Constitution Act 1975. Section 94(B) outlines that VAGO cannot be directed by anyone (see 
also VAGO, 2017b): 
“[T]he Auditor-General has complete discretion in the performance or exercise of 
his or her functions or powers and, in particular, is not subject to direction from 
anyone in relation to – (a) whether or not a particular audit is to be conducted; (b) 
the way in which a particular audit is to be conducted; (c) the priority to be given 
to any particular matter.” 
Each year, VAGO conducts around 30 PAs (see Appendix 1). Although a stakeholder in the 
PA network (see Figure 2) in terms of the conduct of the audit, VAGO is not itself affected by 
the results of its audits (Power, 2003b; Mulgan, 1997, 2000; Gendron et al., 2001). 
Nevertheless, VAGO performance auditors play an important role as they are the producers of 
PA reports, to which relevant key stakeholder groups (auditees, MPs and journalists) react 
(Gendron et al., 2007; Skærbæk, 2009). Performance auditors conducting PAs on behalf of 
VAGO are one of the relevant key stakeholder groups this study focuses on. In the following 
subsections, the researcher refers to this stakeholder group as performance auditors. By making 
auditees face public scrutiny, the media indirectly assists performance auditors and MPs to 
hold auditees to account (Mulgan, 2000; Bringselius, 2014).  
2.4.1.4 Media 
Journalists often consider themselves as key part of a democratic society (INTOSAI, 2010). In 
the PA context, Parker and Jacobs (2015) and Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014b) assign the media 
a central role as an information provider, arena for the public debate, and conduit for reaching 
citizens and taxpayers, i.e. the public (see Figure 2). The INTOSAI (2010) argues that because 
it is the media’s role to inform the public about how well or badly the public sector performs, 
journalists share values and links with performance auditors and are therefore a relevant 
stakeholder group of the PA function of VAGO. 
The media plays a relevant role in highlighting AGOs’ PA mandate (Gerald, 2015). Extensive 
press coverage of PA work has the capacity to reinforce PA findings, to ensure that citizens 
hear the key messages and to increase citizens’ awareness of deficiencies in the public sector 
(United Nations, 2007; Aucoin, 2012). As the arena for the public debate (Parker and Jacobs, 
2015; Gerald, 2015), the media has “the power to determine the kind of information that passes 
the filtering process and reaches the public” (Alon, 2007, p. 71). Parker and Jacobs (2015, p. 
16) also see the media as a catalyst for attracting MPs attention to issues identified and 
emphasised in PA reports. 
Due to its ‘informer’ and ‘issue raiser’ character and the relationship between politics, public 
sector and mass media (Lavi, 1999; Nebenzahl, 1975; Blume and Voigt, 2007), in this research 
study the media is considered a relevant key stakeholder group able to shape stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the performance of the public sector and the quality of its programs and services. 
Scholars’ observations of the media in the PA setting give reason to analyse what journalists 
understand as impacts. 
2.4.2 The performance audit process in Victoria 
PA impacts may emerge before, during and/or after the PA process (Van Loocke and Put, 
2011). Moreover, accountability between relevant stakeholder groups is often concretely 
executed throughout the PA process with different accountability relationships coming into 
effect at different stages (Power, 2000). That is why it is essential to briefly outline the VAGO 
PA process: starting with the planning of a PA, the process begins with the identification of 
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the audit topic as illustrated in Figure 3. Various potential PA topics are considered annually 
and topics are selected based on several criteria, namely, risk, materiality, potential to have 
impact, matters of the public interest, and concerns raised by MPs (VAGO, 2009, 2016d; Kells, 
2011b). Following the Audit Act 1994, VAGO is required to consult the PAEC on the selection 
of PA topics (VAGO, 2014a). Notwithstanding this requirement, the PAEC does not have the 
authority to direct VAGO performance auditors in relation to their PA program as this would 
impair VAGO performance auditors’ independence (Kells, 2011a; VAGO, 2010a, 2016b; 
PAEC, 2016).  
Proposed PA topics are published in VAGO’s annual plan tabled in parliament (VAGO, 
2016d). The annual plan sets out the PA work program. As part of the audit planning process, 
VAGO, according to section 15(2) of the Audit Act 1994 must prepare an audit specification in 
consultation with the PAEC and relevant public sector organisations before the conduct of the 
PA (Kells, 2011b). VAGO performance auditors are required to ask the PAEC and relevant 
public sector organisation(s) to provide feedback on the draft audit specification and to take 
this feedback into consideration before approving the final audit specification (Kells, 2011b; 
VAGO, 2014a). Before the commencement of PAs, VAGO usually provides briefings to 
organisations to communicate any preliminary findings (Kells, 2011b).  
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Figure 3: The phases of VAGO’s performance audit process 
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During the PA conduct phase evidence is gathered from auditees. Common types of evidence 
are evaluation reports, performance data, contracts, business cases and meeting minutes 
(VAGO, 2014a). Section 12 of the Audit Act 1994 gives VAGO the right to access all 
information in the possession, custody or control of public sector organisations. Auditees are 
progressively briefed on issues emerging during the PA (VAGO, 2014a). As it is helpful for 
auditees to be engaged in discussions about preliminary PA findings as early as possible, 
auditees are given the opportunity to express their opinion on preliminary findings before the 
final version of the PA report is issued. This approach assists the development of performance 
auditors’ recommendations, which are supposed to meaningfully address identified issues, be 
implementable and of value for audited organisations (VAGO, 2014a). 
Each PA results in a report providing a detailed discussion of the PA scope and objectives, the 
nature of operations of the audited organisation(s), the circumstances that prompted the PA, 
key findings, recommendations, and auditees’ responses and comments (Funnell et al., 2016). 
According to the Audit Act 1994 the AG is required to request from auditees responses to 
performance auditors’ recommendations. Auditees’ responses are then included in the final 
report to parliament. Following section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994, a proposed draft version 
of the report is sent to auditees who are then asked to confirm the accuracy of the draft and to 
correct factual errors if necessary (VAGO, 2014a). Auditees have ten business days to formally 
respond to PA findings and recommendations before their responses are printed in PA reports 
tabled in parliament (VAGO, 2014a). Shortly after reports are tabled, VAGO initiates briefings 
with MPs to inform them about PA findings, conclusions and recommendations.  
Auditees are expected to report on their progress against recommendations usually at least 12 
months after the tabling of the report. These progress reports include specifications of actions 
planned, actions taken thus far, the status of completion and/or due dates for completion 
(VAGO, 2014a). VAGO has the discretion to revisit audited organisations where considered 
warranted and to initiate follow-up audits (PAEC, 2014a). Follow-ups intend to assess and 
examine auditees’ implementation actions in response to certain or all past recommendations 
(VAGO, 2014a). As part of its accountability function the PAEC also selectively follows up 
on specific PA reports that are of significance for the public and would benefit from further 
scrutiny (PAEC, 2014a). Further, MPs may require auditees to provide further evidence at 
public hearings (VAGO, 2014a).  
2.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has examined the foundations on which PA activities in Victoria are based. 
Insights were provided into the emergence of PA, its key features and intentions, within a NPM 
discourse. The key stakeholders relevant for this study were introduced and the PA process 
was described in brief. After having provided the reader with an overview of the PA function 
in the relevant context, the forthcoming chapter presents a review of the relevant academic and 
professional literature on PA impacts.  
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3 Literature review  
3.1 Introduction 
Previous PA research is comprised of a variety of professional and academic studies including 
cross-cultural comparative work (e.g. Torres et al., 2016; Pollitt et al., 1999) and a range of 
studies focusing on PA practice in specific country-contexts, including Australia (e.g. Parker 
et al., 2018; Funnell and Wade, 2012; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Hatherly and Parker, 1988; 
Parker and Jacobs, 2015; Parker et al., 2018). Only few studies have shed empirical light on 
the impacts of PAs (e.g. Desmedt et al., 2017; Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo, 2017; Justesen 
and Skærbæk, 2010; Morin, 2001). With reference to the topic under research, in this chapter, 
the available literature about PA impacts and factors that facilitate those impacts is reviewed 
and subjected to critical assessment. Attention will also be paid to relevant stakeholder 
relationships.  
In PA literature, several authors have referred to conflicting demands and accountabilities of 
stakeholder groups, however, only a fairly limited number of studies has empirically 
highlighted the link between accountability and PA (e.g. Eckersley et al., 2014; Irawan, 2014; 
Ellwood, 2014). Mzenzi and Gaspar (2015, p. 682) underline that “how external auditing 
(public sector audit) contributes to accountability, has not been clearly established”. 
As accountability (see section 4.3.1) has indirectly been referred to as impact-facilitating factor 
(Mulgan, 1997, 2001; Sharma, 2007; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a), this chapter also takes a 
closer look at the accountability arrangements and relationships in the PA context. Further, this 
study recognises that in PA literature there is growing scepticism about and limited concrete 
evidence on the positive contribution PAs make to public sector organisations’ performance 
(Morin, 2014; Kells, 2011a and b). A recurring implication among exponents of PAs is that as 
a result of PAs, organisations have experienced performance improvements with regards to 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness, while critics have cautioned that PAs occasionally 
serve no purpose and may even have negative impacts that defeat the objectives of PAs (Morin, 
2001; Sutherland, 2003). It is therefore equally essential not only to capture the positive 
impacts PAs may have, but also to elaborate on their unintended effects (Bawole and Ibrahim, 
2016; Kells, 2011a).  
This chapter is organised under the following major themes: firstly, section 3.2 introduces the 
different ways of how authors of previous PA studies understand the notion of impact and gives 
a brief overview of the relevance of impact-facilitating factors. Thereafter, in sections 3.3, 3.4 
and 3.5, PA impacts and impact-enabling factors are examined in more detail using a three-
level approach suggested by Van Loocke and Put (2011). According to the authors, impacts 
and facilitating factors may become manifested on various levels, including the macro level 
concerned with factors specific to the political-institutional context in which PAs are 
conducted, the meso-level that is about factors specific to SAIs and audited organisations, and 
the relationship between these stakeholders, and the micro-level that focuses on factors specific 
to PAs. Finally, section 3.6 summarises findings from the literature review and lists impacts 
and factors facilitating those impacts identified and defined in prior research studies.  
3.2 Performance audit impacts and impact-facilitating factors 
When examining PA impacts scholars have employed different terms, such as outcomes 
(Alwardat and Benamraoui, 2014), results (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008), influences (Gerald, 
2015), consequences (ECA, 2015) and impacts (Parker and Jacobs, 2015; Desmedt et al., 
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2017). Throughout this research study, the term impact is employed, which is defined by Torres 
et al. (2016) as the effect that something has on somebody or something14.  
In 2011, Van Loocke and Put published a literature review of PA impact studies. The authors 
analysed a total of 14 empirical studies that vary substantially in scope, research design and 
theoretical underpinning. From the examination of those studies five types of PA impacts 
emerged: instrumental, conceptual, political-legitimising, tactical and interactive impacts. 
Instrumental impact emerges in form of actions taken by auditees as reaction to PAs. The 
influence of PAs on auditees’ learning process is regarded as conceptual impact, while the 
degree of interest shown by parliament and the media is described as political-legitimising 
impact. Van Loocke and Put (2011) label tactical impact as impact on a decision-making 
process of ministers. Consultation and negotiation between stakeholders are considered as 
interactive impact. Apart from the various types of impacts categorised in their literature 
review, Van Loocke and Put (2011) also identified a range of factors that facilitate impacts. 
Factors likely to contribute to PA impacts can take various forms as will be shown in 
subsequent sections, and may occur at the macro, meso and micro level.  
Van Loocke and Put (2011) conclude that scholars sometimes do not clearly distinguish 
between impacts and impact-facilitating factors. Since the publication of Van Loocke’s and 
Put’s (2011) work, several more empirical studies have been published that considerably add 
to the understanding of the nature and scope of PA impacts and impact-enabling factors (e.g. 
Parker and Jacobs, 2015; Kells and Hodge, 2011; Morin, 2014; Raudla et al., 2015; Torres et 
al., 2016; Desmedt et al., 2017, to name only a few). Some of those studies are consistent with 
conclusions made by Van Loocke and Put (2011), whereas others offer views that contradict 
the authors’ findings. These most recent and previous studies are examined in subsequent 
sections. 
This research study applies Van Loocke’s and Put’s (2011) three-level approach to make sense 
of definitions of PA impacts and facilitating factors as perceived by key stakeholders. The 
following section examines the macro-level that is concerned with the roles of parliament and 
the media.  
3.3 The macro level: parliament and media 
The nature and extent of PA impacts often depend on the institutional structure of the public 
sector, comprising the power of the media and parliament, and the relative public and political 
accountability mechanisms (Bovens, 2007; Barrett, 2011). The macro level encompasses 
actions exerted by parliament and the media (Van Loocke and Put, 2011; Torres et al., 2016). 
This definition of macro level is of particular relevance for this research study, which examines 
the perceptions and interpretations of MPs and journalists. 
Unlike meso and micro levels, the macro level has not been object of extensive research in PA 
literature. Only few studies examine the influence of the macro level on the utilisation and 
impact of PAs. However, following Varone et al. (2005) and Van Loocke and Put (2011) the 
way the political system is structured and how political actors like MPs and journalists view 
PAs, influences the outcomes of PAs. In fact, the media and parliament play significant roles 
in SAIs’ and public sector organisations’ institutionalised task environment (Torres et al., 
2016): they exert pressure on performance auditors and auditees and constitute the arena for 
 
14 Following the European Court of Auditors (ECA, 2015, p. 4) ‘somebody/something’ is defined “as either direct 
addressees of the intervention or indirect addressees falling outside the boundary of the intervention”. 
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the fight over legitimacy between stakeholder groups (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2015; INTOSAI, 
2013). Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017) found that auditees tend to apply concrete 
changes when held politically accountable by MPs and publicly accountable by the media. 
Hence, for the purpose of this study, it is necessary to examine journalists’ and MPs’ interest 
in and reactions to PAs as they may trigger political-legitimising impact (Van Loocke and Put, 
2011). 
3.3.1 Interest from parliament  
MPs play a crucial role as they can influence PA activities (Desmedt et al., 2017). Particularly 
PAC members can provide strength to PA activities by drawing journalists’ attention to PA 
outcomes, thereby ensuring that there is an influential audience that receives and scrutinises 
PA reports (Lonsdale, 2008). However, not every PAC is highly engaged in SAIs’ PA 
activities. Bringselius (2014), for example, demonstrates that the Swedish parliament does not 
assign a PAC to evaluate and oversee the SAI’s PA activities. In fact, until 2011 audited 
organisations were not required to respond to PA reports leading to situations where PA reports 
were ignored by auditees and no public debate was initiated by parliament. In this regard, Van 
Loocke and Put (2011, p. 187) emphasises the vital role parliaments play in the PA context: 
“It is taken for granted that a strong parliament is more likely to boost the impact 
of audits with the administration and with the minister than a parliament that is 
hardly willing or able to control the executive.” 
Nichol (2007) proposes that PA reports provide investigatory resources to PACs based on 
which MPs criticise public sector performance (see also Jacobs, 1998; Jones and Jacobs, 2009). 
According to Morin and Hazgui (2016, p. 583) performance auditors are aware of being used 
by MPs, particularly opposition members, “who brandish the auditors’ reports to pillory the 
elected government”. MPs’ attention to PA reports is often confined to topics that provide 
ammunition for political debate (Skærbæk, 2009). With the active use of the media, by 
referring to PA reports in parliamentary debates, MPs often try to maximise their political gains 
and hope to improve their popularity (Bringselius, 2014; Blume and Voigt, 2007).  
As stakeholder groups that hold coercive power, parliament and particularly PACs as 
legitimacy-conferring authorities exercise oversight through a process of political 
accountability (see section 4.3.3.1) and exert pressure on auditees if they do not act upon 
performance auditors’ recommendations (Bovens, 2007; Barrett, 2012; Jones and Jacobs, 
2009). By initiating follow-up inquiries MPs decisively influence performance auditors’ 
actions and reinforce impact (Justesen and Skærbæk, 2010; Milgrom and Schwartz, 2008; 
Torres et al., 2016). Indeed, NAO performance auditors interviewed by Morin and Hazgui 
(2016) assume that auditees’ undertaking of corrective action is accelerated by the pressure 
exerted by MPs following up on NAO PA reports. Evidence is provided by Morin (2004) and 
Torres et al. (2016) who found that the involvement of MPs prompted auditees to react 
unhesitatingly and more effectively to PA findings than if performance auditors acted alone. 
The effectiveness of parliamentary follow-up inquiries is emphasised by Barrett (2011) who 
contends that follow-ups conducted by PACs would result in greater and more timely PA 
impact and produce better outcomes than the conduct of more PAs by SAIs. 
While the PA process including negotiations between auditees and performance auditors and 
follow-up audits conducted either by performance auditors or MPs are considered as backstage 
(Guthrie and Parker, 1999), public hearings are referred to as the front stage of PAs (Sharma, 
2007), at which accountability is executed and the effects of PAs are reinforced. Public 
hearings appear analogous to court hearings, where auditees as witnesses are subjected to 
interrogation and questioning by PAC members on critical PA findings. Griffith (2005) and 
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Sharma (2007) contend that information provided by PA reports become alive in parliamentary 
hearings, where stakeholders come together, justifications and explanations for action are 
sought and agreements to correct and define practices are obtained. Usually, the witnesses do 
not only face MPs but also the AG, who comments on PA findings and recommendations when 
requested by MPs. Thus, parliamentary hearings often cause both performance auditors and 
auditees to demonstrate their performance and to seek legitimacy.  
According to Lonsdale (2000) and Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014b) it is public hearings in which 
the performance auditors’ criticism unfolds and is magnified in a heated debate invoked by 
PAC members. In public hearings, PACs instil a sense of authority that PA reports alone could 
not achieve. The fact-based and objective rhetoric adopted in the writing style of PA reports 
constrains performance auditors to only include information based on gathered evidence. At 
parliamentary hearings, however, PA findings are brought to life by MPs who phrase their 
criticism as they prefer (Sharma, 2007). Although much of the impact of the PA report may 
already have occurred between the publishing of the report and the parliamentary hearing, 
performance auditors consider the hearing as “icing on the cake” that potentially reinforces 
impact (Sharma, 2007, p. 306): 
“Without the PAC hearing the NAO report alone with its recommendations 
and criticisms would not have the clout to instil caution and impose changes 
to the running of publicly funded programmes. Recommendations made in 
NAO reports are enforceable through PAC connections and moreover 
followed up by the PAC.” 
For performance auditors, it is often the parliamentary hearings through which they see the 
“fruits of their labour” (Sharma, 2007, p. 306). Lonsdale (2000, 2008) and Hepworth (1995) 
contend that performance auditors’ capability to make an impact derives from their ability to 
gain political support from MPs in form of follow-up inquiries and public hearings. Van 
Loocke and Put (2011, p. 194) conclude that “[i]nterest from parliament has both an 
intermediary or indirect impact, as well as a direct impact”. Parliamentary interest in PAs and 
the execution of hearings addressing public concerns provokes the interest of the media. As 
neither auditees, nor MPs can afford to ignore press coverage, the interest of the media plays a 
significant role in the PA context (Parker and Jacobs, 2015; Desmedt et al., 2017).  
3.3.2 Interest from the media 
The media is the key channel that keeps citizens and taxpayers informed about SAIs’ PA work 
(Bringselius, 2014). Hepworth (1995, p 42) emphasises that particularly a “[p]erformance audit 
[…] creates the opportunity for a media headline through its focus on a particular activity”. 
Van Loocke and Put (2011) accommodate the impact emerging from media interest as 
political-legitimising as the interest from parliament is likely to be raised and disseminated by 
the media. Also, Parker and Jacobs (2015) see the media as a catalyst for attracting MPs 
attention to particular public issues. Several studies support this claim: Caspi (1981) who 
identified a sharp increase in the degree to which parliamentary inquiries in the Israeli 
parliament (Knesset) rely on media articles, demonstrates that press coverage does influence 
the political debate. Further, Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014b) and Hepworth (1995) argue that 
the media as an arena for the public debate is important for MPs seeking to advance their 
careers. If public performance issues raised by the media are of political interest for MPs, 
particularly opposition members, they will strategically select and use relevant media reports 
to “build their own personal brands in the media, as part of their individual careers” 
(Bringselius, 2014, p. 89).  
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Providing advice on how to maximise impact, Dye (2009, p. 8), a former Canadian Auditor-
General, recommends performance auditors to not only rely on PACs to reinforce PA impacts 
but to actively boost their media presence: 
“If your audit office does very thorough work but your Public Accounts Committee 
or other committees to whom you report do not pay attention or hold hearings on 
your audits, you have a problem. Parliamentarians are very busy people who don’t 
have much time to read printed reports. […] SAIs need to recognize the reality that 
audit reports may not be read thoroughly or completely and find a way for their [..] 
stakeholders to become aware of the good work of the SAI. One way to do this is 
by getting the media to carry your message for them.” 
The media plays a relevant role in highlighting SAIs’ PA mandate and transmitting SAIs’ 
message to the public (Gerald, 2015; Kells, 2011a; Sutherland, 2003). However, the impact of 
media interest has received surprisingly little attention by previous studies (Lonsdale, 2008). 
Bringselius (2014) is one of the few scholars examining the relationship between performance 
auditors and the media. He argues that performance auditors increase the impact of their work 
by maximising press coverage. In fact, many SAIs follow a dissemination approach concerned 
with the distribution of PA findings through the media to demonstrate and reinforce the value 
of PA activities (Bringselius, 2014; Lonsdale, 1999). Parker et al. (2018) and Pollitt (2003) 
confirm that SAIs have increased their efforts to communicate with the media. The media does 
not only play a significant role in spreading performance auditors’ key messages, but also 
informs them about citizens’ concerns. Parker et al. (2018) and Parker and Jacobs (2015) 
discovered that press coverage of public performance issues provides information to AGOs on 
topics attracting public interest and thus informs performance auditors’ thinking with respect 
to the selection of PA topics.  
PA reports are the primary source for journalists, whose main interest lies in PA findings 
(Barrett, 2011; Lonsdale, 2008). Kells (2011a) found that particularly in Australia and the UK 
PA reports attract much media attention. How PA reports are interpreted, translated and echoed 
by the media is of great significance for auditees who have to deal with PA outcomes (Alon, 
2007; Justesen and Skærbæk, 2010; Mayne, 2007). The INTOSAI (2010, p. 8) claims that  
“[m]edia coverage of audit reports can give reports more impact and stimulate 
public demand for beneficial change in areas that the report highlights.” 
In the same vein, Lavi (1999, p. 275) argues that the media has the power to influence PA 
results and that, “without the media – the trumpet sounding the call – audit is left lacking”. 
Indeed, Morin (2008) provides empirical evidence that media coverage of PAs is likely to 
affect the efficacy of PAs by exerting pressure on auditees and, therefore, spurring them into 
action. The author found that when PAs receive media attention, auditees tend to be more 
willing to comply with performance auditors’ recommended changes and to correct 
deficiencies more quickly. Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017) add that when the media 
uses PA reports to hold audited organisations publicly accountable, auditees tend to implement 
concrete changes. Hence, by making auditees face public scrutiny the media assists the 
accountability process (Mulgan, 2000; Alon, 2007; Kells, 2011a; Hepworth, 1995).  
Van Loocke and Put (2011) contend that the media’s political-legitimising impact emerges 
from its critique and legitimation of public sector organisations’ activities. Justesen and 
Skærbæk (2010) argue that there appears to be a proportionate relation between the level of 
criticism and the number of media articles referring to PA reports. The authors conclude that 
the more critical a PA report is, the more media attention it is likely to receive and the more 
pressure is exerted on auditees. The scenario described by Justesen and Skærbæk (2010) is 
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often the reason for SAIs being overly critical. Following Bringselius (2014) one way for 
performance auditors to make sure that PA reports attract media attention is to present results 
that are interesting, surprising, and/or appalling. In this regard, Morin (2008) accuses 
performance auditors of applying a headline hunting approach desperately seeking for press 
coverage of their PA work.  
Morin (2008) further claims that media attention surrounding PA findings allows auditors to 
demonstrate their role as denouncers of abuse. This, however, does not seem to have positive 
impact with regards to the prevention of future deficiencies and the correction of 
mismanagement. Justesen and Skærbæk (2010) conclude that through media attention PAs 
sometimes generate tension and discomfort as auditees may feel that they are being criticised 
‘no matter what’ and that they are unavoidably involved in a reputation-damaging and 
destructive blame game fuelled by the media. The media potentially increases the visibility of 
performance auditors’ work, which in turn, may motivate them to become overly critical in 
their reporting in order to gain more media attention (INTOSAI, 2013). That may lead to 
situations where performance auditors damage their trust relationship with auditees 
(Bringselius, 2014). Roberts and Pollitt (1994) argue that one reason why performance auditors 
hunt for media headlines is the need to prove their performance and to legitimise their 
existence. 
3.4 The meso level: the Auditor-General’s Office and public sector organisations 
Van Loocke and Put (2011) define the characteristics of performance auditors and auditees and 
the relationship between these two stakeholder groups as meso-level. It is the meso-level, at 
which the PA is conducted, which involves the direct interaction between performance auditors 
and auditees throughout the PA process. Although this research study does not seek to examine 
the interaction between performance auditors and auditees, previous studies have shown that 
the way in which these stakeholders communicate facilitates PA impacts (Van Loocke and Put, 
2011). 
Previous impact studies often begin with an examination of the roles of auditees and 
performance auditors (Raudla et al., 2015; Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008; Alwardat et al., 2015). 
Referring to PAs as social influence process that takes on full meaning through the auditor-
auditee relationship, Morin (2001, p. 100) defines performance auditors as the “source of 
influence” and auditees as the “target of influence”. Given that it is the objective of PAs to 
improve performance and enhanced accountability in the public sector, auditees expect 
performance auditors to add value to their organisations by providing feasible 
recommendations. Due to auditees’ direct involvement in PAs, Alwardat et al. (2015), 
Lonsdale (2008) and Hasan et al. (2013) argue that auditees are not passive recipients of 
performance auditors’ activities but intelligent actors who actively navigate performance 
auditors’ findings and recommendations through their responses to PAs. In this regard, one of 
Power’s (1999, 2003) findings that is of particular interest for this study is that auditees have 
the ability to actively channel performance auditors’ work and thereby influence the outcomes 
by determining the extent to which performance auditors are dependent on auditees with 
regards to the auditees’ knowledge. Findings of Parker’s and Jacob’s (2015) study confirm 
such observations. The authors note that auditees directly affect the PA process by either 
assisting performance auditors through the sharing of high-quality information and engaging 
in open conversations or delaying their work by withholding information. Conclusions made 
by Parker and Jacobs (2015), Alwardat et al. (2015), Lonsdale (2008) and Hasan et al. (2013) 
support Power’s (2003, p. 199) view that the auditee is undoubtedly a “complex being”, that 
might undertake attempts to modify auditors’ findings through a process of negotiation to bring 
them in accordance with their own objectives and organisational culture.  
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The auditor-auditee relationship, the conduct of PAs and PA findings are affected by different 
roles performance auditors may take on (Pollitt et al., 1999; Grönlund et al., 2011; Morin and 
Hazgui, 2016; Pierre and de Fine Licht, 2019). In the NPM environment performance auditors 
are expected to act as change agents (Justesen and Skærbæk, 2010; Funnell, 2015) and 
modernisers (Morin and Hazgui, 2016). Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that 
performance auditors occasionally assume the roles of the controller, the punisher or the 
management consultant (Morin, 2003; Morin and Hazgui, 2016). Depending on the role 
performance auditors take on, they significantly alter auditees’ ways of (re)acting (Gendron et 
al., 2007). Particularly the management consultant role is said to miss the purpose of PAs to 
provide an objective, impartial and independent view on public sector organisations’ 
performance (Gendron et al., 2001; Skærbæk, 2009; INTOSAI, 2013).  
Lonsdale (1999) and Power (1997, 2003) accuse performance auditors of softening, sugar-
coating and under-reporting of PA findings when auditors and auditees interact closely and 
exchange information openly and frequently. When intensively discussing PA findings with 
auditees prior to the publication of PA reports, performance auditors tend to cosy up to auditees 
(Kells, 2011a). Thereby, performance auditors’ independence is put at risk, the accountability 
mechanism is weakened (English, 2007; Gendron et al., 2001), and the efficacy of PAs is 
diminished (Kells, 2011a). Gendron et al. (2001) and more recently Pierre and de Fine Licht 
(2019), raised concerns about the concomitant loss of performance auditors’ independence and 
integrity when they act like management consultants. Studying the changing role of a Canadian 
Auditor-General, Gendron et al. (2001) concluded that performance auditors maintain a 
delicate balance between the role of the management consultant and the independent auditor, 
and that the State Audit Office had compromised its independence by promoting the 
government agenda of the NPM framework. Pierre and de Fine Licht (2019), in their 
examination of how performance auditors manage the tension between holding auditees 
accountable and supporting them to improve their performance, found that the modus operandi 
of PA changed: while historically, PA work has been a one-off exchange between auditor and 
auditees, the new PA approach fosters a more continuous dialogue with auditees. According to 
the authors the continuous engagement with auditees allows auditors to gain a better overview 
of the organisation audited and helps them to provide more tailored recommendations. Pierre 
and de Fine Licht (2019) consider this approach to be an exceptionally efficient PA strategy. 
Depending on the role performance auditors adopt, they have different intentions affecting the 
PA process including topic selection, fieldwork, nature of recommendations and writing the 
PA report. Moreover, the role performance auditors take on evidently affects how useful 
auditees perceive PAs to be (Lonsdale, 1999; Desmedt et al., 2017; Pierre and de Fine Licht, 
2019). While performance auditors acting as controllers and punishers often intend to blame 
auditees and to hold them publicly accountable, performance auditors adopting the roles of 
change agents and modernisers generally have the intention to encourage auditees to implement 
change (Öhman, 2015; Morin and Hazgui, 2016). Empirical evidence provided by Funnell et 
al. (2016), Morin (2003), Sharma (2007) and Skærbæk (2009) has demonstrated the potential 
for role conflict between performance improvement and accountability objectives. According 
to Funnell et al. (2016, p. 16) performance auditors who seek a  
“higher public profile as a watchdog of public accountability might be tempted to 
focus on ‘gotchers’ and ‘juicy bits’ rather than public management improvement, 
thus improving his or her standing with the Parliament at the expense of the auditor-
auditee relationship and the ability of the performance audit to be seen to add value 
to the operations of auditees.”  
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The auditor-auditee relationship is a well-discussed phenomenon in PA literature (Morin, 2001, 
2014; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014a; Funnell and Wade, 2012). Auditors and auditees actively 
shape PAs by exchanging information during the audit process and negotiating audit findings 
(Johnsen et al., 2001; Lapsley and Pong, 2000; Loke and Hamid, 2016). Keen (1999) and 
Funnell and Wade (2012) emphasise the inevitability of the disagreement between auditees and 
auditors due to the difference in their belief systems. The complexity of the auditor-auditee 
relationship is further highlighted by Morin (2001, p. 115) who claims that performance 
auditors and auditees form relations “where power plays occur and where the reactions of both 
parties are quite unpredictable”. Funnell and Wade (2012) accept the emergence of hostile 
relationships fuelled by aggressive behaviour of either stakeholder group as unavoidable part 
of the PA process. Aggressive behaviour and negative attitudes lead to conflict and affect the 
PA process and outcomes. If auditees perceive PAs as a genuine threat to their organisation, 
they may deliberately choose to act strategically to influence audit results (Fellingham and 
Newman, 1985; Funnell and Wade, 2012).  
AGOs recognised that the auditor-auditee relationship plays a significant role in PA practice 
(Funnell et al., 2016). For example, the ANAO has taken effort to improve the relationship 
with auditees based upon the belief that better relationships result in more positive PA impact 
(Gerald, 2015). Therefore, the ANAO (2015) committed to a so-called ‘no surprises’ approach, 
which provides opportunities for auditees to discuss PA findings while the audit is ongoing.  
Morin (2004) found that when performance auditors communicate in an open and honest 
manner with auditees, the PA was most likely to be more effective. However, the reverse was 
also true; when performance auditors behaved like punishers and inquisitors, the risk that PAs 
would be fruitless was greater. Highlighting the importance of effective two-way 
communication between performance auditors and auditees, Van Loocke and Put (2011) and 
the INTOSAI (2013) add that good communication and cooperation is necessary and 
encouraged for building a trustful relationship and to add value to audited organisations.  
3.5 The micro level: before, during and after the performance audit process 
The PA process is comprised of different stages (see section 2.4.2) at which, according to 
previous research studies, different forms of impacts can take place and various factors can 
trigger impacts. The following sections elaborate on the potential impacts as well as impact-
facilitating factors that emerge at different stages of the PA process. 
3.5.1 Performance audit topic selection  
Following Put and Turksema (2011) there are various reasons why the selection of PA topics 
is so important. The authors assert that the topic selection is closely connected to the expected 
contribution of PAs. If performance auditors, in their topic selection process, focus on minor 
issues considered secondary by auditees and MPs, they risk conducting audits that do not add 
value (Put and Turksema, 2011; Van Loocke and Put, 2011). In this regard, Frey (1994) 
remarks that PAs often erroneously attribute great importance to minor performance 
deviations, while disregarding large inefficiencies. Schwartz (2000) who shed empirical light 
on this issue found that auditees were frustrated with PA results. They claimed to have learnt 
nothing because PAs focused on minor issues.  
By making PA topic suggestions, PACs can influence the PA plan and consequently influence 
the PA focus. Therefore, Van Loocke and Put (2011) and Put and Turksema (2011) argue that 
through their influence on the topic selection process, MPs indirectly exert impact as they 
channel performance auditors’ interest to particular issues. In an examination of the PA topic 
selection process of the Belgian SAI (Rekenhof) and the Dutch SAI (Algemene Rekenkamer) 
 
45 
Put and Turksema (2011) assert that the Algemene Rekenkamer carries out several PAs each 
year at the request of parliament, while the Rekenhof intends to select PA topics that are likely 
to attract MPs’ attention.  
3.5.2 Performance audit reports 
Audit findings and recommendations are presented in PA reports (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 
2013a and b). Funkhouser (2011, p. 223) describes PA reports as “opening act in a long series 
of events involving multiple actors”, who make use of the information provided in those reports 
and use them as reference instrument (Morin, 2008; Barrett, 2001). PA reports are therefore 
not the end product of PAs, but the intermediate step that leads to discussion between 
stakeholders (Put and Turksema, 2011). PA reports are the key channel through which 
information on auditees’ performance enters the public domain and becomes accessible (Parker 
and Jacobs, 2015; Lonsdale, 2000). PA literature generally supports the notion that PA reports 
fuel and inform the public sector accountability mechanism (Mayne, 2007; Lonsdale, 2011; 
English and Guthrie, 1991). Arguing that PA reports help to identify those to be held to account, 
Skærbæk and Christensen (2015, p. 1264) refer to PA reports as “blame purification” 
instruments often used by parliament and the media to hold auditees to account (see sections 
3.3.1 and 3.3.2). PA reports provide the scripts relevant for parliamentary hearings where 
further investigation and debate are carried out (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo, 2017; 
Lonsdale and Mayne, 2005; Roberts and Pollitt, 1994; Sharma, 2007). 
PA reports are not only considered as primary vehicle for public sector accountability 
processes, but also as a rationale for PA impact in form of organisational learning (Morin, 
2014; Lonsdale and Bemelmans-Videc, 2007; Van der Meer, 1999), referred to by Van Loocke 
and Put (2011) as conceptual impact. Through learning effects, PA reports are said to trigger 
the long-term impact on audited organisation (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen, 2018).  
Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a and b) and Morin (2014) consider PA reports as point of 
departure for organisational change (see section 3.5.5). Whether auditees make use of PA 
reports and adopt suggested changes, however, depends on the report quality and materiality 
and whether the findings are convincing enough to persuade auditees to adopt change 
(Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo, 2017; Hatherly and Parker, 1988; Lonsdale and Bechberger, 
2011). In a study by Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018) on a Norwegian SAI, the 
authors found that if reports contained suggested changes that auditees were already planning 
to make, they considered reports as culturally compatible and adopted suggested changes in 
order to be granted legitimacy from auditors.  
Drawing on performance auditors’ perspectives on the involvement of auditees at the reporting 
stage, Parker and Jacobs (2015) found that auditees do generally not influence PA report 
structure. However, with regards to the content of reports some auditors contended that 
auditees had no or only very little influence, whereas others held the view that auditees do 
influence report contents through the correction of factual errors, resolving misconceptions and 
influencing the tone. 
3.5.3 Performance auditors’ recommendations 
The acceptance rate of PA recommendations has commonly been defined as indicator of PA 
impact (Hatherly and Parker, 1988; Lonsdale, 1999; Ahlenius, 2000; Torres et al., 2016) and 
has been coined by Van Loocke and Put (2011) as instrumental impact. According to Brooks 
and Pariser (1995) recommendations are the vehicle leading to improved performance of public 
services and programs. Various other scholars (e.g. Hamburger, 1989; Morin, 2001, 2004) 
provide contrasting views on recommendations’ potential to generate impact. In fact, defining 
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the recommendations acceptance rate as impact is a controversial issue in PA literature 
(Desmedt et al., 2017).  
Morin (2001, 2008) and Van der Meer (1999), for instance, indicate that the recommendation 
acceptance rate is an inadequate variable for making a valuable evaluation of PAs’ success. 
This is because the recommendation acceptance rate strongly correlates with the nature of 
proposed recommendations. In the Australian public sector context, Hatherly and Parker 
(1988) noted that the more radical the changes proposed by auditors were, the lower the 
recommendation acceptance rate had been. Van Loocke and Put (2011, p. 198) confirm that 
auditees tend to pick the “low hanging fruit”. The authors echo a statement made by Hamburger 
(1989, p. 17) who exemplifies that a recommendation implementation quota of 75% “might 
not imply success, [..] if the rejected recommendations were the most important”. Similarly, in 
a study on the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Johnston (1988) justifies a 
recommendations acceptance rate of 77% by auditees taking the path of least resistance. 
Consequently, dwelling on the recommendation acceptance rate appears to be a limiting 
approach as it fails to weight the significance of recommendations (Hatherly and Parker, 1988; 
Johnston, 1988; Hamburger, 1988; Desmedt et al., 2017). The number of recommendations 
accepted by auditees is further used by performance auditors who use the ratio as a measure of 
their impact (Talbot and Wiggan, 2010). 
In a comparative study on European SAIs, Torres et al. (2016) assess PA impacts based on the 
recommendation acceptance rate. Acknowledging that the acceptance rate leaves open the 
question of whether accepted recommendations have been implemented, the authors emphasise 
the need to examine how and to what extent recommendations were adopted. More precisely, 
they conclude that for PAs to have impact, the sufficient condition is the implementation, not 
the acceptance of recommendations. That is also emphasised by Barrett (2012) who does not 
rule out the possibility of partial or non-implementation although recommendation acceptance 
rates may sometimes be high. He argues that it should be a reasonable expectation that the 
implementation action of accepted recommendations would take place in a timely fashion. 
However, it has been discovered that despite follow-up actions undertaken by PACs and/or 
performance auditors, auditees tend to delay their implementation practices quite frequently 
and occasionally even go so far to address recommendations only partially or not at all. Barrett 
(2012, p. 133) emphasises the latter arguing that “if a recommendation has not been 
implemented within four years, it is not likely to be implemented”. These observations are also 
emphasised by Parker and Jacobs (2015) who call attention to the limitations of the 
recommendations acceptance rate as an impact indicator. The authors argue that while the 
acceptance of PA recommendations appears to be customary at first sight, “the highly variable 
forms of auditee response phrasing, suggests otherwise”. Parker and Jacobs (2015) offer 
insights into the variety of auditees’ responses to recommendations. Those responses ranged 
from total to minimal acceptance. Also, auditees’ rejection of recommendations took multiple 
forms as illustrated in Table 1:
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Table 1: Auditees’ responses to performance audit recommendations 
Acceptance Rejection 
Accept Reject 
Accept in principle Rejection implied (from the comments) 
Agreed subject to negotiation Under consideration 
Conditional acceptance (e.g. subject to resources) Not applicable 
Agreement implied (from the comments made within 
the auditee response) 
Noted 
Partial agreement implied (from the comments made 
within the auditee response) 
No specific response to the 
recommendation 
[Not available] Obfuscation (e.g. lengthy narrative on 
agency operation) 
Source: Parker and Jacobs (2015, p. 20) 
Parker and Jacobs (2015) discovered that auditees’ reasons for accepting or rejecting 
recommendations were diverse. With regards to the acceptance of recommendations, auditees 
offered different rationales listed in Table 2. The authors (p. 21) note that although the 
implementation approaches offered by auditees give the impression of “a strong degree of 
uptake”, thorough analysis of auditee discourse discloses a more complex pattern of responses. 
With respect to different degrees of rejections, Parker and Jacobs (2015) conclude that they all 
most likely resulted in complete rejection of recommendations or auditees’ inaction. 
From listed rationales it becomes clear that acceptance was expressed in terms of the 
contribution recommendations would make to audited organisations. Apart from the responses 
in Table 2, auditees also expressed their preference for maintaining status quo, arguing that 
current systems and programs are performing adequately (Parker and Jacobs, 2015). 
Furthermore, auditees provided responses that Parker and Jacobs (2015) categorised as self-
defence. Those responses led to procrastination or contestation of the implementation of 
recommendations and sometimes resulted in partial or non-implementation. Reasons for non-
implementation of recommendations discovered by Parker and Jacobs (2015), that have also 
been identified by other authors such as Pollitt et al. (1999), Morin (2014) and Reichborn-
Kjennerud (2014a), are recommendations’ unsuitability and impracticality, auditees not feeling 
responsible, perceived incorrectness of auditors’ assumptions and factual errors in PA reports, 
incompatibility with the political agenda of the government of the day, unavailability of human 
and/or financial resources necessary for implementation actions, and general resistance to 
change among auditees, to name only a few. Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017) oppose 
the view of other authors (e.g. Funnell and Wade, 2012) that the partial or non-implementation 
of recommendations necessarily results from auditees’ attitude to generally resist change 
claiming that the rejection of recommendations often results from auditees’ awareness of 
organisational deficiencies and the fact that measures have already been put in place.  
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Table 2: Auditees’ recommendation implementation approaches 
Implementation approaches 
Will implement changes required (no qualifications) 
Will implement changes required (including approach/plan/technical answer) 
Will implement changes required subject to resource constraints 
Will implement changes required subject to capacity to implement 
Will implement changes required subject to prior implementation from other entities 
Will implement as a framework, but wants to maintain flexibility 
Will implement changes required through working with partner agencies 
Will implement changes required subject to leadership from central agencies 
Will implement changes required where appropriate 
Will implement changes required subject to practical considerations 
Will implement changes required through enhancements of existing systems and processes 
Source: Parker and Jacobs (2015, pp. 20-1) 
Reasons outlined above often lead to situations where auditees tend to strategically respond to 
auditors’ recommendations. Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018) found that auditees may 
decide to resist change if their opinion was not taken into consideration. In a later study, 
Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017) add that auditees occasionally respond to auditors’ 
recommendations by adopting symbolic changes instead of real changes. Power (1997, 2000) 
refers to the phenomenon of symbolic changes as creative compliance and decoupling, a 
process leading to “discrepancy between intentions and actual practice” (Furubu, 2011, p. 41). 
This discrepancy between words and actions has also been noticed by Boxenbaum and Jonsson 
who noted that (2008, p. 78),  
“[w]hen adaptations to institutional pressures contradict internal efficiency needs, 
organizations sometimes claim to adapt when they in reality do not; they decouple 
action from structure in order to preserve organizational efficiency.”  
To this perspective, Wade (2008, p. 140) adds that auditees often conceal their non-compliance 
“behind a façade of rituals and ceremonies or establish a buffer between their formal structures 
and their everyday work activities”. Emphasising the advantages of employing a decoupling 
strategy, Meyer and Rowan (1977), Dillard et al. (2004) and Scott (2008, 2014) outline that 
through decoupling organisations can maintain standardised structures while actual activities 
vary in practice. By employing a decoupling strategy auditees may avoid or minimise conflict 
with other stakeholder groups and may minimise the possibility of future inspection by 
performance auditors (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014a; Taut and Brauns, 2003). Following Loke 
and Hamid (2016), the resistance to implement recommendations clearly hinders the PA from 
having positive impact. 
A drawback of the recommendation acceptance rate is that it implies that auditors’ findings are 
invariably pertinent, and the implementation of recommendations inevitably leads to 
performance improvements (Leeuw, 2011; Kells, 2011a). However, it needs to be noted that 
evidence has been provided by Sutherland (2003) demonstrating that not implementing 
recommendations is not always a bad thing as they do not necessarily lead to performance 
improvements (see section 3.5.5).   
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3.5.4 Follow-up audits 
Performance auditors as well as PAC members are authorised to conduct follow-up inquiries 
(Morin, 2008). INTOSAI (2010) claims that following up on the implementation of 
recommendations is an essential step to ensure that auditees have been responsive to PAs and 
have undertaken corrective action. Brooks and Pariser (1995, pp. 73-4) assert that  
“[w]ithout a follow-up system to facilitate the implementation of audit 
recommendations, it is not uncommon for auditors to make the same 
recommendations year after year because the government entity failed to implement 
prior recommendations.”  
That follow-up audits have an impact on audited organisations has been demonstrated by Morin 
(2008), who concludes that knowing that performance auditors make return visits to follow-up 
on auditees’ recommendation implementation actions, auditees are under pressure to correct 
malfunctions and mismanagement. Thus, follow-ups have a deterrent effect on auditees. 
However, Barrett (2011, p. 403) recognises that despite the extensive follow-up work,  
“we still see failure to implement performance audit recommendations and a repeat 
of the kinds of performance deficiencies that implementation of those 
recommendations was supposed to address.” 
The author lists some of the numerous excuses put forward by auditees for inadequate 
responses to recommendations and follow-up activities: pressures on resources, staff turnover, 
inability to recruit qualified personnel, changing economic and social environment, problems 
with other organisations, and changing political imperatives and timeframes for results. While 
the author (p. 404) admits that there is no doubt that some of these explanations hold true and 
are based on sound facts, at the same time he criticises that  
“if greater attention were paid to implementation of performance audit 
recommendations, the impact of such factors would become apparent earlier and 
could be conveyed to the various stakeholders for any alternative action that might 
be considered necessary.” 
Barrett (2011) holds the view that continual auditing in form of follow-up activities is certainly 
not the answer and that it could indeed be counter-productive.  
3.5.5 Induced organisational changes 
PAs are often portrayed as vehicle of change (Justesen and Skærbæk, 2010; Power, 1997, 1999; 
Funnell, 2015). In numerous studies impact has increasingly been associated with changes in 
auditees’ operations and activities (Torres et al., 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen, 
2018; Raudla et al., 2015). Lonsdale (1999), for instance, argues that PAs have impact only 
when they bring about change. In interviews conducted by Funkhouser (2011) in SAIs around 
the world, performance auditors frequently used the words change to describe what they 
perceive as a successful PA. Examining PA impacts, scholars identified a variety of changes 
implemented by auditees. The following changes have been reported:  
Table 3: Induced changes 
Changes identified by previous studies: 
Changes in internal human resource management 
Changes in personnel (recruitment/layoffs) 
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Changes in staff training 
Modifications/adoptions of laws and regulations 
Changes in budgeting, performance management and strategic planning 
Changes in internal control and risk management 
Changes in procedures for coordination 
Changes in documentation and reporting 
Changes in budgetary allocation to the audited policy area 
Sources:  Morin (2004, 2008, 2014); Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018); Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo 
(2017); Raudla et al. (2015)  
While authors mention the kind of changes, limited reference has been made to whether 
changes have been incremental (Shand and Anand, 1996; Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo, 
2017), extensive (Kells, 2011a and b) or revolutionary (Morin, 2008).15 One of the few studies 
that refer to the dimension of changes is a Belgian study by Desmedt et al. (2017) that examines 
auditees’ perspectives on PA impacts. The survey showed that while PAs have not led to radical 
organisational changes, performance auditors’ work was nevertheless noticeable as it drew 
auditees’ attention to internal organisational processes that could potentially be improved. 
These findings confirm conclusions made by Morin (2008, 2014) that changes have not led to 
revolutions in audited organisations but have had moderate influence. In a study by Reichborn-
Kjennerud and Vabo (2017) survey respondents demonstrated that some changes, for example, 
changes in procedures for coordination and changes in internal control and risk management 
have led to more organisational improvement than, for example, changes in staff training. As 
the survey instrument employed does not allow for an examination of the reasons for auditees’ 
perceptions the questions remain, whether recommended changes have been perceived as 
useful and whether those changes have fostered performance improvements with regards to 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness.  
Bowerman et al. (2003), Kells (2011a) and Shand and Anand (1996) refer to possible adverse 
effects the implementation of changes may have. For instance, PAs may cause organisations 
to implement new systems and processes that are auditor-friendly or superficially desirable but 
unnecessary or even unfavourable for public organisations. There are numerous ways in which 
PAs could lead to unnecessary changes: Sutherland (2003) provides the example of the federal 
government department, Human Resource Development Canada (HRDC), which had to adopt 
new procedures for management control as a consequence of a PA although the department’s 
controls were at least fully satisfactory. The induced changes added C$50 million to the annual 
costs of the HRDC. The author (pp. 214-5) criticises that the new controls “may even worsen 
control by adding more pressures for front-line staff, whose numbers have not been 
augmented”. The scenario described by Sutherland (2003) provides evidence for Kells’ (2011a) 
anti-innovation critique of PAs, which is concerned with whether PAs could reduce public 
sector efficiency and effectiveness. Indeed, the HRDC PA imposed costs, which the 
department could have invested into more innovative operations. Empirical findings of 
previous studies suggest that the implementation of changes is partially dependent on the 
perceived usefulness of PAs (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013b). 
 
15 Different dimensions of organisational change will be explained in detail in section 4.2.4.3.  
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3.5.6 Perceived usefulness of performance audits 
Previous studies have confirmed that PAs are more likely to have impact when they are 
perceived as useful. Therefore, the perceived usefulness of PAs has been regarded as impact-
facilitating factor by various scholars (e.g. Morin, 2001, 2014; Hasan et al., 2013; Hatherly and 
Parker, 1988; Lonsdale and Bechberger, 2011; Funnell et al., 2016; Raudla et al. 2015; 
Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a, 2014a). Scholars argue that the extent to which auditees perceive 
PAs as useful is largely influenced by their prior experience in undergoing PAs (Arnaboldi and 
Lapsley, 2008; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014a) and their attitude towards PA practice and the 
underlying principles of monitoring and evaluation (Van Loocke and Put, 2011; Etverk, 2002). 
Additionally, performance auditors’ levels of competence and expertise, communication style 
(Morin, 2001; Lapsley and Pong, 2000), the credibility of PA findings (Funnell and Wade, 
2012; Wade, 2008; Barrett, 2012; Milgrom and Schwartz, 2008), and the feasibility of 
recommendations (Morin, 2004, 2008; Pollitt et al., 1999), are all factors that could enhance or 
hinder auditees’ perceived usefulness of PAs (Alwardat et al., 2015).  
From an institutional perspective, recommended changes are more likely to be perceived as 
useful, and therefore, to be implemented, if they are compliant with auditees’ organisational 
culture, norms and values (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo, 2017). According to Reichborn-
Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018, p. 10) recommended changes are subject to a compatibility test 
(see also March and Olsen, 1989), meaning that 
“proposed changes, in order to have impact, must be compatible with the 
[organisation’s] own opinion about changes that need to be made as well as with 
their perception of what is appropriate. If this is not the case, the audited entity 
could be quite resistant to change”. 
Egeberg and Trondal (2011) argue that perceptions serve as frames for action. According to 
the authors, stakeholders’ actions are therefore associated with their perceptions. Nevertheless, 
relying on the usefulness of PAs as perceived by auditees is a very limiting way of examining 
the notion of impact (Justesen and Skærbæk, 2010; Lonsdale, 1999). While pretending that 
PAs have been useful, auditees might ignore PA recommendations, or employ a variety of 
strategies, such as decoupling to make other stakeholders, particularly performance auditors 
believe that public sector organisations implemented recommended changes.  
3.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the literature on PA impacts and impact-facilitating factors. The 
purposes of this review have been to examine what the literature establishes as known about 
PA impacts and factors influencing those impacts, and to identify limitations of and gaps in 
previous and recent studies. Drawing on the limited empirical evidence, it can be concluded 
that PA impacts and factors facilitating those impacts emerge in complex and multifaceted 
forms at different stages of the PA process.  
Authors considered impacts categorised as instrumental impacts, thereby framing impact in 
terms of, for example, the implementation of recommendations and adoption of changes. 
Following Lonsdale et al. (2011) this might be the case because instrumental impact is easier 
to identify than conceptual, interactive, political-legitimising, and tactical impacts. Only a 
small number of studies identified tactical impacts and few studies provide insights into 
possible interactive impact in form of debates between stakeholders. Recently, an increasing 
number of studies have focused on the examination of political-legitimising impacts of PAs. 
The different forms of impacts influence and complement each other: conceptual as well as 
political-legitimising impacts are regarded as intermediate variables leading to instrumental 
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impact (Van Loocke and Put, 2011; Morin, 2008). The review shows that many studies do not 
clearly distinguish between impacts and impact-facilitating factors, and that authors’ 
differentiation between those terms is fairly vague. What some authors consider as impacts is 
regarded as impact-facilitating factor by others. These conclusions reflect contentions made by 
Torres et al. (2016, p. 23) that “[t]here is no single way to obtain impacts from performance 
audits”. The leading question therefore is, what the impacts of PAs are (Tremblay and Malsch, 
2015; Morin, 2014). Tables 4 and 5 summarise impacts and impact-facilitating factors as 
identified by authors of previous studies. 
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Table 4: Performance audit impacts 
 
Category of impact Type of impact Time dimension Studies identifying this type of impact 
Instrumental Anticipation of outcomes During the audit process Weets (2011), Pollitt et al. (1999), Morin (2004, 2008), Alwardat and 
Benamraoui (2014), Desmedt et al. (2017) 
Acceptance of recommendations After the audit Etverk (2002), Hatherly and Parker (1988), Parker and Jacobs (2015), 
Ahlenius (2000), Desmedt et al. (2017), Pollitt et al. (1999) 
Implementation of 
recommendations 
After the audit Hamburger (1988), Johnston (1988), Morin (2001, 2004, 2008, 2014), 
Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a and b, 2014a and b, 2015), Torres et al. 
(2016), Parker and Jacobs (2015), Barrett (2012), Brooks and Pariser 
(1995) 
Induced changes  During and/or after the audit Lapsley and Pong (2000), Morin (2004, 2008, 2014), Raudla et al. 
(2015), Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014a), Reichborn-Kjennerud and 
Johnsen (2018), Torres et al. (2016), Desmedt et al. (2017), Lonsdale 
(1999), Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017) 
Conceptual Organisational learning process 
and change in mental or 
intellectual frames 
During and/or after the audit Morin (2001, 2008, 2014), Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a and b, 2014a 
and b), Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017), Reichborn-Kjennerud 
and Johnsen (2018), Lonsdale and Bemelmans-Videc (2007), Hasan et 
al. (2013), Van der Meer (1999) 
Tactical Tactical use of performance audits 
by MPs 
After the audit Skærbæk (2009), Hossain (2010), Mulgan (2001), Bringselius (2014), 
Blume and Voigt (2007) 
Interactive Consultation and negotiation 
between stakeholders 
During and/or after the audit Sharma (2007), Lonsdale (2008), Etverk (2002), Van der Meer (1999) 
Political-legitimising Media interest and press coverage (Shortly) after the audit  Alon (2007), Blume and Voigt (2007), Morin (2004, 2008, 2014), 
Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014b), Weets (2011), Nebenzahl (1975), Lavi 
(1999), Kells (2011a), Hepworth (1995), Gerald (2015), Dye (2009), 
Pollitt (2003), Desmedt et al. (2017), Bringselius (2014), Parker and 
Jacobs (2014) 
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Interest from Parliament and its 
committees (political debate, 
public hearings) 
(Shortly) after the audit Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013b, 2014b), Torres et al. (2016), Jones and 
Jacobs (2009), Jacobs (1998), Skærbæk (2009), Sharma (2007), 
Lonsdale (2000) 
Follow-up audits by PACs After the audit Morin (2003, 2004), Torres et al. (2016), Pollitt et al. (1999), Desmedt et 
al. (2017), Lonsdale (2008), Barrett (2011, 2012), Torres et al. (2016), 
Milgrom and Schwartz (2008), Morin and Hazgui (2016), Justesen and 
Skærbæk (2010) 
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Table 5: Factors that facilitate impact  
Level Type of factor Impact facilitating factor Studies identifying this impact facilitating factor 
Macro Political-institutional system Characteristics of the institutional 
environment and its political system 
Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018), Torres et al. (2016), Put 
and Turksema (2011) 
Meso SAI SAI’s PA mandate and institutional 
anchorage 
Sharma (2007), Lonsdale (1999, 2000, 2008), Morin (2003, 2008), 
Desmedt et al. (2017) 
SAIs’ reputation Blume and Voigt (2007), Torres et al. (2016) 
Roles adopted by performance auditors  Morin (2001), Pollitt et al. (1999), Grönlund et al. (2011), Morin 
and Hazgui (2016), Funnell et al. (2016), Funnell and Wade (2012), 
Gendron et al. (2007), Justesen and Skærbæk (2010), Lapsley and 
Pong (2000) 
Planning and timing of PA Morin (2008), Weets (2011), Put and Turksema (2011) 
PA topic selection Put and Turksema (2011), Weets (2011), Schwartz (2000) 
Follow-up activities Brooks and Pariser (1995), Morin (2008), Put and Turksema (2011) 
Objectivity of auditors Morin (2001, 2004, 2014) 
Auditees Auditees’ PA experience Etverk (2002), Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014a) 
Auditees’ perceived usefulness of PA Morin (2001, 2004, 2008, 2014), Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a and 
b), Weets (2011), Raudla et al. (2015), Trembley and Malsch 
(2015) 
Attitude towards knowledge: audit-minded or 
not audit-minded 
Hasan et al. (2013), Lonsdale (2008) 
Auditor-Auditee Relationship Communication during the PA process Power (2003), Parker and Jacobs (2015), Alwardat and Benamraoui 
(2014), Lapsley and Pong (2000), Loke and Hamid (2016), Morin 
(2001, 2004), Gerald (2015), Desmedt et al. (2017), Funnell and 
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Wade (2012), Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017), Alwardat et 
al. (2015) 
Trustful relationship Raudla et al. (2015), Morin (2004, 2014), Barrett (2002) 
Respectful relationship Morin (2001) 
Micro PA results (findings, 
recommendations) 
Clear and feasible recommendations Morin (2001, 2014), Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014a and b), Pollitt et 
al. (1999), Raudla et al. (2015), Torres et al. (2016), Parker and 
Jacobs (2015) 
Performance auditors’ consideration of 
auditees’ comments on findings and 
recommendations 
Morin (2014), Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014a and b), Reichborn-
Kjennerud and Vabo (2017), Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen 
(2018), Sharma (2007), Gendron et al. (2007) 
Results are ‘acceptable’ for the auditee (e.g. 
recommendations meet auditees’ needs) 
Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018), Schwartz (2000), 
Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017), Morin and Hazgui (2016) 
Credibility of findings Funnell and Wade (2012), Wade (2008) 
PA report Parliament’s reaction to the report Torres et al. (2016) 
Report quality and materiality Etverk (2002), Johnson et al. (2001), Morin (2004), Weets (2011), 
Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017), Hatherly and Parker 
(1988), Lonsdale and Bechberger (2011), Raudla et al. (2015), Frey 
(1994), Parker and Jacobs (2015) 
Organisational learning effect (for auditees) Morin (2008), Van der Meer (1999) 
Report as instrument for negotiations Morin (2008), Barrett (2001), Sharma (2007) 
Report as accountability instrument  Gerald (2015), Mayne (2007), Lonsdale (2000), Skærbæk and 
Christensen (2015), Roberts and Pollitt (1994), Sharma (2007), 
Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017), Mzenzi and Gaspar (2015), 
Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a, 2015) 
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Qualitative, quantitative as well as mixed-method studies have demonstrated that PAs 
generally have impact. The impact, however, varies from audit to audit: while some PAs appear 
to have had significant impact, others have only marginally contributed to organisations’ 
improved performance and enhanced accountability. The literature further demonstrates that 
PAs do not necessarily have positive impacts, and that it should therefore not be taken for 
granted that PAs lead to improvements.  
Following the analysis of previous studies, it must be acknowledged that research remains 
fragmented and is far from constituting a comprehensible body of knowledge. That is further 
reinforced by the substantial variety in the scope of studies and the different research designs 
and theoretical underpinnings they apply. This, in turn, complicates the systematic comparison 
of those studies. Given that PAs and accountability are closely related, it is noteworthy that 
only few studies (e.g. Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen, 2018; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a; 
Wade, 2008) examine PA impacts through the accountability lens. 
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4 Theoretical framework  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the theoretical framework that guides this research study is introduced. The 
applied theoretical framework is comprised of New Institutional Sociology (NIS) as macro 
theory, and dimensions of accountability relationships informing NIS (Ryan et al., 2002). As 
relevant key stakeholders’ accountability relationships are constrained and shaped by the 
political and socio-economic factors of the institutional system in which those relationships are 
enacted, it is central to analytically situate accountability within this specific institutional 
context (Jarvis, 2017; Bovens, 2010; Black, 2008; Parker and Gould, 1999). Bovens (2005, p. 
184), who refers to accountability as an institutional arrangement, underlines the need of an 
assessment of accountability through the lens of NIS. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections, i.e. NIS and accountability. The first section 
sets out the broader institutional context, in which PA is defined as an institution, Australia’s 
Westminster system and accountability framework as the institutional environment and key 
stakeholder groups and their accountability relationships as the relevant organisational field 
(Wade, 2008; Dillard et al., 2004; Scott, 1987). Thereafter, relevant NIS concepts of 
organisational legitimacy, rationalised myths, and organisational change are outlined, which 
provide further insights into the nature and scope of PA impacts as well as stakeholders’ 
accountability relationships. After enriching our understanding of the institutional setting, the 
researcher draws more particularly on stakeholders’ accountability relationships. She 
elaborates on the notion of accountability as understood in this research study and provides 
insights into the significance of accountability for PA work, before distinguishing between the 
three dimensions of political, public, and managerial accountability exerted at the 
organisational field level. 
In his critique of the use of NIS, Suddaby (2010) stresses that institutional theory benefits from 
insights of other theoretical lenses. Embedding dimensions of accountability relationships 
within NIS helps the author to better understand the external factors that shape the formation 
of accountability relationships and how these accountability relationships influence key 
stakeholders’ perceptions of PAs. This theoretical approach allows the researcher to view the 
research phenomenon through complementary and mutually enriching and reinforcing lenses. 
Throughout this chapter the researcher demonstrates that the lenses of NIS and accountability 
can logically be applied together and elaborates in detail how the application of both lenses 
adds value to this study by explaining particular phenomena that each lens would most 
probably not be able to explain if applied alone. 
4.2 New Institutional Sociology 
New Institutionalism has been applied in various disciplines such as politics, economics and 
sociology and has, thus, been conferred a multi-disciplinary character (Scott, 2014; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983).16 This thesis focuses on new institutionalism from the sociological 
perspective, termed New Institutional Sociology (NIS). NIS is concerned with the influence 
institutions and their environments have on the organisational field populated by institutional 
 
16 Scott (2014) provides a comprehensive overview of the different streams (i.e. politics, economics and sociology) 
of new institutionalism. 
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actors (Scott, 2014; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Jepperson, 
2002). In other words, most new institutional sociologists posit that institutional actors 
operating in the organisational field are subject to pressures from the social, cultural, and 
political setting (Fogarty, 1996; Flack and Ryan, 2003).  
In this research study the focus is not on the specific organisations but on their representatives 
to whom the author refers to as key stakeholders. New institutional sociologists often refer to 
institutional actors as the subject under study. Zilber (2002) refers to institutional actors as 
organisational members that are not passive but might become active in choosing actions to 
respond to institutional pressures and demands, and Dacin et al. (2002, p. 47) refer to 
institutional actors as those “who give meaning and life to institutions”. There seems to be no 
unified definition of what institutional actors entail. Scott (1987), for example, defines the state, 
public officials or professional bodies as institutional actors. Ryan et al. (2002), who study 
annual reporting practices in the Australian public sector through the theoretical lens of 
institutional theory informed by accountability theory, refer to government departments, local 
government councils, ministers and parliament, the AG, and taxpayers, to name only a few, as 
stakeholders who influence annual reporting practices and policies. In this study the term key 
stakeholder groups refers to the groups of auditees, VAGO performance auditors, MPs, and 
journalists. 
In contrast to Old Institutional Theory (OIT)17 that primarily focuses on individual 
organisations, the focus of NIS is particularly upon the organisational field level, also termed 
“network of organizations” by Greenwood and Hinings (1996, p. 1026), emphasising the 
relationships between institutional actors (Hinings and Tolbert, 2008; Meyer, 2008; Scott, 
2014). The idea of NIS is that organisations’ actions are not determined by internal 
organisational arrangements but rather by other institutional actors populating the 
organisational field, who decide whether those organisations’ actions and behaviour are 
legitimate (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 1991, 1995; see section 4.2.4.1). Whether organisations are 
granted legitimacy often depends on whether they incorporate the rules, norms, and beliefs 
prescribed by the institutional environment (Hoffman, 1999; Carruthers, 1995; see section 
4.2.4.2). As highlighted by Scott (2014) and Lounsbury (2008) the uniqueness of NIS is rooted 
in its emphasis on the primacy of culture, underlining how social structures and taken-for-
granted meanings are created and have significant consequences for institutional actors. 
Before introducing the fundamental concepts of NIS underpinning this study and explaining 
how they are applied on this research, attention needs to be drawn to the diffuse nature of NIS 
and the diverse ways in which NIS has been defined (Scott, 1987). Studies by new institutional 
sociologists such as Wooten and Hoffman (2008) confirm that the lament expressed by 
DiMaggio and Powell in 1991 (p. 1) about what NIS is about still holds true: “it is often easier 
to gain agreement about what it is not than about what it is”. Indeed, several theorists noted 
that ironically the theory itself is not highly institutionalised (Suddaby, 2010; Wooten and 
Hoffman, 2008; Scott, 1987, 2014), but is rather underpinned by a variety of theoretical 
formulations claiming a sociological institutional focus (Peters, 2012), which leads us to the 
need to explicate the different institutional concepts in more detail in sections 4.2.4.1 to 
4.2.4.3. Following this discussion, it is not surprising that various scholars argue that one major 
problem NIS faces is the broad variety on the boundaries of theoretical definitions of core 
elements of NIS, such as institution, organisational field and institutional environment, as well 
 
17 For a detailed distinction between new an old institutionalism, see DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Hirsch and 
Lounsbury (1997). 
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as NIS concepts relevant for this study (Dacin et al., 2002; Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; 
Hoffman, 1999). In this regard, Scott (1987), in his work on The adolescence of institutional 
theory, noted that there is no single, unified definition of institutional propositions but rather a 
plethora of interrelated ideas. He (p. 493), therefore, advises that “the beginning of wisdom in 
approaching institutional theory is to recognize that there is not one but several variants”. 
Following Scott’s advice, the researcher acknowledges that there is not one way to apply NIS 
and draws on those theoretical studies, which she considers most significant in terms of their 
comprehension of NIS with respect to the purpose of this study (e.g. Scott, 2014; Zucker, 1987; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Dillard et al., 2014).  
Scott (2014) emphasised that new institutional sociologists have employed an oversimplified 
dichotomy between old and new institutional theory, whereas the ideas of NIS do not represent 
a sharp break with the past, i.e. OIT. Instead, NIS presents new emphases and insights. It is not 
part of this research study, to contribute to the overblown distinction between old and new 
institutional approaches (Suddaby, 2010). Instead, the author draws on studies by Greenwood 
et al. (2002) and Hoffman (1999), who theorise the concept of organisational change originally 
introduced by OIT (see section 4.2.4.3), whereby they bridge the theoretical divide.  
In recent years, numerous accounting scholars have demonstrated the value of NIS for studying 
institutional processes in the public sector (e.g. Touron, 2005; Burns and Scapens, 2000; 
Scapens and Varoutsa, 2010; Carruthers, 1995; Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; Fogarty, 1992a and 
b; Dirsmith et al., 2000; Dillard et al., 2004; Van Helden, 2005), including NPM phenomena 
such as PA work (e.g. Wade, 2008; Parker and Gould, 1999; Jacobs, 1998; Funnell and Wade, 
2012; Torres et al., 2016). Although NIS, as argued by Fogarty (1996, p. 246), is to varying 
degrees applicable to any kind of organisation, it is particularly useful for the analysis of public 
sector organisations as they “provide the most obvious examples of an institutionalised 
environment”. With regards to the usefulness of NIS to examine key stakeholders’ perceptions 
and interpretations, it is argued that the highly institutionalised PA practice in Victoria is 
applicable for the investigation through NIS. The significance of examining PA work in 
Victoria and the underlying accountability relationships among stakeholder groups through 
NIS comes to the fore as numerous accounting scholars (Miller, 1994; Dillard et al., 2004; 
Mulgan, 2000; Modell, 2009) have announced that they welcome the conduct of NIS-informed 
research that extends the academic understanding of how accounting practice in the new public 
sector influences and is influenced by a multiplicity of institutional actors. The aim of the 
subsequent sections is to reduce the ambiguity of NIS elements and to explain how those are 
applied on this research. 
4.2.1 Institution 
Due to the multi-disciplinary character of NIS the institutional school of thought does not offer 
a single, unified definition of the notion institution (Greenwood et al., 2008; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Rather, each discipline seems to either only vaguely 
define what an institution should entail or professes its own modified concept (Wade, 2008). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 8) highlight that the notion of institution takes on different 
meanings as we move from economic approaches of institutional theory to sociological 
approaches: 
“In the former approaches, institutions are the products of human design, the 
outcomes of purposive actions by instrumentally oriented individuals. But in the 
latter, while institutions are certainly the result of human activity, they are not 
necessarily the products of conscious design.” 
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In 1995, Scott offered a more precise definition of institutions by introducing the three pillars 
of institutions, i.e. the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillars, as vital ingredients 
of institutions. Following Scott’s (1995, 2014) conception, regulatory aspects of institutions 
involve the capacity to establish rules and regulations, scrutinise others’ conformity to them, 
and, if required, impose sanctions in an attempt to guide and influence future behaviour. 
Sanctioning procedures may take place through informal mechanisms such as blaming and 
shaming or may be more formalised and assigned to specific institutional actors such as police 
or legal courts (Hoffman, 1999; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Normative aspects of institutions generally take the form of rules-of-thumb and standard 
operating procedures (Scott, 2008; Zucker, 1987). March and Olsen (1989, p. 21) embrace the 
normative pillar of institutions when arguing that “[m]uch of the behaviour we observe in 
political institutions reflects the routine way in which people do what they are supposed to do”. 
In other words, the emphasis of the normative pillar is on the appropriateness of actions and 
the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour (Scott, 2014). In responding to 
a normative institution, institutional actors may ask “[g]iven this situation, and my role within 
it, what is the appropriate behaviour for me to carry out?” (Scott, 2014, p. 81). The normative 
pillar is comprised of norms and values of individuals and groups of actors. Scott (2014, p. 80) 
emphasises that  
“normative expectations [..] regarding how specified actors are supposed to behave 
[…] are held by other salient actors in the situation, and so are experienced by the 
focal actor as external pressure.” 
Institutional theorists typically view normative institutional elements as systems that impose 
control and constraints on institutional actors’ social behaviour (Ruef and Scott, 1998; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However, as highlighted by Scott (2014), it is important to 
recognise that the normative component also enables and empowers institutional actors, their 
behaviour and actions, as it confers responsibilities and duties, and provides stimulus and 
guidelines.  
New institutional theorists have particularly stressed the centrality of cultural-cognitive 
elements of institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Scott (2014) 
refers to cultural-cognitive elements as symbols in form of e.g. words, signs and gestures that 
effectively shape the meaning institutional actors attribute to activities, processes and objects. 
Hoffman (1999) claims that cultural-cognitive institutional aspects form a culturally supported 
and conceptually correct basis of legitimacy that becomes unquestioned. He exemplifies that it 
is considered as taken-for-granted that, for instance, environmental activists pursue idealistic 
or collectivist interests, whereas corporations pursue economic and materialistic goals. 
Although rules, norms and cultural-cognitive elements are central building blocks of 
institutions, Scott (2014) claims that new institutional sociologists also need to attend to 
institutional actors’ behaviours and activities that produce, reproduce, and change institutions. 
Barley and Tolbert (1997), Zucker (1977) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) claim that over time, 
institutional actors create and shape institutions through a history of interactions and 
negotiations resulting in shared typifications and generalised interpretations of actions and 
behaviour leading to taken-for-granted assumptions, which in turn, pattern future interactions 
and the formation of relations. 
Following Scott (2008, 2014), Zucker (1977) and Barely and Tolbert (1997), this thesis adopts 
the view that institutions are social constructs that emerge from human activity, have legal or 
rule-like status, constrain and empower institutional actors and influence how they define their 
relations to others. In line with these NIS conceptions and Wade’s (2008) definition of 
ANAO’s PA practice as institution, in this research, PA practice constitutes the institution 
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under study. In Australia, the PA mandate is now well-institutionalised as appropriate practice 
for public sector performance assessment and improvement (Funnell and Wade, 2012; Parker 
and Jacobs, 2015; Gerald, 2015; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Gendron et al., 2001). This thesis 
is concerned with the development stage that PA activities in Australia reached in 2009/2010, 
after a long period of evolution (Parker and Gould, 1999). In Victoria, PA work derives its 
legal significance from the Audit Act 1994 and holds rule-like status as a component of the 
state’s accountability apparatus anchored in NPM (Hamilton, 2015; Keen, 1999). It is a 
heterogeneous phenomenon (Pollitt, 2003), largely formed by its contextual surroundings such 
as the political, economic and social climate (Hatherly and Parker, 1988; Pollitt et al., 1999), 
and is of both symbolic and practical significance for key stakeholders. 
4.2.2 Institutional environment 
In foundational institutional work, new institutional sociologists claimed that the survival of 
organisations is more influenced by their institutional environment than by the technical 
environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Orrú et al., 1991; Oliver, 1997). This proposition 
requires a definition of those two terminologies. Scott and Meyer (1991, p. 123) examined the 
technical/institutional dichotomy and made the following distinction:  
“[T]echnical environments are those in which a product or service is produced and 
exchanged in a market such that organizations are rewarded for effective and 
efficient control of their production systems (…).” 
“Institutional environments […] are characterized by the elaboration of rules and 
requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive 
support and legitimacy.”  
Organisations operating in the construction or manufacturing industry are typically embedded 
in predominantly technical environments. On the other side of the technical/institutional 
environment continuum, non-profit and public sector organisations such as schools, churches 
and hospitals are located that operate in highly institutionalised environments (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1991; Fogarty, 1996; Scott, 2008). Several authors agree that institutional 
environments emerge from state structures that shape the environments of organisations 
through laws and regulations (Scott,1991; Carroll et al., 1988; Zucker, 1987; Thomas and 
Meyer, 1984; Thomas et al., 1987). In accordance with this perspective, Dillard et al. (2004) 
define institutional environments as a macro-level at which political and economic forces are 
articulated and exercised and where society’s most widely promulgated and taken-for-granted 
norms, beliefs and practices circulate. In the words of DiMaggio and Powell (1991, pp. 12-3) 
institutional environments, “creat[e] the lenses through which actors view the world and the 
very categories of structure, action, and thought”. This does not only happen through rules and 
regulations. In fact, as proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1991), Zucker (1977), Fogarty 
(1996), Tolbert (1985), and Scott (2014), modern organisational forms and procedures are not 
only manifestations of powerful institutional rules and regulations or rule-like frameworks, but 
also widely promulgated cultural elements such as taken-for-granted norms and beliefs – what 
Meyer and Rowan (1991) refer to as institutionalised or rationalised myths (see section 
4.2.4.2). Institutional actors experience pressure to adjust their behaviour and processes to 
those expected beliefs prescribed by the institutional environment in order to be granted 
legitimacy essential for their survival (Scott, 2008).  
According to Parker and Guthrie (1991) and Jacobs (1998), the nature of PA practice depends 
on the political, legislative and social forces that shape the dynamics of PAs in a particular 
environment. Following Dillard’s et al. (2004) definition of institutional environment, in this 
thesis the institutional environment that shapes PAs as institution is comprised of Australia’s 
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overarching political Westminster governance framework and its underpinning public 
accountability framework (Aroney et al., 2015; Hamilton, 2015). Australia’s Westminster 
system and public accountability framework have political and legislative relevance for PAs 
as institution, emphasise PAs’ significance and set the boundaries of the organisational field 
(see section 4.2.3).18  
Following Dillard et al. (2004) this thesis supports the concept of a cascading hierarchy of 
institutional influence with the institutional environment as originator of political and legal 
boundaries and rule-like frameworks shaping and regulating the organisational field. Specific 
organisational structures, practices and relations are created and evolve at the organisational 
field level, which provides “the context for the institutions confronted by and embedded in 
organizations” (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 513).  
4.2.3 Organisational field 
Rules, norms and taken-for-granted assumptions prescribed by the institutional environment 
are translated into and absorbed by institutional actors populating the organisational field 
(Dillard et al., 2004). The institutional environment conditions the foundation of stakeholder 
relationships, which illustrate the skeleton of the organisational field (Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2008; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). For various new institutional sociologists the 
organisational field level has become the central unit of analysis (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio, 1991; Wooten and Hoffman, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2002). DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983, p. 148) define organisational field as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognized area of institutional life”. Essential to this definition is the focus upon 
‘sets’ or ‘communities’ of institutional actors as members of organisations that directly interact 
with each other or are influenced by each other (Greenwood et al., 2002). To this view, Scott 
(1995, p. 56) adds that strictly speaking, the organisational field is  
“a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and 
whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with 
actors outside the field”. 
In his study on the maturity of institutional theory, Scott (2008) noted that early formulations 
of the organisational field concept put much focus on relational and structural features, while 
neglecting cultural and symbolic elements (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 
1983), whereas more recent research highlights both, relational system and meanings as 
constituent features of organisational fields (e.g. Haveman and Rao, 1997; Rao et al., 2003; 
Scott et al., 2000). Hoffman (1999, p. 352) further adds that organisational fields should be 
seen as centre of dialogue and discussion, where institutional actors with competing interests 
negotiate what is important.  
Organisational fields can be created around a set of products, processes, services or issues 
(Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 2014). For instance, in their study on institutional change in the 
education sector in the UK, Ezzamel et al. (2007) refer to organisational field as education field 
populated by schools, school governing bodies, state agencies, parents, and school network 
groups, all affected by education reforms. In Hoffman’s (1999) study on institutional change 
in corporate environmentalism in the US chemical industry, the organisational field of 
environmental protection is populated by stakeholders from selected industries, environmental 
 
18 See Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, Chapter 2, Part 2-3, Division 3, Section 40 
(1), see also Public Accounts and Audit Committee Act 1951, Section 7 (8). 
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activists and governmental agencies. The organisational field perspective has also been 
employed in a PA study by Wade (2008): the organisational field of ANAO PA activities is 
comprised of the ANAO, parliament, PAC, executive government, and the Australian Public 
Service (APS). As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Ezzamel et al. (2007) have observed, the 
organisational field level as an analytical concept is fluid as evidenced by the different facets 
that have been emphasised by different scholars. 
Organisational field membership for this study is defined by who is influenced and affected by 
VAGO PAs. Thus, the organisational field embraces the stakeholder groups of auditees, 
performance auditors, MPs and journalists, who are likely to have overlapping as well as 
potentially conflicting interests. This selection of institutional stakeholders is in accordance 
with most NIS theorists’ perspectives that institutional actors exerting pressure and influencing 
institutional processes do not only include government bodies but also the media (Scott, 2014; 
Dillard et al., 2004; Hinings and Tolbert, 2008). Since interactions between key stakeholders 
are routinised due to the institutionalised PA practice in Victoria the relevant organisational 
field is considered a mature field in which stakeholders have a strong mutual awareness of the 
presence of other stakeholders occupying the field (Scott, 2014; Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006). 
Given that all key stakeholders populating the organisational field are involved in various 
relationships the researcher proposes that NIS allows for an extensive examination of 
accountability relationships between the stakeholders within the relevant institutional PA 
setting. Thereby, the researcher follows Wooten and Hoffman (2008, p. 139) who claim that 
organisational fields must be seen as “relational spaces”, where institutional actors “involve 
themselves with one another in an effort to develop collective understandings regarding matters 
that are consequential for organizational and field-level activities”. Adopting this field-level 
perspective is particularly relevant as PA work, according to Guthrie and Parker (1999, p. 327), 
constitutes a dramatic play in which actors as well as the public as audience “continually create 
and review the execution of the drama”. According to Scott (2014) the organisational field is 
of particular significance for the analysis of institutional processes as it is the field level, where 
NIS concepts come into effect. 
4.2.4 Relevant institutional concepts 
In applying NIS, scholars risk becoming lost in the diversity of institutional elements and 
concepts. For the theoretical framework the author has focused on institutional concepts that 
are of fundamental significance for this study. The concepts that have potential to contribute 
to the achievement of the central research objective are organisational legitimacy, rationalised 
myths, and organisational change. The following sections explain these concepts and outline 
how they are applied. Further, it is demonstrated that these concepts are interconnected and 
offer an integrated theoretical conception. 
4.2.4.1 Organisational legitimacy 
Legitimacy as one of the core concepts of NIS influences how organisations act and behave 
(Suchman, 1995; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Deephouse et al., 2016). Suchman (1995) 
and Scott (2014) define legitimacy as a condition that reflects organisations’ consonance with 
rules and regulations, normative values, or their alignment with cultural-cognitive frameworks. 
Based on this definition it is argued that once conferred, legitimacy creates a picture of social 
acceptability and credibility and is a conduit to the survival of an organisation and its economic 
well-being (Scott, 2014; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Deegan, 2002). Legitimacy has further been 
shown to affect organisations’ performance as well as their relationships to other organisations 
(Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Singh et al., 1986; Black, 2008). Being granted legitimacy is a 
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condition sine qua non for organisations to obtain access to resources and enjoy largely 
unquestioned freedom to pursue their operations. Organisations whose legitimacy is 
questioned, are more vulnerable to claims that they are negligent, have less freedom and are, 
in fact, closely monitored by significant others (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 
1983).  
Organisations are granted legitimacy when significant others consider them as desirable and 
appropriate. Bitektine (2011) reminds us that organisational legitimacy is rendered by others 
who evaluate and judge organisations’ processes, structures, and outcomes, their leaders, and 
relations to other actors, and based on this assessment support, remain neutral, or sanction 
organisations. It has been widely recognised that legitimacy exists in “the eye of the beholder" 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p. 416) and that sources conferring legitimacy differ from one 
organisational field to another (Bitektine, 2011). The status of legitimacy is conferred by actors 
empowered and authorised to grant legitimacy (Scott, 2014; Watts et al., 2010). Legitimacy 
sources commonly identified in institutional and accounting literatures are parliament (Baum 
and Oliver, 1991; Meyer et al., 1983), auditors (Gendron et al., 2001; Mulgan, 1997; English, 
2007), as well as the media (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985). In accordance with legitimacy sources identified in previous studies, the 
sources relevant for this study are MPs, journalists and performance auditors. The media as 
proxy for the public opinion does not only reflect society-wide legitimacy but also holds 
potential to significantly influence the general public’s opinion (Scott, 2014; Greenwood et al., 
2008). Due to their broad reach, media reports and articles have widely been considered as an 
operationalisation of legitimacy (Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Brown and Deegan, 1998; 
Deephouse and Carter, 2005). The voice and tone of the media are often used as surrogate 
measures of organisations’ legitimacy with the norms and values of the general public 
(Deephouse and Cater, 2005). Hybels (1995) contends that the media, by reporting on 
organisations’ actions does not only monitor those organisations but also considerably 
influences other actors in their decision-making, for instance, when allocating resources. The 
media as battleground for the negotiation of organisational legitimacy offers an arena where 
de-legitimating attacks are executed (Bitektine, 2011; Ingram and Rao 2004). Parliament 
actively participates in this negotiation process. As parliament does not only influence 
regulation and legislation but also plays a significant role in the allocation of annual budgets 
(Hybels, 1995), for public sector organisations it is essential to be perceived as legitimate by 
parliament. Parliamentary hearings, where the media and performance auditors are present, 
offer an arena for the negotiation of public sector organisations’ legitimacy.  
It is critical to note that not all legitimacy sources have equal weights and, therefore, their 
legitimacy assessments do not have equal importance (Ruef and Scott, 1998). This often leads 
to situations in which organisations seeking legitimacy strategically choose the source with 
which they shall conform (Bitektine, 2011; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). One useful approach 
for gaining or maintaining legitimate status when confronted by inconsistent legitimacy 
requirements expressed by multiple sources is decoupling, which enables organisations to seek 
or retain legitimacy while engaging in business as usual (Boxenbaum and Johnson, 2008). 
Auditees may, for instance, implement changes suggested by performance auditors, although 
decoupling them to be granted legitimacy from the AG while implementing processes conform 
with the government of the day in order to preserve their legitimacy (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 
2014a).  
Apart from the variety of institutional actors authorised to grant legitimacy, Galaskiewicz 
(1985) and Deephouse and Suchman (2008) emphasise that accountability relationships play a 
role in the legitimacy-conferring process. In this context, Black (2008) contends that 
accountability relationships are the route through which legitimacy claims are constructed, 
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validated, and/or contested. In the same vein, Harlow and Rawlings (2007, p. 545) speak of 
“legitimation through accountability” and Bovens (2005), as will be shown in section 4.3.2, 
proposes that obtaining, maintaining and enhancing legitimacy is one of the central functions 
of accountability. However, although accountability relationships can be critical for legitimacy, 
Black (2008) contends that legitimacy is not necessarily always dependent on accountability 
relationships. The author asserts that organisations may be afforded legitimacy for various 
reasons, even though they make no attempt to be accountable.  
This thesis adopts Black’s (2008) view that accountability and legitimacy are related concepts. 
As outlined earlier, key stakeholder groups can take the role as legitimators. As sources of 
legitimation they may influence their managerial, political and public accountability 
relationships (see section 4.3.3) in the organisational field (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). 
The NIS-concept of legitimacy informs the accountability lens and helps the researcher to gain 
further insights into how stakeholders perceive their accountability relationships (see RQ1). 
This, in turn, may have further consequences with regards to stakeholders’ interpretation of PA 
impacts. 
Institutional actors gain legitimacy by conforming to beliefs, values, and rules imposed by the 
institutional environment (Deephouse, 1996; Ruef and Scott, 1998; Bitektine, 2011). Meyer 
and Rowan (1977), in their pioneering work, emphasise how organisations that adhere to the 
prescriptions of rationalised myths in the institutional environment can gain legitimacy and 
thereby protect themselves from having their conduct questioned. Hence, legitimacy as one of 
the survival-enhancing phenomena may not only result from the legitimating powers of 
significant others (Deephouse et al., 2016; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Kamens, 1977), 
but also from conforming to the myths embedded in the institutional environment.  
4.2.4.2 Rationalised myths 
In their foundational work on NIS, Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that in modern societies 
formal organisational structures arise as reflections of rationalised institutional rules. These 
rationalised institutionalised rules function as rationalised myths that are incorporated by 
organisations. Myths are rationalised because they take the shape of rule-like prescriptions 
reflecting values, norms, beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions that are widely shared and 
embodied amongst institutional actors in the organisational field (Touron, 2005; Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997). This implies that institutional actors are influenced by wider belief systems and 
external cultural frameworks (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). New 
institutional sociologists agree that organisations that embody rationalised myths demonstrate 
that they act in a legitimate manner (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001).  
Meyer and Rowan (1977) provide examples of myths: they define jealousy, anger, altruism, 
and love as myths that explain actions of individuals, and the professions of doctors and 
accountants and the services of assembly lines as myths that explain organisational activities. 
The authors contend that the impact of rationalised myths on institutional actors is enormous: 
they can empower, but also constrain their behaviour and actions and specify the means for 
coping with them. Moreover, rationalised myths are not stable, but rather mutable objects that 
can increase and decrease in their meaning (Bealing, 1994; Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
Accounting literature offers a variety of identified rationalised myths, such as auditor 
independence (Wade, 2008), public sector performance measurement systems (Brignall and 
Modell, 2000), GAO’s work processes (Dirsmith et al., 2000), and Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001).  
To gain more comprehensive insights into the phenomenon of PA impacts, it is an essential 
step to examine the usefulness relevant stakeholders attribute to PAs (Schwartz and Mayne, 
 
67 
2005; Wade, 2008). Hence, one rationalised myth considered in this thesis is PA usefulness. 
PAs are useful when they add value to audited organisations through the achievement of 
performance improvements (Morin, 2001; Raudla et al., 2015: Pollitt and Summa, 1997). As 
previous studies on PA impacts found that PAs have not always made positive contributions to 
audited organisations (Bowerman et al., 2000; Braithwaite, 2008; Power, 1997), it is essential 
to examine whether key stakeholders generally consider PAs as useful. Another rationalised 
myth embedded in the relevant institutional environment and examined in this study is the three 
Es, the underlying concepts of PA (Parker and Gould, 1999; Guthrie and Parker, 1999). 
Empirical findings by Parker and Jacobs (2015) support the definition of the three Es as a 
rationalised myth. The authors discovered that PAs conducted across Australia between 2001 
and 2012 have not always focussed on all three Es (see chapter 3). That, however, may affect 
key stakeholders’ interpretations of impacts. The final rationalised myth of relevance for this 
study is Power’s (1997, 2000) audit society. Emerging from the audit explosion, as a 
consequence of the NPM and its demands for more accountability and PA activities (Hood, 
1995; Power, 2000; Pierre and de Fine Licht, 2019), the audit society has created a growing 
population of auditees confronted with an intensification of audits (Bowerman et al., 2000). 
Power (1997, 2000) claims that auditees are likely to react to the increasing pressures of the 
audit intensification either through adaptation or resistance. As illustrated by Appendix 1, PA 
activities in Victoria have indeed increased over the relevant time period. Hence, it is essential 
to examine how auditees perceive the intensification of PAs and whether it affects the 
perceived usefulness and potential impacts.  
4.2.4.3 Organisational change 
Various institutional theorists have concluded that NIS “neither denies nor is inconsistent with 
change” (Greenwood et al., 2002, p. 59), and, in fact, contains “an excellent basis” (Dougherty, 
1994, p. 108) for the investigation of organisational change as it outlines the contextual 
dynamics of the institutional environment and organisational field level, which may trigger 
organisational change (Leblebici et al., 1991; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). Other scholars have 
provided opposing views, arguing that NIS fails to adequately address the concept of 
organisational change as it usually provides explanations for organisational similarity, i.e. 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Orrú et al., 1991). With regards to the latter, 
however, Hoffman (1999, p. 351) clarifies that the focus of NIS on isomorphism “facilitates a 
popular misconception of the theory as having only stability and inertia as its central defining 
characteristics” (see also DiMaggio, 1995; Suddaby, 2010). The author corrects this 
misconception by reintroducing the OIT’s concept of change into the new institutionalism 
literature and thereby follows Greenwood and Hinings (1996) who bridge the old and new 
institutionalism by applying concepts of change seeking to provide a more complete account 
for understanding organisations’ responses to institutional pressures. By embedding the 
concept of organisational change anchored in OIT in NIS, the researcher of this study follows 
propositions made by scholars who called for merging OIT concepts with new institutional 
approaches in order to create one more coherent theory (e.g. Hoffman, 1999, Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996; Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996). In fact, the ideas about 
organisational change drawn from OIT “fit with neoinstitutional ideas about inertia and 
resistance to change” (Hoffman, 1999, p. 367), relevant for this study. 
To explore changes imposed on audited organisations, this thesis borrows concepts of change 
from the organisational change literature, which has increasingly distinguished between 
revolutionary and radical (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), also labelled frame-breaking 
change (Nadler and Tushman, 1989), and convergent change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), 
also referred to as incremental change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). Convergent or 
incremental change is located on the lower scale and is associated with fine tuning of existing 
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orientations within the parameters of the present frame. At the opposite end on the continuum, 
radical organisational change refers to the ability of transforming the entire organisation by 
breaking loose from existing orientations through moving from one structure or concept to 
another. The dimensions of evolutionary and revolutionary change are concerned with the scale 
of upheaval and adjustment (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).  
Previous PA studies mention general kinds of changes, while only minimal reference has been 
made to the dimensions of changes and the usefulness of such changes. The concepts of change 
outlined above help the researcher to further explore known forms of changes, to investigate 
unknown and unexpected forms, and to identify their magnitude. An examination of 
organisational changes and their magnitude as experienced by participants of this study 
provides insights into key stakeholders’ perceived usefulness of those changes. 
4.3 Accountability 
In this research study, it is the organisational field level that provides the revealing foundation 
for the examination of accountability relationships between key stakeholders (Ryan et al., 
2002). As in the accounting profession, there is a distinct lack of consensus with respect to 
what holding to account and being held to account implies (Cooper and Owen, 2007), the 
following section sheds theoretical and empirical light on the terminological ambiguity of the 
notion of accountability. Thereafter, accountability in the PA context is addressed before 
relevant dimensions of accountability relationships are outlined. 
4.3.1 Terminological ambiguity: the notion of accountability 
Research on accountability has long suffered from academics’ inability to reach consensus on 
how to define this chameleon-like term that appears to have different meanings to different 
people (Bovens, 2010; Mulgan, 2000; Sinclair, 1995; Luke, 2010). The notion of accountability 
appears to be controversial and paradoxical (Parker and Gould, 1999; Jos and Tompkins, 2004; 
Mayne, 2007). In fact, the multi-faceted nature of the term accountability has led to distinct but 
complementary problems in accountability research (Ebrahim, 2003): first, a considerable 
body of theoretical and empirical studies has been published that does not adopt an explicit 
conceptualisation of accountability (Dunn and Legge, 2001; Jarvis, 2014). Second, scholars 
have argued for a more comprehensive definition of the notion of accountability. This, in turn, 
resulted in the classification and exploration of various dimensions of accountability (Mulgan, 
2000, 2003; Bovens, 2007; Parker and Gould, 1999; and see section 4.3.3) that have expanded 
rather than consolidated previous research efforts and led to an increased number of less 
explicit conceptualisations of accountability (Bovens, 2010; Jarvis and Thomas, 2012). 
According to Bovens (2010, p. 947) this disjointedness of definitions is due to the many 
discussions about accountability, that “seem to go in circles, as every volume and author tries 
to redefine accountability in his or her own way”.  
The various interpretations and conceptualisations of accountability are partly due to different 
streams of academic research. Bovens (2010) noted that American scholars often apply 
accountability as a virtue, as a set of normative standards for the assessment of public officials’ 
behaviour (e.g. Koppell, 2005; Dunn and Legge, 2001; Klingner et al., 2001; Wang, 2002). 
Used in this manner, scholars often reference accountability as an adjective in order to describe 
the behaviour of public officials either as positively or negatively, i.e. being accountable or 
unaccountable (Jarvis, 2014; Bovens, 2010). Therefore, accountability as a virtue has strong 
positive connotations as a (desirable) quality (Dubnick, 2007). 
In contrast, as Bovens (2010) argues, Australian, British, Canadian and Central European 
academics often consider accountability as an institutional relation or arrangement, a social 
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mechanism, in which an individual or group can be held accountable by another individual or 
group (e.g. Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005; Bovens, 2007; Bovens et al., 2008; Mulgan, 2003; Parker 
and Gould, 1999). Their focus is not on whether individuals or groups acted in an accountable 
way but on how institutional accountability arrangements are operationalised (Bovens, 2010). 
Accountability as a mechanism entails a relationship between the actor (the accountee) and the 
forum (the accountor) (Pollitt, 2003). Bovens (2007, p. 450) offers a definition of 
accountability as a mechanism, which is applicable to the institutional PA setting:  
“Accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences.”  
In other words, an accountability relationship implies that individuals or groups (actors) are 
required to provide information about their actions or non-actions (answerability) to other 
individuals or groups (forum), justifying their actions or non-actions (amenability) and taking 
responsibility for them (Jabbra and Dwivedi, 1988; Parker and Gould, 1999; Roberts and 
Scapens, 1985; Bemelmans-Videc, 2007; Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Thynne and Goldring, 
1987). With respect to the current study, key stakeholders may take the roles of the actor and/or 
forum depending on the dimension of the accountability relationship(s) (see section 4.3.3). 
As indicated by Bovens’ (2007) definition an accountability relationship involves the 
possibility of debate, the posing of questions by the forum, the requirement for the actor to 
provide answers, and eventually, the judgement of the actor by the forum. Judgement may 
result in the imposition of corrective action or sanctions on the actor (Bovens, 2010; Aucoin 
and Jarvis, 2005). With respect to the consequences of being held to account, Bemelmans-
Videc (2007, p. 24) considers sanctioning a vital part of a formal accountability relation and 
refers to the ability of parliament as a higher administrative echelon to impose sanctions on 
auditees that “may vary from formal judicial convictions to the very public nature and resulting 
media attention”. 
This study adopts Bovens’ (2010) perspective, who proposes that to make progress in 
accountability research it is necessary to make a distinction between accountability as a virtue 
and a mechanism. In this research study particular attention is paid to accountability as a 
mechanism, centred on stakeholders’ accountability relationships as institutional arrangements 
(Mulgan, 2003; Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005). Examining accountability as a mechanism the focus 
is on developing a picture of how key stakeholders perceive their accountability relationships, 
to whom they feel accountable, for what and how (Jarvis, 2014).  
4.3.2 Accountability in the institutional performance audit setting 
Given the broad term of accountability, accounting literature has identified a multiplicity of 
purposes that accountability serves in the public sector (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). 
Accountability should achieve the purpose of attaining desired performance, thereby assuring 
that resources are spent with due regards to the three Es (Parker and Gould, 1999; Aucoin and 
Heintzman, 2000). Viewed as a mechanism, accountability is also supposed to serve as a tool 
to promote and encourage learning in the pursuit of continuous improvement in governance 
and public management (Lonsdale, 2007; Behn, 2001). Lastly, accountability is supposed to 
achieve the purpose of providing legitimacy (Christensen et al., 2014; Buchanan, 2002; 
Bovens, 2010). As PAs play a role in all these purposes, the concept of accountability 
constitutes the rationale for the existence of PAs (Lonsdale, 2007; Parker and Gould, 1999; 
Furubu, 2011). The significance of the concept of accountability for the study of PA work is 
further emphasised by Flint (1988, p. 23) who states that:  
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“[t]he primary condition for an audit is that there is a relationship of accountability 
[and that] [t]he subject matter of accountability is too remote, too complex and/or 
of too great significance for the discharge of the duty to be demonstrated without 
the process of audit.” 
In this study, PA work as institution is regarded as social structure that relies on rules and 
taken-for-granted norms and routines which have been established as guidelines for social 
behaviour (Heidhues and Patel, 2012). PAs as an “aspect of accountability” (OECD, 1996, p. 
12) are built on accountability relationships that “represent typifications of habitualized actions 
that provide meaning and stability” (Heidhues and Patel, 2012, p. 46) and form the norms and 
routines adopted by key stakeholders (Lonsdale, 2008; McPhail et al., 2016). The possible 
impacts of PAs can therefore not be studied outside the accountability conception of the PA 
network and without an examination of stakeholders’ accountability relationships. 
4.3.3 Various dimensions of accountability relationships 
In the public sector accountability relationships often extend beyond a two-party arrangement 
between one accountee and one accountor (Ryan et al., 2002; Roberts, 2002; Parker and Gould, 
1999; Luke, 2010). In fact, multiple conversations are going on at the same time between 
different parties. Accountability as a relational concept operates along multiple axes 
(Halachmi, 2002c): (1) who is accountable, (2) for what is one accountable, and (3) to whom 
is one accountable. Given the multifaceted nature of accountability relationships in 
combination with the complexities of the public sector, identifying accountability relationships 
in the PA setting can be a difficult undertaking (Stewart, 1984; Mulgan, 1997; Parker and 
Gould, 1999; Gray and Jenkins, 1993). That is also emphasised by Behn (2001) and Furubu 
(2011) who argue that it is possible for stakeholders to be the accountor in one accountability 
relationship while being the accountee in a different accountability relationship. 
Acknowledging how difficult and challenging it is to answer the questions above, Barrett 
(2001) accepts that in the complex environment of the public sector there is a continuum of 
accountability relationships between public sector organisations, performance auditors, 
parliament and the media.  
In addition to the multiplicity of accountability relationships, it may also be the case that certain 
relationships have varying influence and that the status of some stakeholder groups’ 
accountability relationships carry considerable weight (Lonsdale, 2008). As some 
accountability holders may be considered important sources of legitimacy, stakeholders 
assume to be rewarded in form of increased legitimacy when prioritising the accountability 
demands of those groups (Romzek, 2000; Ezzamel et al., 2007). In this regard, Romzek (2000, 
p. 40) emphasises the importance for public servants to “accommodate expectations from 
several different legitimate sources and be answerable for their behaviour under any and all 
accountability relationships that are relevant”. In her view, public servants are successful when 
they manage to play each role as the demands and expectations of the various stakeholders 
change. 
Dimensions of accountability therefore need to be understood with regards to the different, 
sometimes conflicting relationships between stakeholders. This is particularly important for 
governments in societies such as Australia, where the trust of the increasingly critical public in 
the government is fragile, where citizens demand more accountability for performance 
(Bovens, 2010; Power, 1997), where societal expectations for improved public services are 
greater than ever (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011), and where the media becomes more aggressive 
and intrusive (Besley and Prat, 2006). We know from previous studies that when PAs are 
conducted, several accountability relationships of different dimensions are operationalised 
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simultaneously (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a and b, 2015). Assumptions about how those 
accountability relationships are operationalised have been made by various scholars (e.g. 
Parker and Gould, 1999; Kluvers, 2003; Tippett and Kluvers, 2010), however, they have not 
been tested. An exception is Sinclair’s (1995) early study on CEOs of Australian public sector 
organisations, in which she provides empirical evidence that accountability can take various 
dimensions and is continually being socially constructed over time. Given the presence of 
several legitimate sources and multiple, diverse accountability expectations, considering 
various accountability dimensions is most appropriate and constitutes a significant part of this 
study as it is the dimension of an accountability relationship that  
“can be expected to affect the information demanded or given and the resultant 
pursuit of accountability for different things [which] may lead to preferences for 
different types of information presented.” (Parker and Gould, 1999, p. 119) 
In the wealth of accountability literature, multiple dimensions of accountability, such as 
personal/professional (Mulgan, 2000), financial (Sinclair, 1995), managerial (Stewart, 1984), 
political (Parker and Gould, 1999) and public accountability (Mulgan, 1997) have been 
identified. To focus this study and to give sufficient attention to the three primary 
accountability dimensions that “have been similarly differentiated in theoretical research” 
(Sinclair, 1995, p. 222), this thesis is concerned with the dimensions of public (Mulgan, 1997, 
2000; Luke, 2010; Kloot and Martin, 2001), political (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; Parker and 
Gould, 1999) and managerial (Glynn and Perkins, 1997; Stewart, 1984) accountability. The 
decision as to which dimensions of accountability relationships to focus on is further 
underlined by the relevant institutional environment, which emphasises the importance of 
public and political accountability, and the organisational field level, at which all three 
dimensions of accountability relationships are played out. For reasons illustrated in previous 
and following sections, the researcher argues that how key stakeholders perceive their 
accountability relationships, does potentially influence the nature and scope of PA impacts. 
4.3.3.1 Political accountability 
Political accountability has long been considered a vital component for the accurate functioning 
of a democratic political system such as that of Australia (Bovens, 2007; Parker and Gould, 
1999). In an attempt to define political accountability, Bovens (2007), Stewart (1984), Sinclair 
(1995), and Thynne and Goldring (1987) refer to upward and/or hierarchical accountability – 
exercised along the chain of accountabilities – that complies with Westminster traditions. 
Political accountability is underpinned by a clear line of authority and accountability along 
which the superior-subordinate relationship between accountability forum and actor makes the 
obligation to provide an account (Bovens, 2010). An accountability forum generally obtains its 
legitimacy from direct authority and power (Jarvis, 2017). 
In this classic hierarchical chain of accountability, auditees are directly accountable to their 
immediate superiors, the executives, who are accountable to their ministers (Bovens, 2010; 
Barton, 2006). While ministers are held to account by MPs, MPs are politically accountable to 
citizens (Parker and Gould, 1999; Day and Klein, 1987), who hold MPs accountable through 
the ballot box at election time (White and Hollingsworth, 1999; Pallot, 2003; Bemelmans-
Videc, 2007). In countries that have a parliamentary system, MPs are key actors in the chain 
of accountability and are considered as vehicle through which political accountability is 
exercised. Political accountability as outlined in this section tends to be characterised by high 
levels of politicisation. Bovens (2010) claims that when political accountability is exercised, 
scapegoating and blame gaming instead of learning are often the results. This may restrict and 
slow down the entrepreneurship and creativity of public officials. 
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Despite being one of the most commonly known and long-standing dimensions of 
accountability, Sinclair (1995) argues that the straight-line accountability relationship 
prescribed by the political dimension bears little resemblance to what really happens. Jarvis 
(2017) adds to this critique that the political dimension has simply been outpaced by the speed 
of public sector reform. The author further considers the political dimension to be incompatible 
with the complexity that characterises contemporary public sector organisations and the ways 
in which advanced democracies are governed. Sinclair (1995) found that despite political 
accountability’s poor resemblance to the real world, public sector CEOs perceived this 
dimension to be important as it protects their organisations from getting directly involved in 
political affairs. 
It has been recognised that the media is gaining power as an informal forum for political 
accountability (Bovens, 2006, 2010). This is also emphasised by Besley et al. (2002, p. 45) 
who exemplify that  
“if a bridge or a dam is being built, citizens can only ascertain whether the 
authorities have paid the proper attention to the relevant costs and benefits through 
media scrutiny”.  
The media as political watchdog enables the public to scrutinise governments’ spending of 
taxpayers’ money (Besley and Prat, 2006). Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018) claim 
that the impact of PAs may, in fact, depend on political accountability mechanisms, in which 
MPs and the media are involved. While performance auditors’ efforts to hold public sector 
organisations to account through their PA reports do not necessarily result in the desirable 
changes, the pressure increases once MPs make use of those reports to hold auditees 
accountable. Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018, p. 17) conclude that “what matters 
when it comes to actual changes is accountability pressures”. 
Over the recent decades, the movement of the public sector towards NPM and several 
developments in administrative law19 have shifted the focus to alternative dimensions of 
accountability relationships, such as managerial and public dimensions, which have been 
labelled as more horizontal accountability relationships compared to the traditional vertical-
chain version the Westminster orthodoxy indicates (Parker and Gould, 1999; Mulgan, 1997; 
APSC, 2015; Fuller and Roffey, 1993). Subsequent sections elaborate on those alternative 
accountability dimensions. 
4.3.3.2 Managerial accountability 
In light of today’s institutionalised NPM regime, accountability in the public sector has 
expanded beyond the political realm to include managerial accountability, also termed 
accountability for performance (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000; Mayne, 2007; Parker and 
Gould, 1999). As this term implies, the values embodied in managerial accountability are the 
three Es (Lonsdale, 2011; Parker and Guthrie, 1993), inferring a result and performance-based 
approach which involves the monitoring and measurement of inputs, outputs and outcomes for 
the purpose of improving public sector performance (Jacobs, 2000; Christensen and Laegreid, 
2013). In this regard, Glynn and Murphy (1996, p. 127) define managerial accountability as 
“accountability by managers for the achievement of defined, and perhaps agreed, resource 
utilization objectives”. Hence, the managerial dimension of accountability requires that those 
 
19 See e.g. the Freedom of Information Act 1982, the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, and 
the Public Service Act 1999. 
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with delegated authority are answerable for the use of resources to produce certain outputs 
(Sinclair, 1995). White and Hollingsworth (1999) argue that in contrast to the political 
accountability dimension, managerial accountability is exercised internally, within public 
sector organisations, whereas Bemelmans-Videc (2007, p. 29) provides the view that 
managerial accountability “entails internal, but also mixed internal/external supervision like 
accountability to […] supreme audit institutions […] and the like.” 
4.3.3.3 Public accountability 
Public accountability is meant to create and assure public confidence in government and to 
bridge the gap between citizens and government representatives (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000; 
Bovens, 2010; Parker, 2014a). Sinclair (1995) and Parker and Gould (1999) define public 
accountability as dimension with outward orientation and public officials’ more direct 
answerability to citizens through various mechanisms such as media reports and public 
parliamentary hearings. In this regard, McPhail et al. (2016) equate public accountability with 
‘public dialogue’.  
Arguably, public accountability is becoming less controllable and predictable for public 
officials (Parker and Gould, 1999; Burritt and Welch, 1997; Goddard and Powell, 1994), who 
are now, as Mulgan (2000) notes, accountable outwards to the public, upwards to their 
superiors through the hierarchical chain, as well as within their own organisation. In the words 
of the OECD (1996) public officials work in a fishbowl that is observed from every angle 
creating situations where public sector organisations are under intense public scrutiny (Lapsley, 
2008). The result is “a web of multiple, overlapping accountability relationships” (Romzek, 
2011, p. 28) in which multiple layers of various types of accountability are established at 
different times and at different levels (Lindberg, 2013). This multiplicity of public officials’ 
accountability relationships is further emphasised by the Australian Public Service 
Commission (APSC, 2015), which claims that  
“hierarchical relationships have now been complemented by public servants’ duty 
to explain or justify their actions to various review bodies and directly to 
Parliamentary committees.” 
The literature generally supports the fact that PA work significantly contributes to public 
accountability (Gerald, 2015). Sharma (2007), for instance, argues that pressures for public 
accountability are at the centre of the PA reporting process.  
While not necessarily questioning the multiplicity of accountability dimensions, Wade (2008, 
p. 161) conceptualises public accountability as a “two-dimensional amalgam of political and 
managerial accountability”. White and Hollingsworth (1999, p. 200) support this view in the 
PA context: 
“The system of external audit […] contributes to the democratic [i.e. political] 
accountability of government by providing expert information to Parliament, which 
can be used to hold government to account. Audit also reinforces the internal system 
of managerial accountability which operates within governments. Of crucial 
importance is that audit links democratic and managerial accountability, allowing 
Parliament to a certain extent to participate in the real business of government.”  
This complementarity of outlined accountability dimensions is further emphasised by Stewart 
(1984) and Parker and Gould (1999) who exemplify that when public officials are accountable 
to their superiors within the organisation (managerial accountability), their accountability 
relationship becomes politicised because their superiors represent the hierarchical chain of 
accountability, which, at the end of the continuum, also includes the citizens (public 
accountability). Also, Jarvis (2017) concludes that in actual practice, variations of conjoined 
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accountability dimensions are played out. Following White and Hollingsworth (1999) and 
Wade (2008), who emphasise the significance of political, managerial and public 
accountability dimensions in the audit context, this thesis applies these dimensions to examine 
the stakeholders’ accountability relationships at the organisational field level. This selection of 
accountability dimensions is consistent with the boundaries the institutional environment sets 
for the conduct of PAs in Victoria. 
4.4 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter introduced and explained the theoretical framework of this research study and 
outlined how it is applied. NIS as macro theory not only provides rich perspectives to analyse 
PAs within the broader institutional setting, but also offers the tools for an examination of how 
different dimensions of accountability relationships between auditees, performance auditors, 
MPs and journalists are operationalised in practice. This chapter also identified the NIS 
concepts of organisational legitimacy, rationalised myths, and organisational change that offer 
potential value for exploring stakeholders’ perceptions of accountability relationships and their 
interpretations of PA impacts. Through the application of this comprehensive theoretical 
framework the researcher is capable of offering more meaningful and deeper insights into the 
phenomenon under research. The next logical step in this research study is to outline the 
underlying research design. 
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5 Research design and methodology  
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this research study to capture key stakeholders’ perceptions of their 
accountability relationships and interpretations of PA impacts underlines the need for a 
research design that allows for a comprehensive elaboration on stakeholder perspectives from 
different angles. Therefore, a sequential mixed-methods design was adopted using document 
analysis, a web-based survey questionnaire and in-depth semi-structured interviews, providing 
the tools to yield an enriched, elaborated understanding of stakeholders’ interpretations and 
perceptions. With respect to the applied mixed-methods approach, the discussion is organised 
around the following sections: at first, the appropriateness for the adoption of a mixed-methods 
approach addressing the research purpose and RQs is outlined. Thereafter, it is described how 
data was collected using the methods relevant for this study. Also, the chapter provides details 
on how access to study participants was obtained. Further, employed analysis techniques for 
qualitative and quantitative data are described. The chapter closes with an outline of how data 
was converged in a triangulation fashion.  
5.2 Data-collection method: using a mixed-methods design 
Mixed-methods research designs combining qualitative and quantitative approaches in single 
research projects have gained solid ground across academic disciplines including accounting 
(Caracelli and Greene, 1993; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011; Greene and Caracelli, 1997; 
Modell, 2010). In fact, mixed-methods research designs have extensively been discussed in the 
accounting literature and calls have been made by various scholars to mix data-collection 
methods to conduct more effective research (e.g. Anderson and Widener, 2007; Feilzer, 2010; 
Lillis and Mundy, 2005; Modell, 2005). 
This research study employs a mixed-methods design which seeks to draw from the strengths 
of both paradigms while overcoming the limitations of a purely qualitative or quantitative 
approach to create research outcomes stronger than either method individually. Thereby, the 
researcher echoes Richardson (2012) and Malina et al. (2011), who criticise accounting 
scholars for having separated into methodological camps showing only little interest in refining 
and enhancing the incomplete picture. Malina et al. (2011, p. 60) claim that in accounting 
research, there is a need to accept the complementarity of paradigms:  
“We, as the accounting research community, have to face the fact that both numbers 
and words convey meaning and both are needed if we are to understand the world.”  
In earlier studies, Solomon (1991) and Firestone (1987) propose that in mixed-methods 
research the quantitative component persuades through de-emphasising individual judgment 
and explaining the actions of large numbers of people. On the other side, the qualitative 
component persuades through rich description and exploration of the research phenomenon, 
likely to provide insights into the possible reasons for peoples’ actions, thereby overcoming 
abstraction inherent in quantitative research (Malina et al., 2011). The chief rationale for 
employing a mixed-methods approach is that a combination of both methods is necessary as 
neither quantitative nor qualitative methods alone are able to appropriately generate the 
complete picture (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003; Erzberger and Kelle, 2003). In other words, 
for this research “[e]ach source of data represents an important piece in a jigsaw” (Bryman et 
al., 2008, p. 264).  
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The majority of prior PA impact studies have been of qualitative nature, with interviews and 
document analysis the most commonly used data-collection methods. Quantitative impact 
studies have most often based their findings on survey results. In view of the missing link 
between qualitative and quantitative findings from previous PA impact studies, this study 
employs a mixed-methods approach in search of empirical insights into PA impacts that go 
beyond previous qualitative and quantitative perspectives (Malina et al., 2011; Onwuegbuzie 
and Johnson, 2006; Solomon, 1991). The applied mixed-methods design is most likely to 
enrich the knowledge of PA impacts through the convergence and corroboration of findings 
and the enhanced level of confidence produced by synthesising those findings from both 
approaches (Greene et al., 1989; Foss and Ellefsen, 2002; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006).  
Various mixed methods theorists have developed a multitude of different mixed-method 
typologies (e.g. Bryman, 2006b; Cameron, 2014; Mertens, 2005; Morse, 2003, 2010; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, 2003). Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003) noted that 
methodologists distinguish between nearly forty different typologies of mixed-methods 
designs. As these classifications are drawn from a variety of social science disciplines, they 
emphasise different facets of mixed-methods approaches and often lack consistency in their 
application (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2006). In this regard, Greene et al. (1989) and Mark 
(1988) acknowledge that departures from recommended mixed-methods designs can be readily 
defended. In actual research practice scholars take very flexible approaches and allow the 
research purpose and RQs to guide their choices of data-collection methods and analysis 
techniques (Smaling, 1994; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
When developing the mixed-methods approach for this research study, the researcher 
acknowledged the relevance of several key principles highlighted in methodology literature. 
Methodologists like Creswell et al. (2003), Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009), Morse and Niehaus 
(2009), Bryman et al. (2008) and Greene et al. (1989) broadly agree on five fundamental 
determinants significant when deciding on and constructing the mixed-methods design, 
namely, (1) theoretical underpinning(s), (2) RQs and objective(s), (3) weighting/prioritisation 
of qualitative and/or quantitative strands, (4) timing of qualitative and quantitative strands, and 
(5) mixing of qualitative and quantitative strands. In the following sections, the researcher 
introduces these key determinants in the context of this research study and elaborates on the 
employed mixed-methods design.  
Parker (2012, 2014b) and Parker and Roffey (1997) emphasise the close interplay between 
theoretical and methodological frameworks in academic research and claim that it is difficult 
to separate theory and method. In fact, the methodology applied plays a significant role as it 
offers several ways to contribute to theory; it can strengthen theoretical concepts, modify or 
extend them (Goulding and Lee, 2005). This research study intends to contribute to NIS and 
accountability dimensions. With regards to the theoretical contribution this study intends to 
make, it was noted that several accountability scholars encourage broader interpretive 
approaches to accountability research (e.g. Bovens et al., 2014; Brennan and Solomon, 2008; 
Parker, 2004, 2008; Solomon, 2007) arguing that methodologically accountability research 
must go beyond the primarily positivist views adopted by authors of previous studies (e.g. 
Kluvers, 2003; Kloot and Martin, 2001; Tippett and Kluvers, 2010). Unlike positivist 
researchers who examine their topics from a distance, interpretivist scholars embrace 
interaction and direct engagement with the individual or group and are curious about the actors’ 
world (Parker, 2008). An interpretive approach is arguably best suited to investigate, critique 
and illuminate accountability issues (Parker, 2012). 
In his critique on the application of NIS, Suddaby (2010, p. 16) emphasises that by adopting 
purely positivist methods, which count rather than explain the outcomes of institutional 
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processes, previous institutional work has overlooked “everything that is interesting in the 
‘institutional story’”. Following the author (p. 16), NIS 
“has largely failed to retain methodologies that are consistent with their need to 
attend to meanings systems, symbols, myths and the processes by which 
organizations interpret their institutional environments”. 
In the same vein, Meyer (2008), Hinings and Tolbert (2008), Lawrence et al. (2009) and 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) reason that because NIS emphasises causal structures rooted in 
culture and interpretation, research phenomena assessed through the lens of NIS need to be 
examined through qualitative methods that capture peoples’ perceptions and interpretations. 
Hence, methodologically, it is suggested to new institutionalists to move away from the 
application of strictly positivist methods and to begin incorporating interpretivist methods that 
pay attention to actors’ perceptions of institutions (Suddaby, 2010).  
With respect to the topic under research, van Helden (2005), suggests a more eclectic research 
spectrum comprised of both qualitative and quantitative methods to obtain a more 
comprehensive and convincing picture of PA activities. By applying a mixed-method design, 
this research study follows scholars’ demand for more interpretive research in the fields of 
accountability and NIS and the call for a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods in NPM 
literature (Bryman, 2006a; Collis and Hussey, 2014; Greene et al., 1989). Both, qualitative and 
quantitative research elements offer a rich tapestry of different perspectives and help to unpack 
the complex phenomenon of PA work in Victoria.  
As mentioned earlier, social science researchers commonly contend that it is important to 
ensure that mixed-methods studies are tailored to RQs (Bryman, 2006a; Graff, 2013). 
Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) propose that researchers should demonstrate the necessity for 
applying mixed-methods to answer RQs that include qualitative and quantitative components. 
In this study, RQs asking for “how?” (RQ1), “what?” (RQ2) and “to what extent?” (RQ3) 
justify the need for applying both qualitative and quantitative methods. The examination of the 
theoretical perspective and the RQs has informed the researcher’s choice of a sequential mixed 
methods design most suitable for this study. Sequential mixed-methods studies presuppose that 
multiple data-collection, analysis, and inference approaches are employed in a sequence of 
phases (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998), and that results from one method help to develop and 
implement subsequent method(s) (Cameron, 2014; Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006). For this 
study data was collected throughout the following three-phases sequential mixed-methods 
design:  
1) In-depth analysis of publicly available documents (QUAL1), 
2) online survey questionnaire exclusively sent to auditees (quan)20, and 
3) in-depth semi-structured interviews with auditees, MPs and journalists (QUAL2). 
Morgan (1998) suggests that the weighting or prioritisation of methods (e.g. whether 
quantitative or qualitative methods dominate) used in mixed-methods studies should be based 
on the examination of which data collection method is best suited to address the study’s 
purpose. As the act of interpretation lies at the heart of this research and a predominantly 
interpretive paradigm is adopted, this study favours the priority of qualitative methods (Ahrens 
and Dent, 1998). The researcher draws on conclusions made by Weiss (1968, pp. 344-5) who 
 
20 The quantitative phase does not intend to generate statistical generalisations, but rather to prompt and inform 
in-depth interviews with key stakeholders. This will be explained in further detail in subsequent sections. 
 
78 
argues that “[q]ualitative data are apt to be superior to quantitative data in density of 
information, vividness, and clarity of meaning (…)”. The predominance of qualitative data-
collection methods is considered a necessary condition for creating understanding of social 
constructs such as PA activities (Rowlands, 2005; Walsham, 2006). Following the mixed-
methods research notation system developed by Morse (1991, 2003, 2010), the mixed methods 
design employed in this study is summarised as QUAL1 → quan → QUAL2, with the arrows 
(→) indicating that the project is conducted sequentially21, and the upper case indicating that 
the study is qualitatively-driven. All three different stages address all three RQs. The sequential 
design is illustrated in Figure 4.  
Data was collected and analysed in a triangulation fashion (see section 5.3.3). Thereby, the 
researcher followed Creswell et al. (2004, p. 11), who argue that  
“[a] typical structure for a triangulation study is to have separate sections on 
quantitative data collection and qualitative data collection, as well as separate 
sections on quantitative data analysis and qualitative data analysis. The 
investigators then provide a results, discussion, or conclusion section in which they 
discuss the results of both analyses.”  
Bryman et al. (2008), and Morse and Niehaus (2009) underline the importance of mixing, the 
stage of the research process at which integration of the qualitative and quantitative data takes 
place. With regards to the mixing process, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) and Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2011) distinguish between inferences and meta-inferences, whereby they define 
inferences as conclusions drawn from the separate phases of the study and meta-inferences as 
interpretations drawn from across the qualitative and quantitative strands. In this research 
study, mixing is operationalised at the stages of data analysis, i.e. inference, and interpretation, 
i.e. meta-inference (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006; Morse and Niehaus, 2009). As Figure 4 depicts, 
each of the three phases (QUAL1, quan and QUAL2) includes an inferential stage at which data 
is analysed within the parameters of the relevant paradigm to identify key topics and questions 
that require further exploration (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). The 
subsequent analytical processes provided important information on emergent as well as 
surprising and unexpected topics and offered fresh insight (Creswell, 2006; Driscoll et al., 
2007; Malina et al., 2011). 
 
   
 
21 The sequence of the three phases is indicated by the blue arrows in Figure 4. 
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Those findings then inform the subsequent phase. Here, the researcher mixes by using a 
“strategy of connecting” (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011, p. 67), whereby the results of one 
phase built to the collection of the other type of data. Moran-Ellis et al. (2006) describe this 
process as following a thread. Thus, findings from phase QUAL1 informed and led to the 
development of the second phase, quan, where findings from QUAL1 were further explained. 
Thereafter, findings from the second inferential stage (findings from QUAL1 and quan) set out 
the basis for the final phase, QUAL2, which further explains or confirms findings from previous 
phases (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). This approach, which 
is effectively inductive in nature, is based on a sequential process of data examination that aims 
to interweave the findings emerging from each dataset. The value of this approach lies in 
allowing an inductive focus of the analysis, preserving the value of the qualitative exploratory 
inquiry while incorporating the specificity of the quantitative data (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006; 
Nastasi et al., 2010). However, the emphasis is on the interpretation stage, the meta-inference 
highlighted by the oval in Figure 4, where findings from qualitative and quantitative strands 
are gathered and converged in a triangulation fashion to draw “conclusions or inferences that 
reflect what was learned from the combination of results from the two strands of the study [..] 
by comparing and synthesizing the results in a discussion” (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011, 
p. 67). Thus, final conclusions will be drawn based on all phases in pursuit of the aim of 
knowing more (Graff, 2013; Moran-Ellis et al. 2006). The following sub-sections introduce the 
three phases of the employed mixed-method approach, explain the processes used to gather the 
empirically-rich data of the study, outline how access was gained to study participants, and 
describe data analysis techniques.  
5.2.1 Document analysis 
The systematic review and analysis of relevant printed and electronic documentary sources is 
regarded as an essential first stage in this mixed-methods approach. Document analysis is of 
particular importance for this study as relevant PAs lie in the past and are no longer observable 
(Bowen, 2009; Corbin and Strauss, 2015; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
5.2.1.1 Purpose of document analysis 
Documents serve multiple purposes: they provide background detail on the institutional and 
accountability setting within which research participants operate (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004; 
Fowler and Cordery, 2015; O'Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). Bearing witness to past events, 
documents further contain information on previous issues faced by stakeholder groups. 
Historical insight offered through the review and analysis of documents helped the researcher 
to understand the origin of issues faced by key stakeholders in the PA context and indicated 
the conditions and circumstances that impinge upon the phenomena under investigation 
(Bowen, 2009). In other words, documents are considered as “text providing context” (Bowen 
2009, p. 29). This is particularly relevant as the analysis of documents relevant for this study 
captures the perspectives of performance auditors.  
Following Charmaz (2014), documents do not only give an overview of the research setting, 
but also provide insights into the groups of people being studied. Printed and electronic 
documents allowed for the identification of PAs conducted within the relevant research period 
and further enabled the researcher to identify potential research participants who had 
experienced or had been involved in those PAs. Thirdly, according to Bowen (2009) and Yin 
(1994) documents track change and provide a clear picture of how an organisation developed 
over time. With relevance to RQ3, the researcher assessed and compared different documents 
(see section 5.2.1.2) with the intention to identify whether organisational changes have been 
made. This analytical process allowed for the evaluation and categorisation of auditees’ 
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published responses and strategic reactions to PAs and provided impressions of whether PAs 
were perceived as useful, if implementation actions were undertaken by auditees, and if not, 
why not.  
Data and information contained in relevant documents raised questions that could not have 
been answered through documents only. Notwithstanding the valuable use of document 
analysis for this study, the researcher acknowledges that documents should not be used as 
surrogate for other methods and follows Atkinson and Coffey (1997 p. 47) who emphasise that 
“we cannot treat records – however ‘official’ – as firm evidence of what they report.” Whereas 
in PA literature document analysis has been applied as a stand-alone method (see e.g. Alwardat 
and Benamraoui, 2014; Arthur et al., 2012; Grönlund et al., 2011), in this study, information 
obtained from documentary evidence has informed the survey questionnaire and interview 
guide and thereby complemented subsequent data-collection stages. 
5.2.1.2 Relevant documents 
As argued by Merriam (1988, p. 118) “[d]ocuments of all types can help the researcher uncover 
meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem”. 
Empirical data and information meaningful and relevant for this study was retrieved from 
sources listed in Table 6.22  
Table 6: Overview of relevant documents analysed 
Document type 2009/ 
10 
2010/ 
11 
2011/ 
12 
2012/ 
13 
2013/ 
14 
2014/ 
15 
2015/ 
16 
Total 
PA reports 26 30 29 28 29 25 29 196 
Auditees’ responses to PA 
reports 
n/a 1 1 2 1 n/a n/a 5 
AG reports to Parliament n/a 1 n/a 1 n/a n/a n/a 2 
Parliamentary and committee 
reports and pronouncements 
n/a 2 2 n/a n/a 2 n/a 6 
PAEC Public hearing 
transcripts 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 42 n/a n/a 42 
Media reports and press 
releases 
14 26 11 14 11 21 23 120 
Given the relevant period under study, this thesis focuses on documents containing information 
and data regarding PAs conducted by VAGO within the financial years of 2009/2010 – 
2015/2016. 
5.2.1.3 Identifying research participants 
One of the purposes of document analysis was the identification of potential research 
participants. Different kinds of documents were related to different key stakeholder groups, as 
illustrated by Table 7 below: 
 
22 All documents are accessible online through websites of VAGO (www.vago.vic.gov.au), the Parliament of 
Victoria (www.parliament.vic.gov.au and www.parliament.vic.gov.au/paec) and audited organisations. Media 
reports and press releases were obtained from (local) newspapers (online and print versions) such as “The Age”, 
“Herald Sun” and “The Guardian” to name only a few. 
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Table 7: Documents used to identify study participants 
Study participants 
(stakeholder group) 
Document type 
Auditees PA reports, auditees’ published responses to PA reports, websites of 
public sector organisations 
Members of Parliament Parliamentary and committee reports and pronouncements, Victorian 
Parliament website, AG reports to Parliament, PAEC public hearing 
transcripts 
Journalists Media reports and press releases 
As documents contain information on stakeholders involved in PAs, the researcher reasonably 
assumed that individuals representing key stakeholder groups mentioned in those documents 
were to a certain extent involved in relevant PAs. Identifying research participants based on 
their involvement in PAs through document analysis allowed the researcher to identify 
potential survey and interview participants. To identify potential auditees, in a first step PA 
reports were reviewed. Auditees’ responses to PA reports were examined when PA reports 
and/or organisations’ websites did not disclose auditees’ contacts. Whenever publicly available 
documents and websites did not disclose contact details of auditees involved in PAs, the 
organisations were contacted via phone and asked for the required information. Names and 
contact details of MPs were obtained from parliamentary and committee reports and 
pronouncements related to relevant PAs and the Victorian Parliament’s website. Journalists 
were identified through their published newspaper articles on VAGO PAs and topics related to 
those audits. Their contact details are published on local newspaper websites and could 
therefore easily be obtained. Through this process, 411 auditees, 17 MPs and 28 journalists 
were identified as potential participants. 
5.2.2 Online survey questionnaire 
At the second stage of data-collection an online survey questionnaire (hereinafter ‘survey’) was 
sent out. Following Collis and Hussey (2014), surveys can be divided into two types: they can 
either be descriptive or analytical. Analytical surveys intend to examine relationships between 
specific variables, whereas descriptive surveys are used in order to represent phenomena at a 
particular instance or at various instances (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The survey used in the 
current study is a descriptive one.  
5.2.2.1 Purpose of the survey questionnaire 
The survey sent exclusively to auditees allowed the researcher to reach the relatively large 
number of auditees geographically dispersed throughout Victoria (Bachmann et al., 1996; Fox 
et al., 2003; Taylor, 2000). The survey results should explain findings from document analysis 
and provide evidence of the impacts and accountability relationships identified by documents. 
Although the survey methodology contributed to greater confidence in auditees’ perceptions 
and interpretations, it cannot fully illuminate the reasons for auditees’ perspectives. Hence, 
many questions emerged from survey findings that could not be answered through the 
descriptive analysis of the quantitative data alone. That highlights the priority of qualitative 
methods for the purpose of this research (Christ, 2007). Nevertheless, the survey instrument 
was valuable in two respects: firstly, it helped to purposefully select auditees to be interviewed. 
Secondly, quantitative survey results provided the initial scoping and foundation for in-depth 
semi-structured interviews. Based on the survey (and document analysis) results as well as 
relevant literature, interview questions for auditees, MPs and journalists were designed that 
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allowed for greater variety of topics to be addressed in more depth than was possible in the 
survey (Bryman, 2006b; Bryman et al., 2008).  
5.2.2.2 Group of survey participants 
Based on the preceding document analysis, 411 auditees were identified as potential survey 
participants. The other relevant stakeholder groups (MPs, performance auditors and 
journalists) are smaller in size. Thus, the researcher considered obtaining their perceptions and 
interpretations from interviews and documents as more sensible. As auditees represent a variety 
of public sector organisations including state government departments, independent budget 
sector agencies, public bodies, local government councils, water corporations and health 
services (VAGO, 2017a), diversity has been ensured through the mix of organisations included 
in the selected group.  
5.2.2.3 Constructing the survey questionnaire 
The survey was constructed with the help of the online survey tool Qualtrics. Questions 
included in the survey were informed by relevant PA literature (e.g. Desmedt et al., 2017; 
Morin, 2004, 2014; Parker and Jacobs, 2015; Raudla et al., 2015; Reichborn-Kjennerud and 
Johnsen, 2018), accountability literature (e.g. Kloot and Martin, 2001; Luke, 2010; Mulgan, 
1997; Parker and Gould, 1999; Sinclair, 1995) and NIS literature (e.g. Boxenbaum and 
Jonsson, 2008; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Burns and Scapens, 2000) as well as findings from 
document analysis. The questionnaire was further influenced by survey instruments developed 
by Morin (2001, 2004, 2014), Raudla et al. (2015), Reichborn-Kjennerud (2015) and 
Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018). Survey questions were grouped into seven relevant 
sections arranged in the following order (see Appendix 2): (1) demographic data and 
professional background, (2) contribution of PAs, (3) PA impacts, (4) PAs and the media, (5) 
PAs and the parliament, (6) accountability, and (7) your overall view on the PAs in your 
organisation. The survey questions address all three RQs.  
Response categories were primarily closed-ended and employed a Likert scale format, 
checklist response format as well as rankings (de Vaus, 2002). For 12 survey questions, a five-
category Likert scale was selected offering five response alternatives ranging from very 
positive to very negative attitudes (Zikmund et al., 2010). The option “neither agree not 
disagree” was included to give auditees with limited PA experience the option to provide 
neutral responses. If these auditees were forced to choose between agreeing and disagreeing, 
their responses could have skewed the overall results and distorted survey findings. Lietz 
(2010) argues that including a middle option allowing participants not to commit to a clear 
direction slightly increases the validity and reliability of a response scale. Studies conducted 
by Kalton et al. (1980), and Schumann and Presser (1996) demonstrate that providing a middle 
option attracts between six and 23% of survey respondents. 
To enable the five-category Likert scale to be utilised, statements, rather than questions were 
formulated (Allen and Seaman, 2007; Bryman, 2004). Using a checklist format, the survey 
aimed to show the kinds of PAs in which auditees were involved and helped the researcher to 
explore the different kinds of changes auditees experienced. Further, by employing a rankings 
format, the researcher intended to demonstrate how different accountability relationships are 
weighted according to their relevance. The survey concludes with an open-ended question in 
text field form, which provided auditees with the opportunity to express their views, experience 
and ideas (Bryman et al., 2008). Although participants completed the survey anonymously, 
those willing to participate in follow-up interviews were asked to provide their email addresses.  
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5.2.2.4 Pilot-Testing, administration and timing of the survey questionnaire 
Once the survey was developed, the draft version was subjected to pilot-testing. For this 
purpose the survey was sent to RMIT University School of Accounting staff who 
independently from the supervisor team reviewed survey questions. This resulted in minor 
alterations to wording in some statements. Thereafter, a second round of pilot testing was 
undertaken with the assistance of a public sector authority in Germany, where the survey was 
reviewed by three experienced performance auditors in middle and top manager positions. 
Comments and feedback from those reviewers were taken into consideration and survey 
questions were modified accordingly. The results of the pilot tests enhanced the researcher’s 
confidence that survey questions were likely to be understood by auditees. On 11 October 2016, 
the researcher obtained ethical approval from the RMIT Ethics Committee for the conduct of 
the survey.23 
Over a period of 4 weeks – end of October until end of November – the survey was sent to 411 
auditees via email. This time frame was chosen to avoid overlap with surveys periodically sent 
to audited organisations by VAGO.24 The independent online survey was active for a total of 
4 months (end of October 2017 until end of February 2018) during which time auditees were 
sent friendly reminders to participate in the survey. In accordance with Muñoz-Leiva et al. 
(2009) who suggest a maximum of three or four reminders, the researcher reminded auditees 
every three to four weeks, and therefore sent out a total of three reminders.  
5.2.2.5 Participant response rate 
A total of 82 out of 411 (20%) auditees responded to the survey. While 67 (16.30%) completed 
the survey in full, 15 (3.70%) participants only partially completed the survey. Compared to 
participant response rates of previous impact studies, the response rate of 20% is relatively low. 
For example, in the Canadian context, Morin (2004, 2008) generated response rates of 53% 
and 70%, respectively, Raudla et al. (2015) received responses from 30% of targeted auditees 
in Estonia, and in Reichborn-Kjennerud’s (2013a, 2015) studies 74% of Norwegian auditees 
completed the survey. 
With respect to the higher response rates received by other researchers, it needs to be 
emphasised that those authors followed different strategies to identify and approach survey 
participants: while Morin (2008, 2014) and Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a, 2015) made contact 
with relevant representatives of audited organisations asking for the identification of potential 
survey participants before sending their surveys, in this study, the researcher directly contacted 
auditees who were according to documents involved in relevant PAs. This approach was 
considered appropriate for the following reasons: approaching the highest administrative 
authorities of audited organisations in the same fashion as aforementioned authors, would have 
created the risk of auditees providing biased opinions, which would have affected the quality 
of survey responses. Additionally, the researcher would have run the risk of entire public sector 
organisations declining participation. In this research study, auditees who were contacted as 
potential survey participants were encouraged to provide their own views, perceptions and 
interpretations based on their individual involvement and experience in PAs. Survey invitation 
emails clarified that in this research study auditees are not considered as representatives of their 
 
23 Ethics approval (project number): 20432. 
24 In order to receive feedback for their PA work, VAGO regularly sends surveys to audited organisations.  
 
85 
organisations but as individuals who have been involved in and experienced PAs within the 
relevant period under study.  
The 20% response rate may have been influenced by the approach taken to identify and 
approach survey targets, but might also be due to such factors as high employee turnover, 
auditees’ extensive workload (Raudla et al., 2015), inevitable loss of organisational memory 
(Morin, 2014), or any discouragement from participating by the top management of respective 
audited organisations. The latter was experienced by Morin (2014) who was given various 
reasons by audited organisations for non-participation: budget constraints preventing 
organisations from participating in the survey, and the obligation for public servants to abstain 
from commenting on government actions and violations of ethical policies.  
The item non-response mentioned above, i.e. missing values among respondents’ answers, was 
overcome through the application of imputation techniques (Little, 1993; Little and Rubin, 
2002; Rubin, 2004), whereby missing values are replaced with plausible estimates that 
artificially complete the data set (de Leeuw et al., 2003; Rässler and Riphahn, 2006). The 
researcher applied mean imputation, which fills missing responses through the use of 
respective mean values (Rässler, 2004). Given that the quantitative component of the mixed-
methods approach employed is subordinate to qualitative data, the low participant response 
rate and the occurrence of item non-responses do not constitute major drawbacks of this study.  
5.2.2.6 Demographic survey data 
In this section the researcher provides insights into demographic data of survey respondents 
illustrated in Tables 8 to 11. As outlined in section 5.2.2.5, a total of 82 out of 411 (20%) 
auditees responded to the survey. Respondents represent state government departments 
(45.1%), local government councils (48.8%), and other public bodies and independent budget 
sector agencies (6.1%). 
Table 8: Demographic data of survey respondents: current area of employment 
Current area of employment In % 
Education and Training 3.7 
Justice and Regulation 4.9 
Treasury and Finance 4.9 
Health and Human Services 6.1 
Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources 8.5 
Environment, Land, Water and Planning 8.5 
Premier and Cabinet 8.5 
Local Government  48.8 
Other (e.g. public bodies, independent budget sector agencies) 6.1 
Most respondents (80.5%) hold top management positions as illustrated in Table 9. 
Table 9: Position of survey respondents 
Current position In % 
Top/senior management 80.5 
Middle management 14.6 
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Other (e.g. Chairperson, Board member, Councillor) 4.9 
As Table 10 shows, 25% of respondents were involved in more than 20 PAs. A total of 71.5% 
experienced between one and 20 PAs and 3.5% responded that they had not been involved in 
any PA. With regards to the latter, it must be noted that participants who selected 0 are 
Committee Members and a Chairperson, who clarified in the survey comment section and in 
interviews that they are not directly involved in the PA process but oversee and monitor 
organisations’ implementation actions of recommendations. 
Table 10: Number of PAs participants were involved in 
Number of PAs Number of auditees (in %) 
More than 20 25 
15–20 22 
10–14 18 
5–9 14.5 
1–4 17 
0 3.5 
Following Table 11, 43% of PAs auditees were involved in were audits of particular public 
sector programs, 34% were system audits and 21% were audits of individual public sector 
organisations. In the open-ended survey question auditees defined “other” types of PAs as 
“performance audits of common functions across different organisations”. 
Table 11: The kind of PAs participants have been involved in 
Kind of PA Number of auditees (in %) 
PA of the entire organisation 21 
PA of a particular system 34 
PA of a particular program 43 
Other 2 
In Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9, survey results on the five-point Likert scale are presented in tables. 
The analysis of survey responses is not sequenced in the same order in that questions appeared 
in the survey questionnaire (see Appendix 2). Results of survey responses show the 
questions/statements together with the percentage of auditees (strongly) agreeing, neither 
agreeing nor disagreeing, or (strongly) disagreeing. In order to give greater insights into the 
reasons for auditees’ choices of survey responses, verbatim statements that emerged from 
interviews are provided (Hasan et. al., 2013). 
5.2.3 In-depth semi-structured interviews 
Extensively used in relevant accountability and PA research (e.g. Funnell and Wade, 2012; 
Luke, 2010; Parker and Jacobs, 2015; Parker et al., 2018; Sinclair, 1995), in-depth semi-
structured interviews are considered the most significant data-collection tool for in-depth 
research projects such as this study. The research objective was to explore key stakeholders’ 
perceptions of accountability relationships to other groups and their interpretations of the 
nature and scope of PA impacts. As such, in this study it was vital that perceptions, opinions 
and views of research participants were heard. Without interviewing auditees, MPs and 
journalists, the researcher’s insights into the researched phenomena would have been severely 
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restricted (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008; Parker, 2008; Rowlands, 2005; Walsham, 2006). In-
depth semi-structured interviews provided extensive in-depths insights by exploring what 
happened and how it happened (Parker, 2012; Tanggaard, 2009) and helped the researcher “to 
understand themes of the daily world from the subject’s own perspective” (Kvale and 
Brinkmann, 2008, p. 24).  
5.2.3.1 Purpose of in-depth semi-structured interviews 
Minichiello (1990) considers in-depth interviews as conversations with purpose. Conducted 
between researcher and interviewee, in-depth interviews allow the researcher to break open 
areas of reality that would otherwise have remained inaccessible such as a subjective 
perceptions and experiences of people (Peräkylä and Ruusuvuori, 2011). Through qualitative 
in-depth interviews, participants are given voice to freely talk about their points of view in their 
own words and to highlight what they feel is relevant with respect to the research phenomenon 
(Horton et al., 2004; Kvale, 2006; Parker, 2012).  
Qualitative methodologists have introduced many different kinds of in-depth interviews 
offering a multitude of styles of questioning, each appropriate in different circumstances 
(Alvesson, 2003; Leech, 2002). Between the continuum end points of structured interviews, 
which employ a standardised question set summarised in a detailed pre-planned interview 
scheduled that is strictly followed in each interview, and unstructured interviews that employ 
no formal interview schedule or question order and, therefore, are really more free-flowing 
conversations rather than interviews, lies the intermediate space of in-depth semi-structured 
interviews (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000; Fontana and Frey, 2000; Parker, 2014b; Qu and Dumay, 
2011). In-depth semi-structured interviews offer a balance between structured interviews that 
restrict respondents’ replies and unstructured interviews that often tend to divert from the 
research objective (Horton et al., 2004; Patton, 2002).  
For this research study, in-depth semi-structured interviews supplemented by open-ended 
questions were the most effective and convenient means of gathering information as they 
provided flexibility for the interviewer in her depth of exploration (Aberbach and Rockman, 
2002; Flick, 2002; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008), enabled the interviewee to talk freely, yet 
restricted the conversation to topics relevant to RQs, and disclosed significant and often hidden 
facets of participant behaviour (Qu and Dumay, 2011). As Turner (2010) asserts, the semi-
structured interview provides more focus compared to a conversational approach, but still 
allows for a degree of flexibility in obtaining relevant information from interviewees. In fact, 
in this study interviewees were able to expand upon topics they considered as relevant and 
thereby allowed the researcher to discover themes that were unknown by probing interesting 
comments that arose during the interview (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992; Rubin 
and Rubin, 2012; Shank, 2006). Conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews also had the 
benefit of generating more comparable responses than unstructured interviews would have 
provided, while retaining natural spontaneity where important topics were discovered 
(Maxfield and Babbie, 2017).  
Most importantly, in-depth semi-structured interviews enabled interviewees to respond in the 
way that they think and use language (Qu and Dumay, 2011). The researcher was able to enter 
the interviewees’ world (Schwartzmann, 1993), better see situations through the eyes of her 
counterparts (Parker, 2012), explore their perspectives and understand how they perceive 
accountability relationships and what they regard as PA impacts. Not only interviewees’ 
perceptions and interpretations but also social cues such as voice, intonation and body language 
through which they expressed their views provided empirical material of this academic work 
(Irvine et al., 2012; Opdenakker, 2006). 
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Semi-structured interviews did not only allow for a variety of topics and issues to be explored 
in greater depth than was possible in the initial survey, but also clarified the meanings auditees 
attributed to topics in survey questions by providing additional in-depth data, thereby leading 
to an enhancement of survey findings (Bryman, 2006b; Walsham, 2006). Also, semi-structured 
interviews generated a representative sample of verbatim comments that are used as illustrative 
quotations supporting research results (Arber, 1993).  
5.2.3.2 Selection of interviewees 
Between April and August 2017, interviews with thirty-four auditees, five MPs and three 
journalists who agreed to participate in this study were conducted. These numbers are 
consistent with previous studies conducted by, for instance, Morin (2001) who held 41 
interviews with auditees and two with parliamentarians, Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014b) who 
interviewed four parliamentarians, and Schwartz (2000) who held 39 interviews with auditees. 
In the context of a predominantly qualitative study, conducting the number of interviews as 
reported above for this study is entirely appropriate to the focus on understanding how and why 
(Collis and Hussey, 2014).  
Interviews with auditees were held with a selection of those who responded to the survey and 
agreed to be interviewed (Bryman et al., 2008; Teddlie and Yu, 2007). In selecting auditees, 
the aim was to choose auditees of different public sector organisations in order to obtain an 
indication of perceptions and interpretations from different perspectives. As outlined earlier, 
MPs and journalists were identified through document analysis. All potential participants were 
sent interview invitations via email.  
By applying the purposive technique of snowball sampling (Miles et al., 2014), the researcher 
took advantage of using the networks of auditees, MPs and journalists. Their circles of 
acquaintance provided a set of contacts that the researcher otherwise would have been unable 
to reach (Berg, 1988; Spreen, 1992). At the end of each interview, auditees, MPs and journalists 
were asked if they knew of someone from their professional peers who was involved in relevant 
PAs and might be interested in participating in interviews. The majority of interviewees 
claimed that they themselves were the main person of contact for issues related to PAs. That 
confirmed the researcher in her participant identification and selection strategies. Nevertheless, 
seven auditees and one MP referred to colleagues who were then invited via email and agreed 
to be interviewed. As the current study places the emphasis on quality rather than quantity, the 
researcher’s objective in employing the snowball sampling technique was to become saturated 
with information on the topic rather than maximising interviewee numbers beyond the 
saturation point (Bowen, 2008; Padgett, 1998). The snowball sampling technique particularly 
assisted the researcher to overcome the problem associated with selecting a concealed 
population (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997). Stakeholders who changed positions, locations or 
professions could be identified through this approach. For example, one interviewed auditee 
contacted his former colleague who had experienced multiple PAs but had moved to another 
state. This auditee was willing to share his views and perceptions in an interview held via 
Skype. Snowball sampling proved to be the most suitable method for obtaining respondents 
given that they were relatively few in number (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981; Teddlie and Yu, 
2007).  
5.2.3.3 Development of the interview guide 
With the dual aim of minimising researcher bias through pre-specification of non-directive 
questions and to ensure that conversations are directed towards the topics and issues relevant 
for this research study (Brenner, 1985; Lillis, 1999), interview guides were developed and used 
during the in-depth semi-structured interviews with auditees, MPs and journalists. As the 
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interview guides had to be adjusted to the respective stakeholder group (auditees, MPs, 
journalists), interview questions for each group differed slightly with respect to the 
participants’ roles (see Appendix 3). Nevertheless, by covering the same topics the researcher 
ensured that the same thematic information were collected from each interviewee (Gall et al., 
2003; Lillis, 1999; Parker, 2004; Qu and Dumay, 2011). Thereby the researcher enhanced the 
comparability of the data collected across interviews (Flick, 2002). 
In order to elicit full and undirected responses from interviewees, the interview guide was 
designed to be used in a flexible manner instead of following a stringent order (Kvale and 
Brinkmann, 2008; Lillis, 1999; Qu and Dumay, 2011). However, to build rapport with 
interviewees, the researcher structured the interview guide in a way that she moved from asking 
non-threatening questions to potentially more sensitive questions (King and Horrocks, 2010; 
Leech, 2002; Lindlof and Taylor, 2011). 
Information from the relevant PA, accountability and NIS literatures as well as findings from 
prior data-collection phases, i.e. document analysis and survey, was compiled into a set of 
semi-structured open-ended interview questions that reflect the intent of RQs (Christ, 2007). 
Interview questions were related to four main areas: (1) usefulness of PAs, (2) PA impacts, (3) 
changes made to audited organisations, and (4) accountability relationships (see Appendix 
3). Each area contained a series of general questions, which were followed up by probe 
questions when necessary. Probes, defined as “requests for more explanation, clarification, 
description and evaluation” (Glesne, 2006, p. 96) were used to keep the research objective in 
focus and to guide the length of answers and details provided by interviewees (Rubin and 
Rubin, 2012). Based on interviewees’ responses, interviews were interposed with scheduled 
and unscheduled probe questions to elicit more elaborate responses (Maxfield and Babbie, 
2017; Qu and Dumay, 2011; Turner, 2010). While scheduled probes such as “Can you provide 
an example?” or “What are your suggestions?” were formally included in the interview guide, 
unscheduled probes were not scripted but asked spontaneously when the researcher discovered 
an emerging topic emphasised by the interviewee (Leech, 2002; McCracken, 1988).  
Prior to conducting interviews, the interview guide was reviewed by several academics from 
the RMIT School of Accounting. Based on their feedback interview guides were modified 
accordingly. As interviews progressed, interview questions were further refined. This process 
is outlined in more detail in the subsequent section.  
5.2.3.4 Interview process: administration, conduct and timing of interviews 
The process by which interviews with auditees, MPs and journalists were arranged and 
scheduled was as follows: each participant was sent a personalised invitation email with the 
attached consent form. Included in the invitation email was a list of potential interview 
questions to provide indications of the kinds of matters the study intends to explore. 
Participants could verify the interviewer’s research interest from her LinkedIn profile, which 
the researcher referred to in the invitation email. By presenting her LinkedIn profile the 
researcher intended to build rapport with interviewees (Qu and Dumay, 2011). That was 
considered an important step to be granted access by interviewees (Kvale, 2006). 
Both emails and telephone calls were used to schedule interview appointments. Participants 
were given the opportunity to decide on the time and location most convenient for them to be 
interviewed. A period between April and August 2017 was devoted to conducting interviews 
with auditees, MPs and journalists. All forty-two interviews were carried out by the researcher. 
Appendix 4 lists interviews in chronological order and shows interviewees’ code numbers that 
they were provided with due to confidentiality agreements. The average duration of interviews 
was 47:30 minutes. Most interviews were held at the “scene of the action” (Parker, 2008, p. 
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911), participants’ offices, where the interviewer was able to gain insights into participants’ 
everyday activities and understanding from an inside perspective. Some interviews were 
conducted at RMIT University as a few interviewees contended that they could have a more 
free-flowing conversation outside their office. Conducting interviews at venues where 
participants felt most comfortable enhanced the likelihood of participants providing richer 
responses (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008; Patton, 2002). Due to geographical dispersion of 
interviewees, some interviews had to be carried out via telephone and Skype. Meeting 
interviewees in person produced several advantages. Shuy (2003, p. 179) contends that  
“face-to-face interaction compels more small talk, politeness routines, joking, 
nonverbal communication, and asides in which people can more fully express their 
humanity.”  
The researcher carefully planned each interview to ensure that valuable interview time would 
not be wasted asking questions that documentary sources could answer (Ahrens and Dent, 
1998). To make sure that the right people were asked the right questions, the pre-planning 
phase involved compiling profiles for each individual interviewee including information and 
data about interviewees’ professional background and current position (Qu and Dumay, 2011). 
That information was retrieved from online sources such as relevant websites25 and 
participants’ LinkedIn profiles.  
Prior to the commencement of each interview the researcher obtained the signed consent form 
from interviewees who confirmed their voluntary participation and allowed for the interview 
conversation to be audio-transcribed. To gain rapport with interviewees and to make them feel 
at ease the researcher briefly explained contents, intentions and objectives of the research 
project (Kvale, 2006). Thereby, she reminded interviewees that their responses are kept 
confidential, that they may withdraw their consent at any time and may refuse to answer 
questions. Interviewees were further asked whether they had any questions before commencing 
the interview (Leech, 2002).  
The researcher followed the proposition made by various academics, that the best question to 
begin a semi-structured interview is to ask the participant a grand tour question (Spradley, 
1979). Like the term suggests, this type of question asks interviewees “to give a verbal tour of 
something they know well” (Leech, 2002, p. 667). Therein lays the advantage for the researcher 
to encourage interviewees to talk about and explain their experiences and views in a fairly 
focused way (Leech, 2002). In the current study a specific grand tour question was used to 
begin the interview, asking participants about their general involvement (auditees and MPs) or 
interest (journalists) in PAs. As most of the interviewees’ responses to this question were very 
detailed, their answers rendered many of the subsequent interview questions virtually 
unnecessary (Bailey, 2007). However, subsequent questions helped the researcher to go into 
further detail and to ask interviewees about specific topics and issues they emphasised when 
responding to the grand tour question.  
At the end of each interview, participants were asked whether they would like to share any 
comments or add anything they consider relevant (King and Horrocks, 2010). Thereupon, some 
interviewees raised topics and issues that had not been addressed by the researcher. Those 
topics were then integrated into the interview guide and mentioned to participants in 
subsequent interviews. After several interviews have been conducted, unexpected issues 
 
25 Public sector organisations’ websites (auditees), the Victorian Parliament website (MPs), and online versions 
of The Age and Herald Sun (journalists). 
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emerged that were not covered in prior interviews. When that was the case, the researcher 
followed-up on previously conducted interviews, either face-to-face or via telephone, 
depending on the interviewees’ availability (Fontana and Frey, 2000). 
All interviews (face-to-face, telephone and Skype) were transcribed. Thereupon, unedited 
transcripts were returned to interviewees for review. Although interviewees were given the 
opportunity to make amendments to transcripts, only few made slight modifications that 
clarified the message they intended to express without changing the content. Overall, with 
respect to the interest shown by participants, the researchers’ experience in the interviews was 
highly positive. Most interviewees offered to provide further information to the researcher if 
required. 
5.3 Data analysis: qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques 
In this research study qualitative and quantitative data is analysed in a ‘development fashion’ 
(Caracelli and Greene, 1993; Rossman and Wilson, 1985), which constitutes an appropriate 
analysis technique when the design of the mixed-methods approach is sequential. How data 
was analysed in a sequential order with a qualitative document analysis preceding the 
quantitative survey analysis followed by the qualitative interview analysis (QUAL1 → quan → 
QUAL2), is outlined below.  
5.3.1 Analysis of qualitative data 
The process of qualitative data analysis required several steps: organising data, conducting a 
preliminary read-through of data, coding data and organising categories, interpreting and, 
finally, representing data (Bowen, 2009; Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2003, 2013; 
Rapley, 2007). These steps are interconnected and form a spiral of analytical procedures. 
Following Creswell’s (2013) spiral approach to data analysis, the researcher engaged in the 
process of moving in analytic circles, entering with text data and exiting with an account or 
narrative that added to the development of a conceptual map that captures the perceptions and 
interpretations of research participants. Qualitative data obtained from document analysis, the 
open-ended survey questions, and in-depth semi-structured interviews were analysed, assessed 
and interpreted in the same fashion.  
5.3.1.1 Managing and organising qualitative data  
Once data from documents, the open-ended survey question and interviews was collected, it 
was stored and organised in the data analysis software NVivo (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008; 
Miles et al., 2014; Richards and Morse, 2013; Silverman, 2013). The electronic storage of 
documents, responses to the open-ended survey question, and interview transcripts allowed 
ready access to verbatim statements which potentially provide empirical support for the 
conceptualisation of stakeholders’ perceptions and interpretations. With the help of NVivo, 
themes and issues emerged more freely without the compulsion to force data into previously 
established categories (Buchanan and Jones, 2010).  
5.3.1.2 Reading and analytical memo writing 
Following the organisation of the qualitative data in NVivo, the researcher adopted the 
approach suggested by Agar (1980), who advises academics to read interview transcripts in 
their entirety several times to immerse themselves in the details and to get a sense of the data-
set as a whole before breaking it down analytically. In the initial process of exploring the data 
through careful reading and re-reading the researcher carefully scrutinised documents, 
responses to the open-ended survey question, and interview transcripts and applied analytical 
memo writing that helped to establish an intense relationship with the data, to develop a 
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heightened sensitivity to the meanings contained therein, and to refine and keep track of her 
ideas during the analysis process (Birks et al., 2008; Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Saldaña, 2016).  
Analytic memos took the form of short phrases, mind maps, flow charts or coding summaries 
(Creswell, 2013). They are comparable to researchers’ journal entries, written continuously 
throughout the research process including data collection and analysis stages (Saldaña, 2016; 
Parker and Roffey, 1997). Memos created the intellectual workplace, where the researcher 
engaged with data, reflected data critically, challenged her own assumptions and recognised 
the extent to which ideas, thoughts and decisions shaped what was being seen (Mason, 2002; 
Thornberg and Charmaz, 2014). Memos documented by the researcher reflected emergent 
patterns, categories and sub-categories, the coding process and code choices. Dating each 
analytical memo helped the researcher to keep track of the evolution of the analysis and coding 
process. It is important to note here that analytical memos are different from field notes 
(Saldaña, 2016). Field notes taken for the purpose of this research are the researcher’s written 
documentation that captures the different contexts, behaviours and language observed during 
the researcher’s interaction with interview participants (Ryan and Bernard, 2000).  
5.3.1.3 Classifying data into codes and categories 
Once the researcher carefully familiarised herself with the qualitative data it was analysed 
through coding techniques, whereby the opportunity was taken to deeply reflect on the contents 
of the data (Saldaña, 2016). While this thesis does not seek to develop theory using Grounded 
Theory, the coding technique borrowed for this research, i.e. Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) three-
stage approach of open, axial and selective coding provides valuable tools to the researcher to 
make sense of the wealth of information gathered through documents, the open-ended survey 
question and interviews and to arrive at systematically derived core categories that contribute 
to the conceptual map. These techniques have extensively been used by scholars like Roberts 
et al. (2005) and Parker (2001, 2007) who analysed interview transcripts through coding 
without the intention to develop theory.  
In the process of the initial cycle of coding, open coding (Saldaña, 2016), the large mass of 
data was reduced into preliminary codes and concepts pertinent to different phenomena were 
uncovered and assigned (Bowen, 2008; Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Strauss, 1987). At this stage 
the first provisional codes of data deriving from documents, the open-ended survey question 
and interview transcripts as well as from the researcher’s own professional and academic 
knowledge, emerged (Parker and Roffey, 1997). During the open coding process the researcher 
followed a detailed line-by-line approach recommended by Charmaz (2014). This iterative 
approach of going back and forth, re-reading and fracturing the data promoted a more objective 
and trustworthy data analysis and helped the researcher to break through bias by reducing the 
opportunity to impose her own perceptions and motives on the data (Bowen, 2009; Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990). Through line-by-line coding, the researcher identified similarities and 
differences as well as general patterns. Patterns, as indicators for peoples’ ways of working, 
living and thinking, are of great significance as they provide insights into stakeholders’ “five 
R’s: routines, rituals, rules, roles, and relationships” (Saldaña, 2016, p. 6) that play an important 
role with regards to the objective of this research study. 
In a back-and-forth interplay across qualitative data, the researcher identified direct and 
indirect references to PA impacts, accountability relationships and NIS concepts, which were 
scrutinised, coded and organised into concepts that seemed to cluster together (Bowen, 2008). 
In this manner “conceptually similar events/actions/interactions are grouped together to form 
categories and subcategories” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 12), which offer the researcher 
analytic leads for further exploration and help to see the direction in which to take the study 
(Glaser, 1978). In the same fashion as Bowen (2008, p. 144), the researcher compared 
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interview transcripts with documents and the open-ended survey question by asking “[h]ow is 
this text similar to, or different from, the preceding text?”  
Whenever new data suggested new categories during the coding cycles, previously scanned 
documents, survey comments and interview transcripts were re-analysed to determine the 
presence of such categories (Bowen, 2008). As emphasised by Guest (2006), the development 
of codes/categories is a dynamic process subject to changes or refinement throughout the data 
collection and analysis process. The researcher therefore kept a record of defined codes and 
modified versions. The open coding cycle produced an initial listing of 47 codes, after codes 
supported by only few facts and memos have been deleted due to lacking supportive evidence. 
These numbers are similar to those of other researchers who acknowledge that a multiplicity 
of codes is likely to emerge from the first coding stage (Parker and Roffey, 1997; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). These codes formed the bases for the aggregation 
into core codes at the axial coding stage.  
Axial coding was the second cycle coding method applied (Saldaña, 2016), which helped the 
researcher to recombine the data around the axes of core codes (Parker and Roffey, 1997). 
Axial coding filtered out dominant open codes from less important ones and identified 
relationships between those codes (Boeije, 2010). In this way, dimensions of core codes began 
to take shape emerging as aggregates of the most closely interrelated open codes for which 
supporting evidence was strong (Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Bowen, 2009; 
Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Parker and Roffey, 1997). This process entailed the transition from 
a descriptive to an interpretative mode (Bowen, 2008). According to Strauss and Corbin (1998, 
p. 136), the ultimate goal of axial coding is achieved “when no new information seems to 
emerge during coding (…)”. The axial coding produced a number of core codes that were then 
constituted into the conceptual map after being integrated into the focal core code emerging 
from the final coding cycle, selective coding (Parker and Roffey, 1997; Creswell and Poth, 
2018).  
‘Selective coding’ (Saldaña, 2016) constitutes the process that puts “analytic meat” on the 
“analytic bones” (Strauss, 1987, p. 245). Here, the most significant focal core code, that is, the 
central phenomenon that emerged from the process of axial coding, is selected (Guest et al., 
2012; Parker and Roffey, 1997). The identified focal core code forms the umbrella covering 
core codes formulated previously (Corbin and Strauss, 2015; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 
2006; Stern and Porr, 2011; Parker and Roffey, 1997). In other words, all core codes that 
emerged from axial coding must be related to the focal core code either directly or indirectly 
(Parker and Roffey, 1997). It is the selective coding stage that condenses “all the products of 
analysis [..] into a few words that seem to explain what ‘this research is all about’” (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998, p. 146). The identified focal core code and conditioning or influencing core 
codes enabled the researcher to develop a conceptual map that shows the posited relationships 
between focal core code and core codes and their moderating or facilitating factors (Parker and 
Roffey, 1997; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The conceptual map developed for this research study 
takes the form of a conceptual map that visualises relationships between various codes 
emerging from the data. The conceptual map allows the researcher to make codes and their 
relationships more salient by providing a body of knowledge in illustrative form (Wheeldon 
and Faubert, 2009). During the writing process, core codes were constantly reviewed, 
compared with codes identified at earlier coding stages and reassessed when necessary. Hence, 
the development of the conceptual map was a comparative, iterative and reflective process.  
With respect to the coding process, one issue that needs to be addressed is that of predefined 
or ‘a priori codes’ that have been used in this research (Crabtree and Miller, 1999; Creswell, 
2003; Creswell and Poth, 2018). As the mixed methods are embedded in a sequential model 
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with the document analysis preceding the survey and survey results forming the basis for the 
in-depth semi-structured interviews, codes that emerged from document analysis and open-
ended survey question have influenced coding processes at the interview stage. However, 
following Creswell and Poth (2018) the researcher was open to additional codes emerging 
during data analysis. Hence, pre-defined codes guided but did not confine the analysis of 
interview transcripts (Boyatzis, 1998; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). As the researcher 
was the only person coding the data, one limitation that emerged is that perspectives from a 
variety of people with differing expertise were not taken into consideration during coding 
cycles. However, to minimise researcher bias, identified codes were discussed with the 
supervisor team (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). 
5.3.2 Analysis of quantitative data using descriptive statistics 
Once quantitative data was obtained from the survey the researcher organised the data in the 
statistical analysis software SPSS. Descriptive statistics referred to by Onwuegbuzie and 
Combs (2010) as exploratory-based statistics employ techniques helpful to organise and 
summarise quantitative data for the purpose of enhancing understanding of the research 
phenomenon. The statistical concepts used for the evaluation of survey responses were limited 
to simple but powerful descriptive statistics that summarise data in an understandable manner 
and help the researcher to describe and compare findings (Zikmund et al., 2010; Collis and 
Hussey, 2014; Saunders et al., 2009). With the help of SPSS quantitative measures such as 
means, percentage distributions, and standard deviation were calculated and visualised (see 
Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9).  
5.3.3 Triangulation of qualitative and quantitative results 
The concept of triangulation has been comprehensively debated by accounting scholars and a 
number of calls has been made in support of the use of triangulation in accounting research 
(e.g. Ferreira and Merchant, 1992; Modell, 2005, 2009; Shields, 1997). Solomon and Trotman 
(2003), for example, strongly believe that the triangulation of different data-collection methods 
is essential to make progress in auditing research. While the purpose of triangulation is often 
equated with the premises of mixed-methods research it is important to underline the 
integrative element of the triangulation technique employed by this study (Erzberger and Kelle, 
2003; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006).  
Triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data provided the author of this study with several 
important opportunities (Jick, 1979): first, the effectiveness of the triangulation of document, 
survey and interview data was based on the premise that weaknesses of each data collection 
method can be compensated by the counter-balancing strength of the other methods 
(Sandelowski, 2000). Triangulation further provided a confluence of evidence and enabled the 
researcher to cross-validate results from all three data sets, thus, is likely to make findings more 
credible (Eisner, 1991) and enhances the researcher’s belief that “the results are valid and not 
a methodological artefact” (Bouchard, 1976, p. 268). Finally, the methodological triangulation 
minimised potential biases that may have occurred if the study had been a single-method study 
(Cassell and Symon, 2004; Patton, 1990). Most importantly, triangulation of data was likely to 
yield an enriched, elaborated understanding of research participants’ perspectives, thereby 
allowing the researcher to be more confident of her findings (Bryman, 2006a; Collis and 
Hussey, 2014). In this research study the result of triangulation is a rich narrative in form of a 
conceptual map that consists of a continuum of interpretations of PA impacts and perceptions 
of accountability relationships expressed by relevant key stakeholders.  
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5.4 Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter, the applied sequential mixed-methods design was introduced and its three 
phases of data-collection and analysis were outlined. The document analysis preceding the 
survey followed by in-depth semi-structured interviews generated a rich set of empirical data 
that was analysed with the help of coding techniques and memoing applied to qualitative data, 
and descriptive statistics explaining quantitative data. Mixing qualitative and quantitative 
methods allowed the researcher to analyse and interpret data in a triangulated fashion to 
generate new and more in-depth knowledge about accountability relationships and PA impacts 
from stakeholders’ perspectives. Throughout the chapter it was further demonstrated how the 
researcher managed the limitations of this research design. The following four chapters present 
findings addressing the three RQs underpinning this research. 
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6 Stakeholders’ accountability relationships  
6.1 Introduction 
The examination of stakeholders’ accountability relationships and how those accountability 
relationships influence their perceptions of PAs is the focus of this first findings chapter, which 
addresses RQ1. Informed by the theoretical framework underpinning this study, this chapter 
analyses the dimensions of accountability relationships between stakeholders that empirically 
emerged from the data. In the sub-sections of this chapter the researcher assessed what key 
stakeholder groups understand as managerial, political and public accountability. It is here that 
stakeholders’ general perceptions of accountability dimensions and relationships in the 
institutional environment are explored.  
Revisiting Dillard’s et al. (2004) concept of a cascading hierarchy of institutional influence 
exerted by the institutional environment on institutional actors populating the organisational 
field, this findings chapter examines how managerial, political and public accountability 
relationships at the organisational field level influence stakeholders’ perceptions of PAs. As 
will be demonstrated in the chapter’s sub-sections, the three rationalised myths of PA 
usefulness, the Three Es, and Audit Society anchored in the institutional environment of PAs 
influence stakeholders’ perceptions of accountability relationships (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Another institutional concept that proved to assist in understanding stakeholders’ perceptions 
of accountability relationships is legitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008).  
Forthcoming sections provide insights into how auditees, performance auditors, MPs and 
journalists perceive their accountability relationships to other stakeholder groups. 
Stakeholders’ descriptions of managerial, political and public accountability dimensions are 
summarised in tables, which list terms used in reports and documents as well as by interviewees 
to define their accountability relationships. 
6.2 Managerial accountability relationships and their influence on stakeholders’ 
perceptions of performance audits 
Managerial accountability is often referred to as accountability for performance. Those who 
are held accountable in managerial terms are required to demonstrate through output-based 
measures that services are provided efficiently, effectively and economically. In the public 
sector, the managerial accountability mechanism involves the monitoring and reviewing of 
inputs, outputs and outcomes and seeks to improve organisations’ performance by increasing 
their efficiency and effectiveness and enhancing their economic decision-making (Parker and 
Gould, 1999; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Lonsdale, 2011) (see section 4.3.3.2). 
With respect to VAGO’s PA mandate and in accordance with the general objectives of PAs 
(see section 2.3.1), it is the performance auditors’ task to hold auditees accountable for 
efficiency, effectiveness and economic decision-making. Auditees participating in interviews 
were asked how they perceive their relationships with VAGO performance auditors and 
whether they feel accountable to them. Although the majority responded that VAGO 
performance auditors put them under pressure to perform more economically, efficiently and 
effectively (see Table 12), it became clear that this pressure does not result from a formal 
accountability relationship between auditees and performance auditors. More precisely, by 
underlining that they “don’t have obligations to VAGO” (A4), interviewed auditees highlighted 
that they do not regard themselves and their organisations as holding direct accountability 
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relationships with performance auditors, which would require auditees to justify their 
performance to VAGO. From auditees’ perspectives, performance auditors only oversee and 
monitor public sector organisations’ performance. More precisely, interviewees referred to 
performance auditors as “just another pair of eyes” (A27) and a “watchdog” (A20) that informs 
other stakeholder groups of audited organisations’ performance but does not have the power 
and authority to command auditees as to what to do.  
Although auditees claim not to be directly accountable to VAGO performance auditors, they 
are aware of the AG’s and performance auditors’ institutional power to elevate performance-
related issues and issues resulting from auditees’ inaction on PA recommendation to political 
levels of attention. As will be discussed in more detail in section 6.3, performance auditors 
directly report to parliament and are politically accountable to MPs. They derive a requisite 
informal power from their political accountability relationships with parliament of which they 
make use when interacting with auditees. To prevent auditors from reporting performance-
related issues to MPs, auditees expressed their interest in deriving legitimacy from performance 
auditors. They argued that being considered as operating appropriately in terms of public 
service delivery, does not only discourage performance auditors to return to audited 
organisations for the conduct of follow-up investigations or further PAs (see section 7.4.6), but 
also helps auditees to avoid attention from parliament and the media (see sections 8.4 and 8.5).  
From auditees’ elaboration on their relationship with performance auditors, it further became 
evident that they do not always consider PAs as useful for improving audited organisations’ 
performance in terms of, e.g. efficient, effective and economic delivery of public services and 
programs (see Table 12). As will be explained in more detail in later chapters, several auditees 
view PAs as an oversight function instead of a performance improvement opportunity. In this 
regard, interviewees referred to PAs as “just a check method to make sure that we’re doing the 
right thing” (A13). Survey responses confirm auditees’ interview responses. Table 12 shows 
that auditees consider PAs to play a relevant role in exerting pressure on organisations’ 
performance (mean: 3.9), whereas they do not perceive PAs to assist them in improving 
organisations in terms of more efficient (mean: 2.6), effective (mean 2.3) and economic 
performance (mean: 2.2).  
The majority of auditees perceive themselves to be accountable to their organisations’ 
executive management. Mean values clearly demonstrate that auditees (Table 12) perceive the 
executive management of their organisations to be most supportive in assisting them to 
improve the efficiency (mean: 4.2) and effectiveness (mean: 4.1) of their organisations, and to 
make better economic decisions (mean: 4.3). Referring to PA recommendations (see section 
7.4), several auditees explained in interviews that they feel most accountable to their executive 
management as it is top managers who usually assign managerial accountability internally for 
the implementation of recommendations either to individual auditees or to groups of auditees. 
Those auditees are responsible for the timely and comprehensive completion of 
recommendations through a clear line of accountability (VAGO, 2015b). Auditees further 
explained that their line of accountability goes through the organisations’ executive 
management to the internal audit committees, to which auditees feel accountable. Public sector 
organisations have separate audit committees that assist the board by reviewing the 
organisations internal reports as well as auditors’ reports. Therefore, audit committees play a 
key role in the accountability and governance framework (VAGO, 2016c).
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Table 12: Auditees’ perceptions of their accountability relationships to other key stakeholders 
Through PAs the stakeholder… Min-Max VAGO Parliament PAEC Ministers Executive 
Management 
Media Public 
exerts pressure on our organisation’s performance. 1–5 3.9 2.0 2.1 3.9 4.3 3.8 2.1 
assists us to achieve more efficient outcomes.26  1–5 2.6 1.5 2.0 3.7 4.2 1.6 2.4 
assist us to reach higher level of effectiveness.27 1–5 2.3 1.3 2.4 3.7 4.1 1.7 2.3 
assist us to make better economic decisions.28 1–5 2.2 1.4 2.5 3.7 4.3 2.1 2.2 
assist us to improve the overall ability of our 
organisation to reach its strategic objectives and its 
mission. 
1–5 2.1 1.4 2.3 3.6 4.3 2.0 2.0 
Note 1: The numbers represent mean values.  
Note 2: 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree 
Note 3: n = 82 
 
 
26 i.e. deliver better programs for the given level of financial and human resources. 
27 i.e. achieving intended goals of provided programs. 
28 i.e. reduction of the costs of resources used for a program while maintaining program quality. 
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Audit committees consists of a mix of independent and internal members. To ensure that the 
audit committee works with a degree of independence, Chief Executive Officers or Chief 
Finance and Accounting Officers of the public entity cannot be members of internal audit 
committees (DTF, 2018)29. While auditees retain ultimate accountability for their operations, 
it is the audit committees’ role to monitor and assess whether organisations’ run their 
operations effectively, efficiently and economically (VAGO, 2016c). 
According to the Standing Directions 2018 audit committees are obliged to oversee and to 
regularly review auditees’ implementation actions of PA recommendations and assess 
auditees’ progress in implementing suggested changes (DTF, 2018). With regards to 
managerial accountability relationships to audit committees, auditees outlined that they feel 
accountable for advising committee members on how they intend to address those 
recommendations, and to report to the audit committee the timeframe and the outcomes of 
implementation actions: 
“We’ll have to report back to our internal audit committee that wants to know that 
we’ve taken the recommendations on board from the VAGO performance audit 
and we have to be very accountable for doing that.” (A16)  
Some auditees emphasised that they feel accountable to audit committee members as those 
members – as part of their overview function – carefully review and scrutinise auditees’ 
implementation actions before they approve that recommendations were fully implemented: 
“We run every single recommendation through our committee. Audit committee 
members are involved in the entire process, from receiving the report to the point 
of implementation. It is the committee members who tick the boxes and confirm 
that recommendations were implemented accordingly.” (A30) 
In this regard it was further outlined by auditees that the oversight and monitoring role of audit 
committees constitutes an accountability mechanism that is of a managerial nature as audit 
committees monitor auditees’ implementation actions of performance auditors’ suggestions of 
how to improve organisations’ performance. It is the internal oversight and monitoring role 
audit committees take on that is of utmost importance from performance auditors’ perspectives 
(VAGO, 2015b; see also Table 13).  
According to VAGO (2015a), public sector organisations’ operation of well-functioning audit 
committees is highly relevant as informed and probing audit committees enhance the 
accountability of auditees for their responses to PA recommendations. That is done by holding 
management accountable for overdue actions on recommendations (VAGO, 2015b). Results 
from document analysis have shown that following VAGO (2015b, p. xi) “a clear line of 
accountability for the timely and comprehensive completion of recommendations” enhances 
recommendation completion rates (see section 7.4), thereby leading to better PA outcomes and 
better performance of public organisations in terms of the three Es.  
Despite auditees’ claim of feeling accountable to audit committees, VAGO (2015a, p. xi) 
reported that it was surprising “to see that not all agencies have audit committee or board level 
 
29 The Standing Directions 2018 are issued by the Minister for Finance under section 8 of the Financial 
Management Act 1994. They specify and outline public sector organisations’ responsibility to achieve high 
standards of public financial management and accountability (DTF, 2018).  
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monitoring of recommendations”. More precisely, when conducting follow-up audits VAGO 
(2015b) found that one fifth of audited organisations in Victoria were not compliant with the 
requirement of the Standing Directions 2018. These organisations neither regularly provided 
progress reports on recommendation implementation actions to their audit committees, nor 
considered their audit committees to play significant monitoring roles. That audit committees 
did not always fulfil their role in seeking assurance that recommendations were addressed by 
auditees in a complete and timely manner (VAGO, 2016d; PAEC, 2014a), was confirmed by 
MP2: 
“[T]o my absolute horror I found out that some organisations didn’t even have 
proper functioning [internal] audit committees. I just couldn’t believe it. So, by 
asking ‘do your recommendations get tabled in the [internal] audit committee 
meeting?’ ‘Do the audit committee people, especially the so-called experts […] do 
they know what the heck is going on?’ And sometimes they just didn’t. […] If these 
guys don’t know how do they hold whoever is managing to account?” 
According to the interviewee, PA recommendations were often not tabled in audit committee 
meetings, resulting in committee members not being aware of the nature of recommendations 
and auditees’ implementation actions. It was concluded by MPs that because committee 
members were not aware of PA recommendations, there was no functioning internal 
managerial accountability process in place to hold auditees accountable for the timely and 
appropriate implementation of recommendations.  
Table 13: Stakeholders’ perceptions of managerial accountability: results of open, axial 
and selective coding 
Stakeholder Group Managerial Accountability30 
Auditees Reviewing, overseeing, monitoring, check-list, pressure, outcomes, internal 
audit committee, reporting, scrutinise, tick the box, performance improvement. 
Performance auditors Oversight, monitoring, internal audit committee, internal oversight, informing, 
probing, timely and comprehensive completion, outcomes, efficiency, 
effectiveness, economy, authority, soft power. 
MPs Monitoring, oversight, verification, internal audit committee, audit committee 
meeting, board level, assurance, complete and timely implementation, tabled 
recommendations, address recommendations, internal accountability, soft 
power, hard power, pressure, authority. 
Journalists Efficiency, performance improvement, public performance, change. 
According to MPs, performance auditors play a major role in holding auditees to account and 
improving public performance. However, MPs acknowledged that performance auditors exert 
“soft power rather than hard power” (MP4), which implies that performance auditors have no 
authority to force auditees to implement recommendations. MP4 further elaborated on the 
meaning of soft power and what it implies for the public sector accountability framework: 
 
30 Listed terms are the recurring keywords used by relevant stakeholders in interviewees and documents to qualify 
their perceptions of managerial accountability.  
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“By soft power, I mean if [..] VAGO [..] embarrassed the department sufficiently 
publicly, then that causes the shadow minister [...] to put pressure on the minister 
[...] and then that might lead to systemic changes inside the department.” 
According to this statement, performance auditors hold diagonal accountability relationships 
with auditees, which give performance auditors the power to publicly blame auditees, but not 
to impose sanctions on them for not acting upon recommendations. Therefore, performance 
auditors can draw parliamentary opposition members’ attention to PA outcomes with the 
intention to fuel the accountability circle. Performance auditors’ soft power has also been 
acknowledged by VAGO in annual reports and reports to parliament, in which VAGO clearly 
outlines that performance auditors do not hold formal accountability relationships with 
auditees:  
“We cannot direct agencies to respond to our findings, or accept and implement 
our recommendations, as legislation gives the Auditor-General no executive 
authority.” (VAGO, 2012a, p. 30) 
Performance auditors, as argued by auditees, are only the producers of PA reports, which 
identify who is accountable for performance deficiencies (see section 7.3). They can only point 
auditees towards a desirable direction. 
There is general consensus among auditees that PAs provide an important role in independent 
assessment of the performance of public sector organisations in Victoria. While A15 concludes 
that PAs are “an absolutely essential component of our government system of independent and 
transparent government”, A2 describes PAs as “an unbiased view looking at particular 
elements, looking at what is happening in the organisation” and thereby supports the 
accountability framework. In this regard and with regards to survey results (see Table 12), it 
was mentioned by auditees that performance auditors through their reporting on auditees’ 
performance, increase the transparency of auditees’ performance, which in turn puts pressure 
on auditees to perform well: 
“I think the most powerful mechanism to drive performance is transparency. 
Improved reporting of outcomes is a great incentive to actually perform well. 
People know that your performance will be reported. That’s an accountability 
mechanism […] it’s ultimately the fact that there’ll be a light shone on your 
performance that gives you an incentive to actually perform more effectively and 
efficiently.” (A28) 
Hence, according to this interviewee, performance improvements in terms of the three Es 
emerge from the extensive accountability mechanism that is fuelled by PA activity, which 
makes public organisations’ performance transparent for other stakeholder groups, and thereby 
encourages auditees and creates incentives for them to perform better. According to some 
auditees it is the constant checking and inspecting by performance auditors that does improve 
performance:  
“[U]ltimately, it is about efficiency and effectiveness, et cetera, but the way that 
happens in practice is because you got someone scrutinising your performance, you 
got someone effectively holding you accountable.” (A28) 
Similarly, other auditees argued that the presence of VAGO and its PA mandate have a direct 
effect on auditees’ behaviour and actions as emphasised by A17. 
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“[T]hey can’t look at everything but you know that they’re going to look at 
something every year, and there’s probably that sort of feeling that I better do the 
right thing because at some time I might get audited. So, it does regulate your 
behaviour and influence your behaviour in some way. So, I think it’s vital that you 
have that accountability in there that sort of provides that, I suppose, the presence, 
if you like, to make sure you are trying to do the right thing.”  
Such statements provide evidence that auditees have become part of what Power (2000, 2003a) 
terms as the Audit Society. Auditees have institutionalised VAGO’s PA practice and accepted 
the possibility and practice of being frequently investigated by performance auditors. Frequent 
and often ongoing PAs influence auditees’ behaviour and prompt them to perform well. Several 
auditees perceive PAs as useful as will be explained in more detail in forthcoming sections. 
However, some hold less positive perceptions about the usefulness of PAs, arguing that from 
an accountability perspective PAs give other stakeholder groups the opportunity to hold public 
sector organisations accountable. In this regard, A27 underlines that particularly MPs “love” 
PAs as they provide them with material “to beat you on the head with” in situations where PA 
issues are elevated to higher levels via the accountability chain, which the research further 
elaborates on in the next section. 
6.3 Political accountability relationships and their influence on stakeholders’ 
perceptions of performance audits 
In political systems such as the Westminster system, accountability is often exercised along a 
hierarchical chain of accountabilities (Bovens, 2010; Parker and Gould, 1999). The political 
system of Australia complies with Westminster traditions. Although the hierarchical 
accountability chain is said to be outdated (Sinclair, 1995), participants in this study repeatedly 
emphasised the upward process through which accountability is exerted. When asked about 
their perceptions of accountability relationships in the institutional environment of Victoria, 
several interviewed auditees made direct reference to the “hierarchical chain” (A14) along 
which they are accountable to government executives, who are accountable to ministers and 
through ministers to MPs.  
The importance of the accountability relationship to ministers was identified in the 
questionnaire. Survey findings indicate that auditees perceive ministers to play an important 
role in improving organisations’ economic performance (mean: 3.7), efficiency (mean: 3.7) 
and effectiveness (mean: 3.7) as it is the ministers who can exert pressure on auditees (mean: 
3.9) (see Table 12). From A9’s perspective, for instance, “the Auditor-General can’t tell us 
what to do but our ministers can” as ministers have the institutional power to exert pressure on 
auditees through the lines of reporting anchored in the legislative framework of the 
Westminster system. Several auditees describe the minister as their number one accountability 
relationship.  
Regarding auditees’ accountability relationship to MPs, particularly state government auditees 
pointed out that parliament plays a crucial role in holding auditees accountable in parliamentary 
hearings for inaction in relation to the implementation of recommended changes (see section 
8.5.2). Given parliament’s institutional power, auditees describe their accountability 
relationship to MPs as the “highest standard of accountability in political terms” (A22). 
However, they also contend that although their accountability relationship to MPs is a crucial 
one that may entail serious consequences for auditees, the relationship is of an indirect nature 
as it goes through the ministers and therefore through the hierarchical accountability chain. 
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That is why, as shown in survey findings, on average auditees feel more accountable to 
ministers than to MPs and parliamentary committee members (PAEC) in terms of their 
performance. In this context, it was reasoned by auditees that while they consider that 
parliament does not have the authority to enforce the implementation of recommendations, 
ministers can instruct auditees to act upon recommendations. This was also recognised by MP5 
who claims that “[t]he only people that can force the implementation of recommendations are 
the ministers of the departments”. These perceptions that auditees hold of parliament are seen 
by MPs as one major problem with regards to the accountability framework: 
“The [state] departments view the parliament as a temporary thing and themselves 
as a permanent thing. They see members [of parliament] come and go but they’re 
there forever, they’re the king of the castle. […] That’s why the tail wags the dog. 
That’s why the department does whatever it likes.” (MP2) 
According to auditees the accountability relationship between them and MPs in the PA context 
is limited to the political term of the government of the day. MPs consider this as a major 
“loophole” (MP2) which is perceived as “a problem that will break down the system” (MP1). 
As interviews with MPs have shown, auditees’ views of parliament and their denial of direct, 
straight-line accountability relationships to MPs are the main reasons why MPs consider PAs 
as such an important tool: 
“[Y]ou have to put VAGO out there yelling ‘pay attention’. That’s where I see 
VAGO as such a valuable tool […] because they’ve got the imprimatur of getting 
there and find out (a) what’s really going on and not what they [auditees] say is 
going on, and (b) trying to come up with some recommendations.” (MP2) 
Examining documents and reports relevant for this study, the researcher noticed the frequency 
with which parliament emphasises the importance of VAGO’s PA mandate. It became evident 
that MPs rely on the independent investigations of the AG and his office (PAEC 2010b). 
“In countries operating with the Westminster system of government […] Auditors‑
General are an important means used by Parliament, on behalf of the community, 
for holding elected governments accountable for the use of public resources 
entrusted to their control. […] The position of Auditor‑General within this model 
is considered a crucial link in the process of accountability to the taxpayer on the 
utilisation of public funding. The principal role of the Auditor‑General is to provide 
assurance to Parliament on accountability and performance of the Executive 
Government.” (PAEC, 2010b, p. 5) 
MPs emphasise that performance improvements in the public sector will only be reached if 
auditees are held to account. They refer to holding to account as the crux of the PA function. 
The necessity for performance auditors to hold auditees to account was emphasised by MP2 
who criticised the public sector organisations’ lacking accountability, referring particularly to 
state government departments: 
“In terms of accountability it’s a very clear structure but […] the departments are 
a law unto themselves. They do whatever they like […] it’s just like sitting on top of 
a mountain […] How can you possibly know what’s going on there.” 
In the following example the interviewee elaborated further on the meaning of mountain, 
claiming that it is not uncommon that performance-related issues are not noticed by auditees 
as the lines of accountability and reporting range across multiple levels: 
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“[W]e had a former minister who was extremely good at his job […] So he had a 
matter coming through from this level and then went up to the next level, next level, 
next level and ends up on his desk and he has got his chief of staff and he has got 
his departmental secretary and he’s looking at it […] and he says ‘hang on a minute 
this doesn’t make sense… what about this here?’. And he was right and it took about 
five levels and he’s the guy to pick up the mistake. And you just think ‘what the hell 
is going on there?’” (MP2)  
From MPs’ perspectives, as a consequence of the multiplicity of accountability layers, 
accountability lines can be “very messy” (MP3), unstructured and undefined. MPs stated that 
especially in state departments “there is a lack of accountability” (MP3). Auditees use the 
messy accountability lines as an opportunity to hide behind multiple layers that are part of the 
accountability mountain. Thus, MPs conclude that PAs are a highly significant and useful tool 
for cutting through the multiplicity of accountabilities and making transparent the various 
issues related to organisations’ efficiency, effectiveness and economic performance.  
According to MPs, PAs are of great value because they detect inefficiencies, for example, in 
public sector organisations’ service delivery, that parliament does not have the ability to 
investigate and thereby support MPs in holding auditees to account. That is why MPs consider 
performance auditors as a conduit for detecting mismanagement and deficiencies and holding 
the responsible individual, group of auditees or entire organisation accountable for 
inappropriate behaviour and actions that (1) members of the public, (2) MPs, and (3) the media 
would otherwise have never found out about.  
PAs, in the words of MP2, are the “arms and legs” of the accountability process in the Victorian 
public sector. MPs describe their relationships with performance auditors as one of 
complementarity. This view is also shared by VAGO, which underlines the role of MPs. 
Following VAGO (2012a, p. 30), performance auditors’ “only recourse is to expose issues by 
reporting them to Parliament.” In other words, performance auditors can only channel 
accountability by elevating performance issues to political levels and exposing PA findings to 
parliament. Through their reports to parliament (see section 7.3), performance auditors inform 
and assist MPs and the public (see section 6.4), so that MPs and citizens “have a better 
understanding of the accountability and performance of the public sector” (VAGO, 2010b, p. 
2).  
According to the Audit Act 1994 it is VAGO’s primary role to provide assurance to parliament 
through the PAEC (VAGO, 2015b). Hence, it is not surprising that VAGO performance 
auditors as independent officers of parliament are regarded by MPs as an extension of the 
scrutiny role performed by the PAEC on behalf of the parliament: 
“VAGO does the work in the agency or department and then reports to the 
parliament. So, in terms of the accountability of VAGO to the parliament and to the 
people of Victoria, that’s outstanding.” (MP2) 
MPs underline that although performance auditors are accountable to the PAEC through a 
direct reporting line, they conduct audits independently. From a parliamentary perspective it is 
important to note that MPs do not have the power to direct the AG, but they need to ensure that 
the AG is independent of government and independent of parliament, but politically 
accountable to parliament through the PAEC (VAGO, 2019). The strong features of the AG’s 
accountability to parliament anchored in the Audit Act clearly illustrate that VAGO PAs are a 
political instrument of the state parliament. In this capacity, performance auditors have the 
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fundamental purpose of serving the interests of the parliament, and through it the needs of the 
public (PAEC, 2010b, p. 10).  
Table 14: Stakeholders’ perceptions of political accountability: results of open, axial and 
selective coding 
Stakeholder group Political Accountability31 
Auditees Political, policy, blame, sanction, parliament, PAEC, institutional power, 
institutional pressure. 
Performance auditors Westminster system, expose, reporting line, elevate, assisting parliament, on 
behalf of parliament, PAEC, Audit Act, independent officers. 
MPs Westminster system, political terms, ministers, upward, hierarchical chain, 
accountability mountain, layers, multiplicity, Audit Act. 
Journalists Hold peoples’ feet to the fire, better results, real change, tax dollars, spending 
taxpayers’ money, reporting, PA reports.  
VAGO’s PA mandate is considered as highly significant by journalists. In interviews they 
emphasised that it is the accountability mechanism exercised in the PA process that leads to 
improvements in audited organisations’ efficiency, effectiveness and economic performance:  
“It is the job of the Auditor-General to basically hold people’s feet to the fire and 
say, ‘We need a better result here’ […] as a reporter, I definitely see that it leads 
to real change.” (J1) 
Even though journalists claimed not to hold any direct accountability relationships with 
performance auditors or MPs, they maintain that they support performance auditors and MPs 
in holding auditees to account through press coverage of public performance issues: “it is our 
job to hold the public sector accountable” (J3). The significance of journalists’ role of exerting 
accountability was emphasised by J1 who contends that “[i]f we left it up to them [auditees] to 
only tell the story about what they were doing, everything would be rosy.” In this regard, 
journalists claim that their role is aligned with that of performance auditors in terms of probing 
how well tax dollars are spent, whether the public is receiving value for money, and by holding 
the government of the day to account for its performance. Journalists are aware that they fuel 
the public debate through their press coverage of public performance issues, whereby political 
accountability is exerted by MPs who read and then utilise media articles. Informed by the 
media, parliament then seeks to hold ministers to account. According to journalists, this 
“trickle-down effect” (J3) ultimately results in auditees being held accountable by their 
executives. Some MPs openly declared that they deliberately use the media to fuel the public 
debate by drawing public attention to certain issues, to attack and to criticise auditees, and to 
hold them accountable. This strategy is mainly used by opposition members. 
6.4 Public accountability relationships and their influence on stakeholders’ 
perceptions of performance audits 
Auditees acknowledged in survey responses and interviews that the list of stakeholder groups 
demanding answers regarding a multitude of issues can sometimes be long. In the PA context 
 
31 Listed terms are the recurring keywords used by relevant stakeholders in interviewees and documents to qualify 
their perceptions of political accountability. 
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relevant for this study, they consider themselves being accountable to different accountability 
forums to a varying extent. Although survey results imply that the relationship between 
auditees and the public is not based on strong accountabilities in terms of performance 
improvements (see Table 12), in interviews multiple auditees explained that they feel 
accountable to the public for the use of public money. A4, for example, justifies the perceived 
accountability relationship with the public by arguing that “we are accountable to the public 
because we’re using their money to fund our organisation”, to which A26 adds that public 
sector organisations “daily feel accountable to the community because it is their money and we 
only exist because of the community as a sector.” As these statements indicate, auditees’ 
perceptions of accountabilities to the public are conditioned by auditees’ use of public money 
to fund and provide public services and programs.  
When probed in interviews how they feel accountable to citizens, for what and to what extent 
they feel accountable, auditees explained that there is no direct accountability relationship they 
hold with citizens, as auditees’ relationship to the public is channelled through elected ministers 
and other MPs who have been referred to as “representatives of the people” (A2, A3). When 
describing their accountability relationship to the public, auditees explained that they do not 
feel the need to justify their performance to citizens. Instead they appear to be motivated by 
the aspiration to be perceived by citizens as providers of high-quality public services and 
programs that benefit the public. Auditees’ legitimacy-seeking behaviour is justified by the fact 
that if citizens are not satisfied with services and programs provided by public sector 
organisations, issues will be reported to political levels. Moreover, auditees are aware that if 
they are perceived as legitimate by politicians and the public, the media is less likely to publicly 
blame audited organisations. 
According to survey results (see Table 12), auditees consider the media as a source of pressure 
that puts audited organisations under the spotlight and holds auditees to account through 
articles on their insufficient performance (see section 8.4). However, as survey results show, 
pressure exerted by the media does not necessarily spur auditees into action to produce more 
efficient outcomes, to reach higher levels of effectiveness, and to make better economic 
decisions. This is mainly due to the continuous critical media reporting, which has been 
referred to as “public shaming” (A22) by auditees. When asked in interviews whether they felt 
accountable to the media, one auditee asserted that the accountability to the media  
“is pretty much a one way street… they publicly blame you for things that went 
wrong… things that are not always in your power […] but we are not directly 
accountable to the media in a sense that we need to justify to them what went wrong 
and why.” (A30) 
Despite auditees’ claims not to be accountable to the media, in interviews several auditees 
expressed their awareness of being required to address concerns raised by the media via press 
coverage. Auditees often answer media concerns by releasing press statements or reports 
addressing relevant issues. Moreover, interviewed auditees referred to past situations where 
recommended changes were implemented as a consequence of extensive press coverage of PA 
findings. In this regard it was mentioned that the press coverage was not the determining factor 
leading to the adoption of change, but was one of the factors that triggered auditees’ 
implementation actions. This form of response to media concerns demonstrates auditees’ 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour. Through such legitimating actions, auditees hope to be 
perceived as responsible organisations that address citizens’ needs appropriately. Elaborating 
further on their perceived obligation to answer to media concerns, auditees reasoned that they 
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consider the media as proxy for the public opinion, with the potential to significantly influence 
public opinion. These perceptions held by auditees about the media have been confirmed by 
journalists who claimed in interviews to be accountable to the public, with the public interest 
being journalists’ main focal point of concern. Therefore, auditees consider it as important to 
be viewed by journalists as appropriate and well-performing.  
From journalists’ perspectives, the high level of media interest in the activities of public sector 
organisations helps the public, MPs and performance auditors to scrutinise public organisations 
and to prompt them to operate more efficiently and effectively. Journalists claim to take the 
role as a conduit between performance auditors and the public:  
“an ordinary member of the public can go to the Auditor-General’s website and 
read the report, but 99 per cent of people would never do that. So, what they are 
more likely to read is a journalist’s version.” (J1) 
This statement signals that journalists perceive themselves as playing a major role in releasing 
findings from PAs into the public domain and mediating the public debate between relevant 
stakeholder groups. Interviews have shown that among journalists VAGO’s PA work is 
considered as very valuable accountability mechanism. Journalists’ perceived usefulness of 
PAs was underlined by J1:  
“[S]o many of billions of dollars are at stake here and often from the outside, it’s 
really quite opaque how that money is being put to use, whether it’s being put to 
the best use most efficiently and as well as it could be. As a reporter from the outside 
you’re interested in that question, but you’re outside the system and there’s only so 
much you can kind of glean. You can ask questions, you probe, you sometimes get 
information from different sources, but the Auditor-General clearly is on the inside 
and has this washed-up hole where they can drill in and have high level access and 
so I think the Auditor-General’s role is invaluable.” 
According to journalists, stakeholder groups such as the public and parliament can only get a 
glimpse of public sector organisations’ performance, whereas performance auditors “are 
behind the scene” (J1). It was further highlighted that performance auditors’ role is invaluable 
for the public accountability framework of the public sector:  
“I think that helps keep a lot of the agencies on a narrow track and be more efficient 
[…] I think it [performance auditing] plays a pretty big role.” (J2) 
From journalists’ perspectives, VAGO PAs are primarily useful because they publicly blame 
auditees for poor performance and thereby, enhance the accountability of the public sector. It 
is PAs’ feature of holding to account those who are responsible for poor performance, 
inefficiencies and wasted taxpayers’ money that lead to public performance improvements with 
regards to efficiency, effectiveness and economy.  
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Table 15: Stakeholders’ perceptions of public accountability: results of open, axial and 
selective coding 
Stakeholder group Public Accountability32 
Auditees Community, public, citizens, people, public opinion, public service, public 
program, public money, benefit the people, funding, taxpayers, media, critical 
reporting, public shaming, public blaming, spotlight, institutional power. 
Performance auditors Availability of PA reports, VAGO homepage, website activity, accessibility of 
PA reports, VAGO website, communication of findings, accountability to the 
public, needs of the public, public accountability framework, responsibility 
MPs Public accountability framework, public, citizens, public hearings, public 
domain, PA report, public interest. 
Journalists Public, citizens, media, journalists, journalists’ version, conduit between AG and 
public, proxy, accountability, responsibility, blame, scrutiny, government of the 
day, public performance, story-telling, tax dollars, spending taxpayers’ money, 
value for money, AG website, PA reports, public domain. 
 
Apart from the fundamental purpose of serving the interests of parliament (see section 6.3), it 
is performance auditors’ obligation to serve the needs of the public (PAEC, 2010b). 
Demonstrating VAGO’s responsibility to be accountable to the public and MPs, VAGO 
contends to continuously strive for improving the public accessibility of PA reports (VAGO, 
2013a). For this purpose, VAGO is constantly seeking to improve the accessibility to and 
dissemination of PA findings, conclusions and recommendations and regularly measures the 
website activity of its homepage. In its annual reports 2010-2016, VAGO (2010c, 2011a, 
2012a, 2013a, 2014b, 2015c, 2016d) announced that reports are being accessed by more 
people, more frequently. The increased interest in VAGO’s online presentations does not only 
reflect the public’s increased interest in VAGO’s PA work but also demonstrates VAGO’ 
success in increasing public awareness of PA work, enhancing the value of PA reports to 
impact on the public and parliamentary debate and to draw media’s attention to the office 
(VAGO, 2015c; see sections 8.4 and 8.5). It further demonstrates the strong accountability 
relationship with the public that VAGO holds. 
Performance auditors’ accountability relationship to the public is further supported by VAGO’s 
annual plan that is considered to be a “key accountability mechanism” (VAGO, 2016d, p. 11). 
It does not only set out the PA work program, but also serves as an information provider for 
MPs, auditees, and the media. It gives those key stakeholders the opportunity to review 
VAGO’s PA program and to find out what topics performance auditors focus their PAs on.  
6.5 Chapter conclusion 
Chapter 6 addressed RQ1 and focussed on how accountability relationships between key 
stakeholders influence their perceptions of PAs. Guided by the study’s theoretical framework, 
empirical data from documents, survey questions and interviews, this research identified, 
explored and elaborated on the managerial, political and public accountability dimensions. 
 
32 Listed terms are the recurring keywords used by relevant stakeholders in interviewees and documents to qualify 
their perceptions of public accountability. 
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Findings provide empirical evidence for stakeholders’ accountability relationships being of 
managerial, political and/or public nature. From the evidence presented, it appears that key 
stakeholder groups relevant for this research do not always have precise or explicit 
accountability relationships. For instance, while performance auditors claim to be publicly 
accountable to citizens, they describe their relationship as being indirect, channelled through 
parliament. Also, auditees labelled their political accountability relationship to MPs as indirect, 
claiming that their accountability to parliament is exerted along the hierarchical chain through 
ministers.  
Further, auditees largely only feel managerially accountable to executives of their 
organisations’ and their organisations’ internal audit committee. No accountability relationship 
was identified between performance auditors and auditees. Based on those findings, the 
researcher concludes that in this study context, managerial accountability is exerted internally, 
within organisations. Nevertheless, it is the performance auditors who exert pressure and 
therefore provide the initial impetus for the execution of managerial accountability processes 
between auditees, their executives and internal audit committees. Interestingly, although 
auditees claim to hold managerial accountabilities internally with executives and audit 
committees, this does not always appear to be the case in practice. MPs and VAGO 
performance auditors have raised the issue of several public sector organisations not having 
properly functioning internal audit committees. 
Another finding shows that the three dimensions are interconnected. When ministers become 
involved, issues related to the efficient and effective delivery of public sector programs and 
services become political. In this way, managerial accountability is being politicised. 
Occasionally, such issues are then taken up by MPs and the media, two stakeholder groups that 
feel predominantly accountable to the public.  
This chapter has further demonstrated that relationships between some stakeholders are not 
based on accountability but rest on legitimacy-seeking behaviours. While auditees do not feel 
accountable to performance auditors, they seek legitimacy for their operations. Such findings 
are aligned with contentions made by Black (2008), who asserts that because legitimacy is not 
necessarily dependent on accountability relationships, organisations may seek legitimation 
from relevant sources without feeling accountable to those sources. For auditees, it is important 
to be granted legitimacy from performance auditors in order to be able to perform their routine 
activities and to avoid follow-ups and continuously repeating PAs.  
Findings from this chapter are closely related to findings explained in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 as 
perceived accountability relationships appear to influence what stakeholders interpret as 
impacts. When explaining how their accountability relationships influence their perceptions of 
PAs, stakeholders frequently referred to, for instance, PA reports, PA recommendations, 
follow-ups, media attention to, and parliamentary interest in, PAs. The close relationship 
between the components of accountability dimensions and stakeholders’ interpretations of 
impact is reflected in the following findings chapters.   
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7 Process-induced performance audit impact factors  
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 is the first chapter to present an interpretational account of what auditees, 
performance auditors, MPs and journalists consider as PA impact. The central concern of this 
chapter is to outline and elaborate on the impacts and impact-facilitating factors that emerge 
from the formal PA process as conducted by VAGO (VAGO, 2017c).33 The formal PA process 
begins with the PA scoping and ends with the tabling of PA reports in parliament (see section 
2.4.2). From documents, survey results and interviews it emerged that auditees, performance 
auditors, MPs and journalists relate impacts and facilitating factors to the various different 
stages of the PA process. Actions directly related to the PA process that take place during 
and/or after the PA are subject of discussion in this chapter. Theoretical concepts that help to 
explain findings are the rationalised myths of Audit Society and PA usefulness.  
As this chapter identifies and explains impacts and impact-facilitating factors that emerge from 
the PA process, its structure follows the sequence of a PA process. Thus, firstly, the researcher 
provides insights into the relationship between performance auditors and auditees. Thereafter, 
the PA report as the outcome of PAs will be discussed. In a next step, the potential of 
recommendations to impact on audited organisations will be elaborated on before VAGO 
follow-up inquiries on auditees’ recommendation implementation actions are investigated.  
7.2 Auditor-auditee relationship 
The relationship between performance auditors and auditees plays a significant role in the PA 
process and can substantially influence PA outcomes. As empirical evidence has shown, 
relationships between these stakeholder groups are driven by multiple factors discussed in the 
following sections. 
7.2.1 Setting the performance audit scope: narrow scope or fishing exercise? 
Before the commencement of PAs, performance auditors are required to set the scope of those 
audits. Scoping is regarded as a factor that facilitates impact as it directly relates to the PA 
focus and the materiality of recommendations (see section 7.4). Auditees have different 
perspectives on performance auditors’ scoping procedures. From interviews it became evident 
that two different views are represented: some auditees argue that auditors are supposed to do 
some initial preliminary planning, decide on the precise scope before the commencement of 
the PA and invoke the scope throughout the audit process. Others take the view that 
performance auditors should start PAs by identifying an area that requires auditors’ assessment, 
undertake their initial investigations and then “dig around a bit to try and find whether there’s 
any substance to that” (A9). Following this procedure, performance auditors start with 
applying a “broad brush” (A9) before they narrow down the scope. The latter scoping 
procedure was referred to as a “fishing exercise” (A5, A9) or “fishing expedition” (A27). 
According to auditees, when performance auditors go on a fishing expedition they often deviate 
significantly from the initially declared scope. According to A27 this implies that  
 
33 See also Audit Act 1994. 
 111 
 
“[y]ou never quite know where it’s going to land, and you never quite know if it’s 
going to be actually in the part where you’re expecting it or not.”  
Hence, it is not surprising that some auditees view performance auditors’ fishing expedition as 
an attempt “to nail you” (A7). This often leads to auditees becoming suspicious and reserved, 
sometimes even restrained when dealing with performance auditors. 
However, several auditees claimed to be sympathetic to the fishing expedition scoping 
procedure, highlighting that “VAGO has the right to look at whatever they want to look at” 
(A17) and that “it’s not uncommon for it [VAGO] to expand and not uncommon for it to change 
and not uncommon for it to cast a different net” (A22). Narrowing down the PA scope in the 
process is a procedure tolerated by most state government auditees, whereas local government 
auditees appear to be more suspicious of performance auditors modifying the PA scope when 
the PA is already ongoing. From state government auditees’ perspectives, auditors who notice 
during the PA that they have been pursuing a line of inquiry that has not eventuated should 
adapt the scope to set a clearer audit focus so that the PA leads to useful changes (see chapter 
9). Performance auditors “who are on the wrong track in terms of their scoping do not add any 
value” (A34). While local government auditees expressed to feel “left out” (A34) by 
performance auditors at the PA scoping stage, state government auditees stated to be 
occasionally involved at the early scoping stages, whereby they support auditors in building 
and narrowing down the PA focus. Thereby, auditees supply performance auditors with 
relevant information about their organisations and draw their attention to areas that require 
investigation. For auditees, obtaining the opportunity to engage with performance auditors at 
early stages of the PA process is considered very positive with regards to building and 
maintaining trusting relationships with auditors.  
7.2.2 Trust, respect and collaboration as basis for positive relationships 
This study has found that a collaborative, trusting and respectful relationship between 
performance auditors and auditees during the PA process leads to better PA outcomes. More 
than 90% of survey respondents are convinced of PAs being more valuable when (1) 
performance auditors employ a collaborative approach during the PA process, (2) take into 
account auditees’ comments on audit findings, and (3) correct factual errors in PA draft report 
versions based on auditees’ disagreement with audit findings and conclusions (see Table 17). 
In interviews, auditees provided rationales for their survey responses and offered detailed 
explanations of what the key drivers for a positive auditor-auditee relationship are. In general, 
auditees are more “open and honest and self-disclosing” (A3) and provide more information 
during the PA process if trust is established: 
“[I]f you have that relationship of respect and trust that means we […] provide all 
the information for you and you should be able to make judgment […] negative or 
positive […] then it can still be very tense but it’s a respectful relationship based 
on trust.” (A2) 
Where the auditor-auditee relationship is characterised by mistrust and hostility, it is not 
uncommon for auditees to “hide information in the top drawer” (A2), whereas respectful and 
trustful relationships with auditors often lead to auditees providing more information than 
required. This approach is fuelled by the assumption that “in order to get the complete picture, 
the Auditor-General has to understand other bits as well” (A16). 
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Table 16: Performance audit effects on public sector organisations 
Performance audits have stronger effects on our 
organisations when auditors… 
Min-Max SD D N A SA x̄ σ 
(1) demonstrate a collaborative style during the PA (e.g. 
communicate in an open manner). 
3–5 0.0% 0.0% 6.1% 39.4% 54.6% 4.5 0.6 
(2) take into consideration our comments made during 
the audit. 
3–5 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 42.4% 56.1% 4.6 0.5 
(3) correct factual errors based on our disagreement with 
audit findings and conclusions. 
3–5 0.0% 0.0% 3.0% 40.9% 56.1% 4.5 0.6 
(4) encourage us to comment on their recommendations. 1–5 1.5% 0.0% 4.6% 39.4% 54.6% 4.5 0.7 
Note 1:  SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = Neither agree nor disagree34; A = agree; SA = strongly agree; x̄ = mean; σ = standard deviation 
Note 2: n = 82 
 
34 In the comment section of the survey several auditees revealed that they have not always been involved in the entire PA process and therefore chose to “neither agree nor 
disagree” when they were not certain what answer to choose. 
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Opposing opinions have also been presented by auditees who have had negative experiences 
with performance auditors: one auditee (A18) claimed that when performance auditors ask for 
information, “it would be best to get a lawyer to say, ‘how much [information] do I give 
them?’”, while another (A7) auditee stated that it would be best to “build a moat around the 
place” when performance auditors arrive. 
Some auditees described their negative PA experience arguing that talking with PAs is “almost 
like two alien species talking to each other” (A27), emphasising the importance of respectful 
communication between performance auditors and auditees. From auditees’ perspectives it is 
all about the relationship management with auditors during the PA process. To foster this 
relationship and to mitigate the risk of PAs of not adding any value, state government auditees 
claimed to actively engage with performance auditors: 
“I want there to be some value in that… the better the relationship we have with 
them and the more integrated they are with us in terms of being able to see what we 
do and what our challenges are, I think the better position they are in then to make 
decisions.” (A9)  
Most state government auditees claim to have positive relationships with performance auditors. 
They consider good relationships as highly significant since they prefer to have “an open 
dialogue with them whereby [they] can influence them to an appropriate degree” (A9). 
Considering PAs as opportunity for improvement, state government auditees outline that 
departments sometimes consult performance auditors if internal issues are detected. The 
departments seek for performance auditors’ assistance and encourage them to conduct PAs in 
order to ensure that internal performance issues are addressed by auditees: “asking the Auditor-
General to elevate the issue, make it public in some way is enough to get everybody saying, 
‘Okay, we’ll fix it’” (A11). Another motif for keeping good relationships with performance 
auditors is to avoid media attention (see section 8.4):  
“[H]aving a good relationship with performance auditors is considered an asset 
in this department […] you are at risk of being publicly criticised in the media if 
the AG has any interest to punish you […] we prefer to avoid that.” (A27) 
Consistent with this view, other auditees were continuously working on maintaining positive 
relationships with performance auditors in order to not “get on to the front page of The Herald 
Sun” (A28).  
7.2.3 Frequency of auditees’ exposure to performance audits 
This study found that the level of engagement between auditors and auditees differs depending 
on the level of government.35 State government auditees engage more frequently with auditors 
than local government auditees. While most state government auditees perceive performance 
auditors to engage well and to welcome the opportunity to “meet with them five or six different 
times formally, [..] get briefings from them, [..] get two versions of the report to look up” (A9), 
the relationship between performance auditors and local government auditees was described as 
 
35 Section 5.2.2.6 shows the number of local and state government auditees participating in the survey of this 
study. Appendix 4 lists interview participants and shows whether they are local government interviewees, state 
government interviewees or interviewees representing other forms of public sector entities. 
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tense. Local government auditees often find it more challenging to be the target of PAs as 
opposed to state government auditees. This, according to A9, is due to the frequency of 
exposure to PAs: 
“[B]ig government departments have a much better understanding of how VAGO 
works […], whereas councils and smaller agencies will find it much more troubling 
and kind of challenging because they just don’t have that exposure. As a state 
department we get seven, eight, ten or so performance audits a year. We just churn 
through them. We know them. When the Auditor-General comes into the department 
then we set the scene […]. We don’t hide things.” (A9) 
As a consequence of their frequent exposure to PAs and interaction with performance auditors, 
state government auditees have developed a strong audit culture and have become more 
auditable (Power, 2000). While for state government departments dealing with “a full book” 
(A17) of PAs is not unusual, local government councils experience PAs only once every three 
to five years. Due to the infrequent encounter, local government auditees often perceive PAs 
as “more of a shock” (A32). They identified the limited interaction as a constraining factor in 
terms of relationship management with performance auditors and the valuable contribution of 
PAs. Moreover, interviews with local government auditees have shown that they do not fully 
understand the PA process. Some interviewees were not aware of PA reports being tabled in 
Parliament. Their lack of understanding is a reflection of local government auditees’ limited 
exposure to PAs.  
7.3 Performance audit reports as outcomes of performance audits 
PA reports are the products of PAs that are tabled in parliament after the PA process is finalised, 
findings have been discussed and recommendations have been made. Analysed documents, 
survey responses and interviews have demonstrated that stakeholders hold different views of 
PA reports’ ability to improve public performance and facilitate positive change. Study 
participants emphasised various factors that influence the effect PA reports have. These factors 
are discussed in subsequent sections. 
7.3.1 Performance audit reports as accountability tool 
By publishing PA reports on the VAGO website, performance auditors inform MPs, auditees, 
the media and the public of the performance of the Victorian public sector (VAGO, 2012a). 
The power that performance auditors exert through PA reports is also recognised by auditees 
who are mainly concerned with the reach PA reports have: 
“[T]hey have a power that’s over and above and that’s their report to Parliament… 
they report to Parliament, which then get in the media.” (A7) 
In other words, PA reports function as a public accountability tool that does not only provide 
stakeholders with insights into performance issues but also allows them to form judgement and 
to hold auditees publicly accountable (VAGO, 2011a, 2014b; see section 6.4).  
“[I]t’s about transparency and accountability, and so it doesn’t always lead to 
efficiency, but it definitely makes you more accountable and transparent to others.” 
(A16) 
The function of PA reports to make auditees more accountable was confirmed by several 
auditees, who further stated that it is the accountability mechanism, which ultimately leads to 
performance improvements in terms of the three Es (see section 7.3.2) through other 
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stakeholders’ scrutiny of audited organisations’ performance and their ways of effectively 
holding auditees to account. Performance auditors are aware that PA reports inform and support 
MPs and welcome that MPs intensively use PA reports to drive political accountability 
mechanisms (see section 6.3). For example, PA reports inform parliamentary inquiries and 
public hearings and thereby support MPs in holding auditees to account (VAGO, 2010c, 2011a, 
2012a, 2013a). That PA reports are used by MPs to hold auditees publicly accountable was 
confirmed by survey participants who experienced parliamentary inquiries and/or hearings. Of 
survey participants, 31.8% (strongly) agree to PA reports being used by MPs for accountability 
purposes (see Table 17). In interviews, auditees expressed their concerns about MPs regularly 
using PA reports as a “weapon” (A27):  
“[I]t’s something that PAEC members love because it gives them material, that is 
the whole problem. For us, as a receiver, basically, it’s an opportunity to give 
someone a stick to beat you on the head with.” (A27) 
Auditees who (strongly) disagreed (16.7%) with PA reports being used by MPs to hold them 
accountable (see Table 17), stated in interviews that MPs do not necessarily use PA reports 
with the intention of enhancing organisations’ performance but instead to attack the 
government of the day. Opposition members routinely give PAs “some degree of political 
flavour” (A18) by referencing PA reports in parliamentary debates and inquiries, among others, 
to attract media interest and to improve their political image (see section 8.5).  
PA reports are “invaluable sources” (J1) for journalists, and the “heart of the story” (J1) from 
which journalists derive relevant information. PA reports are considered vital by journalists 
because they “really break down in exhaustive detail what went wrong and why” and outline 
in print, visible for everyone “who is accountable and for what” (J1). That explains why from 
journalists’ perspectives, PA reports are “fantastic accountability tools” (J3).  
Interviewed MPs underline the significant role PA reports play in the public accountability 
framework arguing that PA reports “are of great indispensability” (MP4) and that “[f]rom an 
accountability perspective, VAGO reports are very, very important because of the public 
scrutiny” (MP5). They so highly value the critical third-party perspective because PA reports 
list (1) what went wrong, (2) why it went wrong, (3) who is accountable, and (4) how to 
improve the performance of the public sector. Therefore, PA reports are used by MPs  
“intensively and in detail, to drive particular Parliamentary accountability processes” 
(VAGO, 2010c, p. 12). MP3 highlights that the accessibility and exposure to the public and 
parliament is what is significant for PA reports to have impact:  
“[W]hat’s important is not that everyone reads it, but that it’s out there and if it’s 
available to me it means it’s available to the public and that’s the important thing. 
The important thing is that the work is done and it’s available to the parliament, 
but it’s also available to the public. […] well, not all of the 128 parliamentarians 
are going to be reading the report. […] probably six or seven will, including the 
minister, who’s probably going to ask questions about it. And that’s – really, that’s 
the important thing.” 
For MPs, PA reports are the tools to generate impact. PA reports enable them to monitor and 
scrutinise public performance issues and recurring matters, support them to identify and choose 
PAs to follow up on, and are their source of knowledge relevant to hold parliamentary hearings 
(PAEC, 2014b).  
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7.3.2 Performance audit reports as performance improvement tool 
PA reports do not only provide valuable reflections on public performance but also function as 
a “catalyst for change and an impetus for decision-makers” (VAGO, 2014b, p. 10). With 
regards to organisational change (see Chapter 9), VAGO (2014b) declares it has seen changes 
made to audited organisations’ practices in response to PA reports. VAGO therefore considers 
PA reports to facilitate change in audited organisations by making public PA findings and 
recommendations (VAGO, 2015c, 2016d). 
With due regards to the impacts of PA reports several auditees stated that PA reports voice 
concerns that management had already identified, and thus, support them in convincing their 
teams that the deficiencies previously identified need to be addressed and that changes 
suggested by performance auditors are necessary. State government auditee A1, for example, 
explained that “[PA] reports have confirmed that what we were worried about is correct.” 
Hence, some auditees consider PA reports to have an affirmative function. In other words, PA 
report findings did not take them by surprise and were in fact not unexpected. Several local 
government auditees, however, hold opposing views as outlined by A21 who argues that 
performance auditors’ “final report shouldn’t be a shock, but it generally is”. 
In other cases, auditees highlighted that they were appreciative to performance auditors for 
bringing inefficiencies to their attention in form of PA reports. Referring to a particular PA, 
A2 explained that the PA report led to auditees’ relief as PA findings revealed performance 
inefficiencies that auditees were aware of but had not been sufficiently confident to publicly 
expose them:  
“Throughout the organisation the people are pleased that it is disclosed because 
that means that someone else other than them is saying it […] there was almost 
universal sigh of relief in this work.” (A2) 
Before the PA, the organisation was operating out of nine different databases that were not 
well-connected, therefore slowed down internal processes, and in turn, hindered the efficient 
provision of services.  
7.3.3 Materiality of performance audit reports 
More than half of the survey participants consider PA reports as unbiased (59.1%) and perceive 
them to reach conclusions that are supported by relevant facts (64.7%) (see Table 17). 
However, as standard deviation values (0.9 and 1.0, respectively) for these statements show, 
perceptions of respondents are quite divided. Auditees who (strongly) disagree with those 
statements, explained in interviews that they question the materiality of PA reports because the 
context is often missing. They would prefer performance auditors to provide more background 
information instead of being reluctant to spell out the institutional environment and its political, 
and regulatory boundaries (see section 4.2.2) within which organisations operate and to 
disclose the limiting factors that trigger performance issues. According to auditees, in PA 
reports performance auditors often present an inaccurate picture of the audited organisation to 
the public and other stakeholders. Despite several auditees perceiving PA reports as biased 
(18.2%) and not fully disclosing important facts (20.0%), a total of 84.8% of respondents 
regard PA reports as a valid basis for internal discussion of improving processes, programs or 
other services (see Table 17). Those few who (strongly) disagreed (7.6%) with using PA 
reports internally, asserted in interviews that they do not take notice of PA findings and 
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recommendations because performance auditors make deliberate use of “overly critical” (A16, 
A25) language and report on minor, irrelevant issues to justify their existence.  
MPs value the specific focus of PA reports. From MPs’ perspectives, the contribution of PA 
reports lies in the evaluation of public organisations’ specific programs like, for example,  
Effectiveness of Victims of Crime Programs (VAGO, 2011c) and services such as, for instance, 
Early Childhood Development Services (VAGO, 2011b) and Efficiency and Effectiveness of 
Hospital Services: High-value Equipment (VAGO, 2015d): 
“[PA reports] tend to be on specific aspects of a department’s function rather than 
the whole thing. […] that aspect would probably be lost in the bigger picture of the 
[department’s] annual report – and so it would be concealed.” (MP3) 
While issues concerning public programs and services would be ignored in audited 
organisation’s annual reports, PA reports scrutinise public sector programs and services in 
detail. That is why MP3 describes PA reports as a “magnifying glass”. Further, as PA reports 
remain in the public domain forever, they do not only offer a point of departure for auditees 
wishing to make improvements but also allow stakeholders such as MPs and the public to keep 
track of organisational changes.  
7.3.4 Reporting style, tone and language of performance audit reports 
The majority of survey respondents (strongly) agreed (62.2%) that performance auditors 
generally use PA reports to exert pressure on auditees to move from discussion to action (see 
Table 17). According to auditees, this pressure emerges from PA reports’ language and tone: 
“[I]t’s the tone that’s the important thing. There are different ways that you can be 
critical of an organisation: you can be critical of an organisation in a way that’s 
sure to grab a headline or you can be critical in a way that is more likely to help 
that organisation actually improve. And [..] it comes back to intent.” (A5) 
“[I]t wasn’t a big issue but it got picked up in the media because his [AG’s] 
language in the report was so emotional. It’s all in the tone.” (A7)  
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Table 17: Usefulness of performance audit reports 
Performance audit reports… Min-Max SD D N A SA x̄ σ 
are unbiased. 1–5 1.5% 16.7% 22.7% 48.5% 10.6% 3.5 0.9 
serve as a valid basis for an internal discussion. 1–5 1.5% 6.1% 7.6% 68.1% 16.7% 3.9 0.8 
reach conclusions that are adequately supported by relevant facts.  1–5 1.5% 18.5% 15.3% 53.9% 10.8% 3.5 1.0 
are used by auditors as an opportunity to pressure us to move from 
discussion to action 
2–5 0.0% 13.6% 24.2% 54.6% 7.6% 3.6 0.8 
are used by parliamentarians/PAEC members to hold us accountable. 1–5 4.6% 12.1% 51.5%36 28.8% 3.0% 3.1 0.8 
Note 1:  SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = Neither agree nor disagree; A = agree; SA = strongly agree; x̄ = mean; σ = standard deviation 
Note 2: n = 82 
 
36 As interviews revealed, less than half of the auditees who responded to the survey questionnaire experienced parliamentary inquiries in the context of PAs. That is also why 
most of them decided to choose the option “neither agreed nor disagreed” when asked about MPs’ use of PA reports to hold auditees to account. 
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Auditees confirmed that the tone of the report reflects the intent of the AG and performance 
auditors (see section 8.3). It is, in fact, the tone of the PA report that influences auditees’ 
perceived usefulness of PAs, and in turn, motivates auditees either to implement changes or to 
react strategically (see Chapter 9). Because of performance auditors’ continuous negative 
reporting “there can be a bit of a resignation” (A12) among auditees to act upon PA findings.  
As performance auditors’ overly critical reporting style often discourages auditees from taking 
actions, they occasionally put PA reports “in the bottom drawer” (A32) or “chuck it in the bin” 
(A19). The continuous negative reporting also influences auditees’ perceptions of performance 
auditors and affects their relationship. Several auditees emphasised that performance auditors’ 
overly critical reporting style has made them a caricature of what they are supposed to be. A22 
explained that historically PAs were taken more seriously by auditees as PA reports have not 
always been critical and inflammatory:  
“I remember when I first started in government you would be terrified of a 
disastrous audit result. Now, because you’re guaranteed a negative report 
irrespective of the quality of the organisation, it doesn’t hurt as much as it once did, 
and that’s really damaging in a governance and accountability sense […] They’re 
going to say it’s bad anyway.” (A22) 
Resulting from constantly negative PA reports, several auditees feel that they have to be more 
protective of the information they provide. As opposed to auditees, journalists consider the 
“sharp angle” (J2) of PA reports as essential in order to underline the severity of performance 
inefficiencies and to lead to performance improvements. PA reports that use “hard-hitting” 
language and offer “scathing” (J1) criticism have higher chances of being taken seriously by 
auditees. The use of very strong language in PA reports, in order to attract media interest, has 
also been recognised by MPs, particularly opposition members. MPs usually welcome media 
reporting of performance issues as press coverage exerts additional pressure on auditees.  
7.4 Recommendations as outcomes of performance audits 
PA recommendations are regarded as a valuable tool by performance auditors and MPs to 
improve public performance (PAEC, 2014c; VAGO, 2015a and b). Performance auditors claim 
that their recommendations cannot result in performance improvements unless they are 
accepted and enacted by auditees (VAGO, 2014a, 2015a). When the researcher asked auditees 
about recommendation acceptance rates, auditees claimed to usually accept most 
recommendations. One significant reason for auditees’ acceptance is the longevity of 
recommendations as emphasised by A9: 
“[A]t the end of the day the recommendation is the only thing that lives on past the 
report […] Conclusions and findings are what they are. The recommendations live 
on beyond that.” 
From auditees’ perspectives, recommendations are instruments used by performance auditors, 
MPs and occasionally journalists, to hold auditees accountable and to exert pressure on them. 
While PA findings hold auditees accountable for past events, PA recommendations are 
intended to improve auditees’ future activities with regards to the effective, efficient and 
economic provision of public services and programs (see Table 18).  
 120 
 
Table 18: Recommendations improving audited organisations' efficiency, effectiveness, 
economic performance and accountability 
Purpose of 
improvement: 
Sample recommendations: Source: 
Enhancing 
accountability 
When reviewing its operations and effectiveness 
in 2012, the Committee of Food Regulators 
should definitively assign accountability for the 
success of the strategic plan and for agency-
specific actions to support the strategic plan. 
VAGO (2012b, p. 25) 
Improving economy That the Department of Transport, Planning and 
Local Infrastructure [..] identifies back office 
functions most suitable for shared services and the 
potential cost savings and other benefits that could 
result from these initiatives. 
VAGO (2014c, p. 24) 
Improving 
effectiveness 
That the Department of Health: [..] identif[ies] 
options for health services to effectively and 
appropriately share relevant patient information 
by developing a secure data exchange or 
messaging network.  
VAGO (2013b, p. 49) 
Improving efficiency The Department of Health, in consultation with 
health services, should improve the measures it 
uses to assess health service energy efficiency 
performance 
VAGO (2012c, p. 16) 
As auditees’ actions upon recommendations are closely monitored by other stakeholders, 
auditees assert that regardless of their usefulness and feasibility, recommendations must be 
accepted as they are an “unspoken rule” (A4): 
“Recommendation pretty much means that if you don’t do it, you’ll be hung out to 
dry if anything goes wrong. So, it’s not really a recommendation. It’s a 
requirement.” (A25) 
Such assertions give the impression that auditees take recommendations seriously. This is, 
however, not always the case as auditees’ actions upon recommendations are dependent on 
their perceived usefulness.  
7.4.1 Perceived usefulness of recommendations 
Auditees only commit to act on PA recommendations if they are perceived as useful and 
achievable. Table 19 illustrates that survey respondents hold relatively positive perceptions 
about the contribution of recommendations. More than 75% of survey respondents share the 
opinion that recommendations usually lead to performance improvement. Auditees’ favourable 
perceptions were further highlighted in interviews, in which several auditees contended to be 
generally satisfied with the quality of recommendations by describing them as “enlightening” 
(A21), “reasonable” (A1, A4), “useful” (A22) and “practical” (A24). However, some auditees 
hold controversial opinions. More than 40% of survey participants question the practicality of 
recommendations (see Table 19). They perceive them to be theoretically useful but difficult to 
apply. Contrasting opinions were provided by more than 36% of survey respondents, who 
(strongly) disagreed with recommendations being more useful in theory than in practice. 
Demonstrated by a standard deviation of 1.2, surveyed auditees hold different perceptions.  
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Table 19: Usefulness and effects of PA recommendations 
Recommendations made by auditors… Min-Max SD D N A SA x̄ σ 
usually result in performance improvements of our 
organisations. 
1–5 1.5% 13.6% 9.1% 66.7% 9.1% 3.7 0.9 
generally reach the source of the problem. 1–5 56.1% 9.1% 16.7% 15.1% 3.0% 3.5 1.0 
are often theoretically useful but difficult to apply. 1–5 6.1% 30.3% 22.7% 25.8% 15.1% 3.1 1.2 
have stronger effects on our organisation when auditors 
consult us before recommendations are developed. 
3–5 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 43.9% 54.6% 4.5 0.5 
Note 1:  SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = Neither agree nor disagree; A = agree; SA = strongly agree; x̄ = mean; σ = standard deviation 
Note 2: n = 82 
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From interviews, the researcher found that the majority of those perceiving recommendations 
to be difficult to apply in practice are local government auditees. Several local government 
auditees questioned the general materiality and feasibility of recommendations claiming that 
“there is no one on this planet that can do that thing that they’re recommending” (A22). Several 
auditees also expressed their frustration with recommended changes arguing that 
recommendations addressing policy issues do not lead to desired outcomes of PAs. 
It became evident that how auditees perceive the usefulness of recommendations is dependent 
on the audited organisation’s culture and attitude towards PAs. State government auditees 
assert that  
“it is the culture of the organisations being audited that is really important [..] If 
you see performance auditing as an opportunity for improvement you view that 
[recommendation] very differently.” (A2) 
Performance auditors are aware that auditees only accept and implement recommendations if 
they consider PAs as useful (VAGO, 2012a). They are more likely to perceive 
recommendations as feasible and useful if their organisation supports the pillars of PA 
activities, which are comprised of scrutiny, accountability and performance improvement. If 
auditees’ culture towards PAs is positive, they view recommendations as a value-adding tool:  
“Our general view is we take them as an improvement opportunity, so we take them 
as an opportunity to provide us some advice on how we might be able to do things 
better. So that’s always been our sort of culture towards it.” (A17) 
“I’m very supportive of having a performance audit function. I’m supportive of 
agencies, including ourselves being held accountable. And it’s very useful to have 
external scrutiny of our own processes and recommendations to improve 
performance.” (A28) 
When probed as to what auditees consider as good culture, it was stated that good culture 
implies welcoming the process of being reviewed, “to feel comfortable with being tested and 
audited” (A15) and to “feel encouraged when [..] someone’s auditing” (A20) while “[t]rying 
to get the best out of it” (A14). Another local government auditee stated that PA 
recommendations and PAs in general “are useful if you look at them in the right spirit” (A23). 
In fact, according to auditees embracing PA recommendations as useful performance 
improvement tool shows that organisations are mature entities that demonstrate to be willing 
to learn and improve. Auditees generally perceive PA recommendations as valuable if they 
suggest something new in regard to their organisations’ performance. Hence, it often is the 
learning aspect that encourages auditees to perceive PA recommendations as useful. However, 
if organisations or parts of organisations simply “don’t like being audited” (A17), they are 
more likely to adopt an adversarial approach. If that is the case, auditees often act strategically 
as explained in more detail in chapter 9. 
7.4.2 Targeted and whole-of-government recommendations 
Auditees, who claim that the implementation of recommendations does not always result in 
performance improvements, reasoned in interviews that recommendations are sometimes “a 
bit aloof” (A14). Auditees generally perceive specific recommendations on particular 
organisations, programs, services or systems to be useful as those recommendations are 
focused on the requirements of a particular organisation, program, service or system. However, 
recommendations resulting from whole-of-government PAs, so-called whole-of-government 
recommendations, are generally non-specific, vague, and untargeted and therefore are not seen 
as leading to performance improvements: “that can be really difficult if the recommendations 
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are too vague or too specific even… on either end of that scale […] responding to that is very 
tricky” (A9). 
Whole-of-government recommendations are often not suitable for all organisations involved. 
Particularly local government auditees who undergo sector-wide PAs based on a sample of 
councils underlined the difficulty of dealing with whole-of-government recommendations. 
They complained that in formulating recommendations, performance auditors often fail to 
recognise the diversity of the 79 councils in Victoria in terms of size, available resources and 
service provision. Consequently, local government auditees occasionally ignore 
recommendations as they do not regard them as applicable to their individual council (see 
Chapter 9). Another root cause of recommendations perceived to be of marginal relevance or 
practicability is performance auditors’ limited experience and understanding of the activities 
of local government and its operational environment: “where there’s a weakness I think is that 
they actually don’t know the business very well. They don’t know local government business” 
(A16). Interviewees argued that because of performance auditors’ insufficient understanding, 
they often ask inappropriate or irrelevant questions, “miss the main points they should be 
looking into” (A16) and target the wrong councils.  
7.4.3 Low-level and strategic recommendations 
In the past, performance auditors have often made recommendations that were perceived by 
auditees to be “low-level” (A9), meaning that recommendations did not reach the source of the 
problem, were short-term oriented and operational rather than strategic. Survey responses show 
that more than 65% of auditees believe that recommendations do not target the source of the 
problem (see Table 19). Low-level recommendations often only represent the general opinion 
of performance auditors and are not grounded in a comprehensive examination of 
organisations’ issues and weaknesses and the external factors causing them. According to 
auditees, this is often the reason why those low-level recommendations only lead to 
incremental performance improvements. When probed what auditees consider as low-level 
recommendations, some participants provided examples of formulations that indicate the low 
quality and usefulness of recommendations (see also VAGO, 2015f, 2015g, 2015h): 
▪ review and update of records to align with better practice; 
▪ provision of strategic leadership and better guidance; 
▪ review of guidance material and evaluation of its uptake and usefulness. 
With regards to what auditees term low-level recommendations, MPs expressed concerns that 
performance auditors sometimes make recommendations for the sake of making 
recommendations rather than ensuring that those recommendations are of significant value and 
have practical relevance for auditees’ daily operations. Low-level recommendations do not 
have the desired effect, whereas more strategic recommendations proved to be more useful in 
the past as they have led to significant positive change (see Chapter 9). It is strategic 
recommendations that auditees assert they can work best with: 
“[I]f the recommendations are really low-level and detailed, the chances are that 
they will not have a huge impact, whereas if they’re more strategy-focussed on a 
higher level then I think there’s a better chance of having an impact and there’s a 
better chance of agencies being able to work meaningfully with them.” (A9) 
Strategic recommendations have been described as detailed in planning but flexible in 
implementation. With regards to strategic recommendations reference has been made to a PA 
on Occupational Violence Against Healthcare Workers. The following two recommendations 
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pointed at by an interviewee, provide insights into what auditees consider as strategic 
recommendations (VAGO, 2015e, p. 34): 
“That health services and Ambulance Victoria build on, or develop a 
comprehensive and tiered occupational violence training program, that is tailored 
to need, delivered as a refresher on a regular basis, delivered flexibly, and reviewed 
for effectiveness.” 
“That health services develop, and Ambulance Victoria enhances existing, 
investigation training and procedures – including root cause analysis – and 
undertake compliance monitoring in relation to investigative practices.” 
From the review of PA recommendations listed in analysed reports the researcher concludes 
that strategic recommendations address the long-term objectives of government programs and 
procedures and do not only address public sector organisations’ day-to-day operations.  
However, strategic recommendations have sometimes been perceived as illusionary by 
auditees and MPs as they have suggested, for instance, the restructuring of systems (e.g. 
performance measurement systems, infrastructure systems etc.) for which no funding was 
available. Recommendations that require large investments that are often not available are 
perceived as unfeasible: 
“[I]t is not good recommending processes that will cost the department 100 million 
dollars unless the government is prepared to say, ‘here’s another 100 million 
dollars to do it’.” (MP3) 
From MPs’ perspectives, for recommendations to have impact, it is important that what is 
suggested is practical, implementable and in accordance with the resourcing framework within 
which auditees have to operate. 
7.4.4 Discussing performance audit recommendations 
Auditees emphasise the importance of having discussions with performance auditors about 
recommendations in order to make sure they are achievable and implementable. This confirms 
findings from the survey questionnaire, in which 98.5% of respondents agree (43.9%) and 
strongly agree (54.6%) that recommendations have stronger effects on their organisations when 
performance auditors consult auditees before making recommendations (see Table 19). While 
state government auditees are usually afforded the opportunity to do so, claiming that 
performance auditors are “always open for discussion” (A2), local government auditees argued 
that their attempts to discuss recommendations are often ignored, although VAGO claims in 
its PA practice statement that auditees are given an opportunity to provide feedback (VAGO, 
2017c). According to state government auditees, the intent of such negotiations is not to 
influence the nature of the recommendations, but rather to emphasise and/or deemphasise 
elements of recommendations and to ultimately improve recommendations so that they add 
value to audited organisations: 
“[T]hat’s part of the end of the audit process to say ‘well, if you recommend that it 
doesn’t make sense’ or ‘we’re actually not going to be able to respond to that but 
if you recommend this then it’s something that we think makes sense and we accept 
the findings.’” (A5) 
“[I]f what they recommended is not practical in the coalface […] they can’t be 
implemented, we’d explain, ‘well, if you change it slightly, we could possibly work 
with it.’” (A33) 
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According to state government auditees performance auditors are usually willing to modify 
recommendations when discussions are held. Such discussions between auditees and auditors 
are crucial as underlined by A9: “[…] if you commit to a recommendation and it’s not a good 
recommendation we end up in a lot of pain”. According to state government auditees it is better 
to have conversations with performance auditors regarding recommendations at an early stage. 
Nevertheless, although performance auditors claim to consult auditees (VAGO, 2009, 2015a, 
2015b), several interviewed auditees, particularly local government auditees, reported their 
experience that performance auditors took no note of their comments and that issues discussed 
were ignored. Instead, over time, performance auditors kept making the same 
recommendations, not recognising that auditees did not have the resources and capabilities to 
commit to those recommendations.  
7.4.5 Ripple effect 
Due to the large scale of public sector organisations in Victoria, VAGO acknowledges that it 
does not have capacity to conduct PAs on each organisation annually or more frequently. 
Nevertheless, to enhance the impact of PAs, VAGO encourages organisations that have not 
been the target of PAs and therefore not received specific recommendations, to review 
published PA reports to “find recommendations or better practice to […] improve their 
performance” (VAGO, 2014b, p. 5). VAGO refers to this as the ripple effect that intends to 
disseminate PA findings beyond the immediate subject(s) of PAs (VAGO, 2014b).  
In parliamentary hearings held in 2014, the AG at that time referred to the ripple effect as the 
process of recommendations impacting on the actions and behaviour of other organisations 
(PAEC, 2014c). Performance auditors observed that several organisations carried out self-
assessments based on tabled PA reports and implemented changes despite not being a direct 
subject of those PAs (VAGO, 2014b). Following VAGO, such impacts of the ripple effect are 
encouraging as they demonstrate the reach of PAs (VAGO, 2013a). The ripple effect has 
demonstrated that it can “promote continuous improvement and [to] strengthen the 
accountability and performance of the public sector” (VAGO, 2014b, p. 15). That the ripple 
effect has impact was also emphasised by auditees. Various auditees contend that they often 
look at PA reports on other organisations that deliver similar programs and services. The 
rationale behind this is that auditees are aware of the likelihood to become the target of future 
PAs: 
“[t]’s not just when they’re [VAGO] auditing us, but when they’re auditing other 
councils, I look to see what they’re saying and try to implement them as best 
practice here, because one day, they will come looking here. That’s the philosophy 
I’ve got. […] I do it on the front foot – will be proactive anyway and say, ‘well, 
what relevance does this VAGO report have to what we do here? (A16) 
Auditees claimed to have a general interest in acting upon recommendations despite not being 
directly involved in the audit in order to “mitigate the risk of being caught out by VAGO” 
(A29). The ripple effect therefore encourages auditees to take preventive actions. Several state 
government auditees claimed to always review PA reports relating to other organisations to 
evaluate whether recommendations apply to them: 
“[J]ust because you were not involved in performance audits doesn’t mean that 
you’re not dealing with the same issues. So, we have to look at recommendations 
and if we think it is relevant for ourselves then we do it.” (A5) 
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Some auditees reported that the departments’ audit committee expect them to review PA 
reports and to act upon listed recommendations. As demonstrated in section 6.2, this is part of 
the managerial accountability mechanism exercised by internal audit committees: 
“[O]ur audit committee requires us to basically look at […] every performance 
audit tabled whether the department is involved or not. And if there is a whole-of-
government recommendation, then we are supposed to respond to that.” (A9) 
An interviewed internal audit committee member welcomed the likely positive impact of the 
ripple effect, his/her declared approach being to ask not only “what happened when they 
[performance auditors] investigated this?” but also “what if that [the PA] were to happen in 
here? How would that impact us? What if we were tested on that? Would we stand up?” (A20). 
That the ripple effect has significant impact was also confirmed by a state government auditee 
who experienced PAs that the organisation was not directly involved in to have been more 
useful than PAs, which the organisation was a direct target of: 
“[I]t’s a bit sad that an audit that we weren’t in scope for was very, very valuable, 
and an audit that we were in scope for wasn’t. […] [E]ven though we weren’t in 
scope, I think it gave us an opportunity to review operations and make a couple of 
changes.” (A29) 
It was concluded that PAs drive better performance and lead to better practice in audited 
organisations even if those organisations are not audited. It is, in fact, the risk of being audited 
that impacts on auditees’ behaviour.  
7.4.6 Follow-up audits by performance auditors 
VAGO performance auditors occasionally conduct follow-up audits in order to examine if and 
how auditees have responded to recommendations (VAGO, 2015a and b, 2017c). For MPs and 
performance auditors, follow-ups constitute an important part of the public accountability 
framework as they enhance the accountability of auditees for their responses to 
recommendations (PAEC, 2014a; VAGO, 2015a and b). MPs consider VAGO follow-ups as 
highly relevant, particularly because over many years a range of PAs constantly led to the same 
findings and identified the same deficiencies. According to MPs it is auditees’ predisposition 
to ignore recommendations and their assumption that performance auditors will not return that 
triggers MPs’ perceived usefulness of VAGO follow-up audits:  
“It’s almost like a risk-reward kind of thing. Maybe from their [auditees’] 
perspective they might be thinking ‘how likely is it that VAGO will come back and 
do a follow-up audit?’” (MP4) 
“We’ve got to rely on the third party, the Auditor-General to get back in there and 
follow up […].” (MP2) 
MPs value VAGO follow-up audits so highly because they “close the accountability loop on 
past recommendations” (PAEC, 2014a, p. 14) and put auditees under pressure to act upon 
recommendations. In order to enhance auditees’ accountability and to encourage the timelier 
implementation, VAGO assessed auditees implementation actions to recommendations made 
in 2012/13 and 2013/14. As part of follow-up audits, in 2015, VAGO published Auditees’ 
Responses to Performance Audit Recommendations 2012–13 that disclose the extent to which 
auditees responded to recommendations (VAGO, 2015a). The report identified high 
recommendation acceptance rates. It was, however, noted that many responses show 
inconsistencies between actions and the completion status. Further, several organisations took 
months to commence work to address recommendations (VAGO, 2015a).  
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Later in 2015, VAGO published a second report, Auditees’ Responses to Performance Audit 
Recommendations 2012–13 and 2013–14. The report focuses on organisations subject to PA 
recommendations in 2013/14 and those with outstanding recommendations from 2012/13 
(VAGO, 2015b). Audited organisations still showed inconsistencies between the actions taken, 
the completion status and the time frame given (VAGO, 2015a and b). Table 20 illustrates the 
number of recommendations made between 2009/10 and 2015/16. While no information about 
the recommendation acceptance rate could be obtained for the financial years (FYs) of 2009/10, 
2010/11 and 2011/12, Appendix 5 lists acceptance rates for the FYs of 2012/13 and 2013/14. 
Reports further provided information on the acceptance rate for the FY of 2015/16, however, 
no information could be found on how many recommendations were only partially accepted or 
rejected. A partially accepted recommendation is one where auditees did not accept all 
recommendations, or where they accepted the intent but preferred an alternative method to 
achieving them (VAGO, 2015b). Auditees accepted 94% of recommended actions and partially 
accepted the remainder (see Appendix 5). As at September 2014, of the 411 recommended 
actions (VAGO, 2015a) 
▪ 60% were completed; 
▪ 11% were substantially completed; 
▪ 27% were partially completed; and 
▪ 2% had no action.37 
According to VAGO, the relatively high completion rate (including substantial and partial 
completion) indicates recommendations’ value in driving change (VAGO, 2015a). Auditees 
who experienced PAs in 2013/14 fully accepted 96% of recommendations and partially 
accepted 3%. Two recommendations were no longer relevant following organisations’ 
structural changes (VAGO, 2015b). VAGO (2015b) provided evidence for follow-up audits 
being effective in encouraging auditees to change their acceptance of recommendations. It was, 
for example, stated that a local government council “has now accepted two recommendations 
that they only partially accepted last year” (VAGO, 2015b, p. 7). Another example 
demonstrated that because of VAGO’s follow-up, a state government organisation accepted a 
recommendation which it initially only partially accepted. These positive outcomes, according 
to VAGO, demonstrate the value of follow-up inquiries. 
Since an examination of recommendation implementation rates alone does not allow for a 
comprehensive analysis of the perceived usefulness of follow-up audits, in the survey the 
researcher asked auditees whether they regard follow-ups as a performance improvement tool. 
Survey results show that while a total of 83.3% of respondents (strongly) agreed with follow-
up audits encouraging auditees to respond to recommendations, fewer respondents (66.1%) 
hold the view that VAGO’s follow-ups strengthen the overall effects of PAs (see Table 20).  
Table 20: VAGO follow-up inquiries 
Follow-up audits… Min-
Max 
SD D N A SA x̄ σ 
encourage us to respond 
to recommendations 
made by auditors. 
2–5 0.0% 9.1% 7.6% 72.7% 10.6% 3.9 0.7 
 
37 Partial completion implies that work to address the recommendation is underway but there is still significant 
work (e.g. 50%) to complete. Substantial completion indicates that most the work to close off the action (e.g. 
75%) is complete (VAGO, 2015a). 
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strengthen the overall 
effect performance 
audits have on our 
organisation. 
1–5 1.5% 23.1% 9.2% 50.8% 15.3% 3.6 1.1 
Note 1:  SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = Neither agree nor disagree; A = agree; SA = strongly agree; 
x̄ = mean; σ = standard deviation 
Note 2: n = 82 
Hence, it appears that although follow-ups may lead to higher acceptance rates, they do not 
necessarily have such positive impacts since accepted recommendations may not be acted 
upon. Local government auditees explained that follow-ups are not always as effective as one 
would think because they are a survey-based self-assessment. VAGO follow-up surveys 
require auditees to confirm that all recommendations have been implemented. They do not 
formally assess how and to what extent recommendations have been implemented. Usually, 
after auditees filled in the survey, they do not hear back from performance auditors. Hence, 
follow-ups do not always have the desired effects due to their informal character.  
As opposed to local government auditees, state government auditees explained that sometimes 
performance auditors follow up on auditees’ implementation actions on site (at the audited 
organisation), whereas at other times they request supplementary information via the survey 
tool. It appears that performance auditors use different follow-up approaches for different 
government levels. Survey data has shown that most survey respondents who (strongly) 
disagree with follow-ups strengthening the overall effect of PAs are local government auditees. 
Hence, it can be concluded that VAGO’s survey-based approach predominantly used when 
following up on PAs on local government organisations, is not considered as useful.  
Similarly to local government auditees, state government auditees expressed their concerns 
about the usefulness of automated survey follow-ups. Some argued that it would be of real 
benefit if performance auditors came back for follow-ups in person. Auditees also claimed that 
follow-up audits are sometimes controversial. One reason for this is that in situations, where 
auditees disagreed with recommendations in the first place, performance auditors conducted 
hard-hitting follow-up investigations: 
“There have been occasions where we haven’t accepted their recommendations 
and then they’ve beaten us up in the follow-up for not implementing 
recommendations, which we haven’t agreed with.” (A12) 
Under such circumstances follow-up inquiries are not useful as auditees have had their reasons 
for disagreeing on recommendations made in the course of the initial PA. One auditee stated 
that the effect that follow-ups have is “relabelling old wine in new bottles” (A33). Interviewees 
further added that changing the status of recommendations from disagreeing to accepting 
requires more than a simple follow-up investigation. Auditees suggested that performance 
auditors’ re-consideration of the nature of recommendations and negotiations with them would 
lead to more successful implementation rates.  
7.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter explored stakeholders’ interpretations of impacts and impact-facilitating factors 
emerging from the PA process. It was found that the auditor-auditee relationship is an impact-
enabling factor that is conditioned by trust, respect and collaboration between performance 
auditors and auditees. It is further conditioned by auditees’ frequency of exposure to PAs. 
Because local government auditees do not have the frequent exposure, they find it more 
troubling to be performance audited and often do not see the value in those audits. 
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Publicly available PA reports offer not only key stakeholders but also the public a window into 
the actual management of public sector operations. MPs underline the importance of PA reports 
being in the public domain, visible and accessible for everybody. Hence, according to MPs it 
not just the content of the reports that potentially facilitate PA impact, but their power to trigger 
and exert accountability and to create a more transparent environment. Findings from this 
chapter have further shown that compared to local government auditees, state government 
auditees are involved to a greater extent in the reporting stage. This, in turn, influences 
auditees’ perceptions, behaviour and actions.  
If implemented, PA recommendations can have positive impact. The impact is however 
dependent on how feasible and useful recommendations are perceived. Auditees consider 
recommendations to be more valuable when they get the opportunity to discuss 
recommendations before the report is tabled. Moreover, it is the ripple effect that enhances the 
potential impacts PA recommendations have. Performance auditors and MPs consider follow-
up audits as an impact-enabling factor. On the other hand, auditees’ analogy of follow-up 
actions being like relabelling old wine in new bottles demonstrates that auditees are rather 
sceptical about the potential of follow-ups for having positive impact. What is needed, 
according to auditees, is comprehensive debates and discussions with performance auditors 
about the kind of recommendations made in the first place. 
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8 Interaction-induced performance audit impact factors  
8.1 Introduction 
Findings presented in chapter 8 augment the findings presented in chapter 7. This chapter 
adds to the interpretational account of stakeholders’ definition of PA impact. The impacts and 
impact-facilitating factors discussed in this chapter are triggered by the interaction of different 
stakeholder groups populating the organisational field.  
The following sections examine the effects of performance auditors’ attendance at audited 
organisations’ internal audit committee meetings. They further discuss the intent and culture 
of AGs and performance auditors and how their attitudes affect how other stakeholders view 
PAs and what they interpret as impact. Journalists’ attention to and impact on PA activities 
will then be examined. In this regard the researcher also elaborates on the media’s role as 
informant for other stakeholder groups in the PA network. One of those stakeholder groups is 
the parliament that has a legitimate interest in PAs. The effects of MPs’ follow-up inquiries 
and parliamentary hearings that occasionally result in political blame-gaming and affect 
politics, are also part of the discussion in this chapter. The chapter concludes with a summary 
of findings. 
The institutional concepts of rationalised myths and legitimacy help the researcher to interpret 
auditees’, performance auditors’, MPs’ and journalists’ understanding of PA impact and factors 
enabling such impacts. As will be outlined in the following sub-sections, the accountability 
mechanism is often directly linked to impacts and facilitates them. Therefore, accountability 
dimensions also play an important role in analysing this study’s findings. 
8.2 Performance auditors’ attendance at audited organisations’ internal audit 
committee meetings 
In accordance with section 3.2.1.1 of the Standing Directions 2018 performance auditors 
cultivate their relationships with internal audit committees by regularly attending state 
government departments’ internal audit committee meetings38 (VAGO, 2010c; DTF, 2018; see 
section 6.2). According to VAGO (2013a, 2014b, 2015c) reports, VAGO meets twice a year 
with the chairs of departmental internal audit committees to share information, raise awareness 
of significant issues arising from PAs, to drive action on PA recommendations and improve 
relationships with state departments. This does not only indicate that performance auditors and 
state department auditees hold close relationships, but also that state government auditees 
frequently get the chance to communicate and discuss PA findings and recommendations with 
auditors: 
“We have a pretty good relationship with VAGO because we see them regularly in 
the audit committee meetings […] they also discuss the findings during the 
committee meeting. Even though they are not obliged to do that, they do that. And 
that works pretty well.” (A1) 
 
38 VAGO performance auditors do not attend audit committee meeting as members of the committee but as 
observers.  
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Performance auditors’ attendance at internal audit committee meetings has been described by 
state government auditees as positive practice, as they see it to be an effective way for auditors 
to gain insights into departments. Their attendance helps to improve the relationship between 
performance auditors and state government auditees, to target organisational issues more 
precisely and effectively, and to make more tailored recommendations. Hence, it is not 
surprising that state government auditees embrace performance auditors’ attendance at internal 
audit committee meetings as influencing factor for performance improvement. 
8.3 Intent and culture of auditors-general and performance auditors 
When asked about potential impacts of PAs, interviewees frequently referred to the intent or 
culture of AGs and performance auditors. Elaborating on what they mean by intent and culture, 
auditees, MPs and journalists referred to the personalities and character traits of AGs and 
performance auditors. Throughout interviews it became evident that the intent and culture of 
AGs and performance auditors influence how PAs are conducted, whether PA reports and 
recommendations are material (see Chapter 7), and perceived as useful by auditees, MPs and 
journalists. According to auditees, how useful PAs are “comes down very much to the culture 
of the Auditor-General’s Office and the intent of the Auditor-General and the intent of the 
Auditor-General staff” (A5). In other words, depending on “who the Auditor-General is, things 
can be very black hat” (A29). In general, auditees hold very negative perceptions of AGs and 
performance auditors who are “adversarial” (A27), “aggressive”, “opinionated” (A18) and 
seek journalists’ attention through critical reporting on performance issues with a view to 
exposing auditees in the media. These qualities of AGs and performance auditors often lead to 
a “more fearful” (A10) relationship between auditees and performance auditors (see section 
7.2).  
AGs’ and performance auditors’ intent and culture further influence the relationship with MPs. 
MPs described their relationship with AGs and performance auditors as “pretty good”, 
“cooperative” (MP3), “positive” (MP4) and “trustful” (MP1). However, this has not always 
been the case as several AGs were identified by interviewees to have only shown little interest 
in communication with other stakeholders in the PA network. As observed by MPs, historically 
AGs and performance auditors applied a fixed view, whereby they sought to validate their 
hypotheses as opposed to applying an unbiased audit lens and investigating inefficiencies. The 
fact that AGs and their offices used to adopt biased views and had preconceived ideas of audit 
findings, was also confirmed by auditees: “you can tell what they’re going to find based on the 
assumptions that are inherent in the spec [specification] in the first place” (A22). It is therefore 
not surprising that auditees hold strong perceptions that performance auditors conduct PAs 
with pre-determined outcomes. This often results in situations where auditees find themselves 
to be forced to react strategically, as performance auditors led by such intentions produce 
reports showing controversial findings. This was particularly the case when AGs sought media 
attention.  
8.3.1 Perceptions of Auditor-Generals’ and performance auditors’ headline-hunting 
attitude 
According to auditees, performance auditors, who adopt a media headline-hunting attitude, are 
“looking for exposure in the media for their work” (A5) by “looking for the problems and really 
blow those out” (A17) with the motive to catch headlines. 
“I have been engaged with the Auditors-General who have been very interested in 
terms of their own profile and the profile of their office and so headlines were quite 
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important to them. That makes it very difficult to have a rationale conversation.” 
(A5) 
According to auditees, performance auditors’ ‘gotcha’ attitude increases the imperative to 
always need to find something. Performance auditors are often perceived to be more concerned 
about their media profile than about driving performance improvement, which makes it 
challenging for auditees to embrace PAs as an opportunity to improve their organisations’ 
performance: 
“[P]erformance auditors seem to have adopted a kind of performance audit style, 
which is more about ‘gotcha, we found something that you didn’t do’, than a 
genuine attempt to stand back as a disinterested party and analyse what’s going 
on.” (A11) 
Whenever performance auditors employ a headline hunting approach, auditees adopt the view 
of “are we making sure our practices are bullet-proof so nothing can go wrong?” instead of 
“how can we make things better, how can we get more output, how can we improve the 
outcomes for the citizens?” (A7). Hence, instead of motivating auditees to welcome 
recommendations, a headline-hunting style appears to result in auditees being more protective 
and defensive of their organisations. 
Interviews revealed that journalists generally welcome the headline-hunting attitude as it 
provides them with many issues to report on. From journalists’ perspective, a headline-hunting 
approach is more effective as media exposure exerts pressure on auditees, often encouraging 
them to take immediate action. Journalists contended that the more negative the picture of 
audited organisations presented in the media, the quicker auditees are in undertaking 
corrections. It was argued that it is the role of performance auditors to encourage media interest 
and to expose performance issues to the public. As proponent of a media-attention-seeking 
attitude, J1 was unequivocal in his/her view: 
“[T]he role of a watchdog is to be fierce. The role of a watchdog is not to be close 
and cosy with the organisations that are being audited. In a way, they [auditees] 
should be dreading getting the phone call from the Auditor-General saying, ‘We’re 
going to be looking at this’, because they should know that someone’s going to be 
coming in and going over it with a fine-tooth comb because the Auditor-General’s 
role is… they’re working for us, the public. It’s ultimately our tax dollars that are 
going to all these public systems that we’re paying for.” 
Journalists generally concurred in their view that a “softly-softly” (J2), “partnership-like” (J3) 
and “collaborative client type relationship” (J1) between performance auditors and auditees is 
one that should normally invoke suspicion. They are of the opinion that a stakeholder-friendly 
attitude does not align with the public accountability framework. Additionally, a stakeholder 
focus “doesn’t have as much oomph to it as it could have” (J2). In conclusion, from journalists’ 
perspective “the more holding to accounts type of structure” (J2) is a preferred approach that 
leads to real change. As opposed to journalists, MPs who experienced PAs that “had been 
designed to catch headlines” (MP4) are not in favour of a headline-hunting PA approach:  
“What we want from the audit office is a contribution to the improvement of the 
public sector. We don’t want someone who’s going to catch the mouse or write 
reports being critical for the sake of criticism. We want reports that will assist with 
the improvement.” (MP3) 
With regards to AGs’ and performance auditors’ headline-hunting attitude, MPs further raised 
the concern that historically, performance auditors have frequently assessed and commented 
on politically contentious policy-related issues in order to attract media attention. Although 
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“the Act makes it very clear that issues of policy are a matter of Parliament, not the Auditor-
General” (MP1) performance auditors have focused on policy issues that were beyond the 
scope of VAGO’s PA mandate. Thereby, the main purpose of PAs to improve public sector 
performance with regards to the three Es has often been effectively hindered. MPs clearly 
emphasised that they do not consider this approach to be valuable with respect to PAs’ 
objective to improve public performance. Instead, they voiced their support for a stakeholder-
oriented culture of the audit office. 
8.3.2 Perceptions of Auditor-Generals’ and performance auditors’ stakeholder-
oriented attitude 
A stakeholder-oriented attitude was described by interviewed auditees and MPs as one whereby 
performance auditors request input from other stakeholders. For instance, requesting input 
from auditees regarding their perceived usefulness of PA recommendations before reports are 
tabled has been referred to by auditees as stakeholder-oriented attitude adopted by performance 
auditors (see section 7.4.4). One of the reasons why MPs favour a stakeholder-oriented, also 
termed as “stakeholder-friendly” (MP3) approach, is that it allows for more collaboration and 
consultation between performance auditors and MPs with regards to the early development 
stages of the annual plan. According to MPs, a stakeholder-friendly approach adopted by AGs 
and performance auditors allows them to exert more influence over the planning stage of PAs. 
When describing the planning stages of the annual plan, MPs emphasised that the AG is 
entirely free to agree or disagree to MPs’ PA suggestions. While MPs can make suggestions 
regarding areas they would like performance auditors to investigate, they cannot tell them what 
to do:  
“We can advise, we can warn, we can ask questions, we can give them ideas. We 
can’t compel them to do anything. We can certainly ask them ‘why are you doing 
that’ but we can’t tell them not to. We have no role to say ‘no, you can’t do that’.” 
(MP1) 
Similarly to MPs, auditees are generally more favourably disposed towards a stakeholder-
oriented approach. Interviews have shown that a more co-operative attitude exhibited by 
performance auditors directly translates into auditees’ more positive perception of PAs. For 
instance, auditees referred to PAs conducted by auditors applying a stakeholder-friendly 
approach as “process or opportunity for improvement” (A26). Essentially, interviewed auditees 
explained that when performance auditors adopt a stakeholder-oriented attitude based on a 
consultative and constructive approach, whereby those investigated “don’t feel that they’re 
being labelled as guilty before you prove your innocence” (A10), auditees are more receptive 
to auditors’ findings (see Chapter 7). In fact, auditees argued that it is really in performance 
auditors’ interest to collaborate more with auditees and to work on the shaping of PAs, in order 
to encourage greater PA impact. Auditees further agreed that the intent of AGs and 
performance auditors influence the usefulness of PA reports and feasibility of 
recommendations (see sections 7.3 and 7.4). The benefits of the stakeholder-friendly approach 
are summarised by A7: 
“[T]hey give you a very early look at what they’re thinking of doing and they work 
with you to build the scope […] not to do what they did in the past, which is just 
collecting all the documents they could and then trying to nail you.”  
The stakeholder-oriented approach is therefore perceived to be “a much more sensible 
approach” (A28), whereby regular engagement and consultation with auditees takes place. A5 
concludes that performance auditors have “much less of a desire to be on the front page for the 
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sake of being on the front page.” Although auditees assert their favouring of the stakeholder-
oriented culture, performance auditors contend that some auditees are resistant to this 
approach: “[s]ome agencies remain unnecessarily adversarial and often delay or obstruct 
audits” (VAGO, 2010c, p. 8; see Chapter 9). 
8.4 Media attention to and press coverage of performance audits 
Media coverage of PA findings is significant for VAGO as it generates greater transparency 
around identified performance and accountability issues and puts pressure on auditees to act 
upon recommendations (VAGO, 2013a, 2014b). As following sections show, media interest 
and press coverage can not only lead to PAs, but also inform other stakeholders and facilitate 
impacts. 
8.4.1 Media attention leading to performance audits 
Document analysis has shown that performance auditors welcome immediate and ongoing 
media debate on PA findings (VAGO, 2010c, 2011; 2014b; 2015c). While VAGO (2013a) 
claims to not actively seek media attention, performance auditors are aware that their PA 
reports can ignite and influence the public debate on performance issues (VAGO, 2012a, 
2013a, 2014b). As outlined in earlier sections, PA reports constitute the main source of 
information for journalists reporting about PAs. Journalists read through PA reports searching 
for stories that they consider to be of potential interest to the public. If PA reports have a critical 
tone and scrutinising reporting style, they are given “very good currency” (J2) by journalists. 
Additionally, sometimes members of the public, MPs or whistle-blowers from inside the 
government provide journalists with information and point out where to dig deeper to find 
critical issues: 
“[T]he unique aspect of a journalist’s role is that somebody might leak you some 
information from inside that was never meant to be revealed in the public […] those 
are where many of the best stories come from because that’s when you find out 
some problem that somebody’s basically trying to keep from the public eye.” (J1) 
Journalists clearly emphasised that those sources of information want someone to be held to 
account. In response, it appears that journalists consider themselves responsible for  
accountability in the public sector. They further underline the importance of their role in the 
PA context by emphasising that their stories are “very revealing” (J1) and put auditees under 
pressure. Journalists further claimed that subsequently to the publication of media articles on 
public performance issues, PA reports were often published on topics closely related to those 
issues raised in media articles. As emphasised by J2, it can work both ways: “[a]n auditor 
general report could trigger more media reports or a lot of media reporting could probably 
trigger an auditor general report”. 
In media articles’ potential to trigger PAs, journalists may demonstrate their power to 
“unleash” (J3) performance auditors. Presumptions that PA reports trigger press coverage of 
public performance issues, and press coverage leading to PAs have also been made by auditees. 
As survey results demonstrate, more than half of the respondents claim that media attention 
potentially leads to the initiation of PAs (see Table 21). These results were confirmed in 
interviews, in which auditees contended that they have no doubts about media reports being a 
trigger for the conduct of PAs. 
  
135 
8.4.2 Press coverage as facilitator for recommendation implementation 
According to survey results, auditees do not necessarily feel pressured or obliged by press 
coverage to implement changes. In fact, a total of 59.1% of respondents (strongly) disagree 
with press coverage enforcing the implementation of changes (see Table 21). 
Table 21: Media attention towards performance audits 
As a consequence of 
media interest the 
following occurred: 
Min-
Max 
SD D N A SA x̄ σ 
Media attention 
towards services 
provided by our 
organisation leads to 
the initiation of (a) 
PA(s). 
1–5 4.6% 16.7% 27.3% 42.4% 9.1% 3.4 1.0 
Press coverage forces 
us to implement 
changes recommended 
by auditors. 
1–4 21.2% 37.9% 33.3% 7.6% 0.0% 2.3 0.9 
Note 1:  SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = Neither agree nor disagree; A = agree; SA = strongly agree; 
x̄ = mean; σ = standard deviation 
Note 2: n = 82 
Those who feel obliged to implement changes if the media publicly criticises their performance 
(7.6%), are state government auditees who asserted in interviews that they often decide to 
implement changes in order to avoid MPs taking up issues reported by the media. In other 
words, state government auditees intend to prevent the intervention by MPs by acting upon 
findings raised in media articles.  
8.4.3 The media as informant for parliamentarians 
Once the media identifies and reports on performance issues emphasised by performance 
auditors in PA reports, MPs take notice and become involved, which often leads to political 
debate: 
“If opposition members get involved, dynamics change and the whole thing 
becomes a political issue discussed in parliament. The result is a parliamentary 
debate, lots of media articles and public hearings […] but the initiator is the media 
because they make sure it becomes a public issue.” (A18) 
Indeed, in interviews, auditees argued that many problems identified by PAs in recent years 
have only raised parliamentary and public awareness because of press coverage of those issues. 
In this context, auditees claim that it can be very frustrating when journalists are adversarial in 
their reporting style just to attract readers. Often, from auditees’ perspectives, the issues on 
which journalists report, do not provide what auditees consider to be the true picture:  
“They actually didn’t care to weigh up the truths of what they were saying. As long 
as they had someone telling them some dirt, they publish the dirt. They didn’t care 
whether the dirt was true or not.” (A20) 
A33 further adds that if PA findings make it to the front page of newspapers, the issues reported 
“become fact because it’s the Auditor-General who published it in his report”. According to 
auditees, PAs can reach highly political dimensions: for example, when journalists critically 
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report on PA findings, MPs (particularly opposition members) focus on those, then approach 
performance auditors and request a PA to be conducted on these critical issues.  
8.5 Parliamentarians’ interest in performance audits  
Within the public accountability framework in Victoria, parliamentary activities are vital as 
they are often a means by which auditees are held accountable for their actions in response to 
PA reports (VAGO, 2013a, 2014b). Essentially, VAGO (2012a) claims that parliamentary 
committees are a crucial link in the public accountability framework in Victoria. VAGO 
(2011a, p. 24) refers to MPs’ close interest in PAs, their use of and response to PA reports as 
a key measure of the contribution of PA work: 
“[w]hen Parliamentary committees use Auditor-General reports and services to 
inform its inquiries, we know that we have been relevant in informing Parliament 
on public sector accountability and performance.”  
MPs, particularly opposition members, occasionally have an interest in exposing auditees and 
frequently make use of PA reports. VAGO regularly reviews parliamentary inquiries, the 
public debate and feedback from parliamentarians to assess the impact of PAs. For the 
examination of MPs’ interest in PA reports, VAGO requests feedback from MPs through an 
annual survey. Survey results demonstrate that MPs accessed PA reports more frequently over 
the years and increasingly refer to PA reports when criticising auditees’ performance (VAGO, 
2014b, 2015c, 2016d).  
8.5.1 Parliamentary follow-up inquiries 
MPs periodically undertake follow-up inquiries into selected PAs (VAGO, 2011a, 2014a, see 
section 2.4.2). Such parliamentary inquiries are referred to by VAGO (2010c, p. 9) as a 
“crucial part of the accountability cycle” through which auditees are held accountable for 
either not responding or insufficiently responding to PA recommendations. It is parliament’s 
obligation to hold public sector organisations to account as emphasised by MP1 who referred 
to the parliamentary accountability mechanism as “fundamental political parliamentary role” 
(see section 6.3). From performance auditors’ perspective, parliamentary follow-up inquiries 
have substantial impacts as they reinforce the relevance of addressing outstanding 
recommendations (VAGO, 2010c, 2013a, 2014b, 2015c). The overall intention of 
parliamentary follow-up inquiries is to signal to auditees that their actions detailed in the PA 
report responses are subject to serious scrutiny by parliament and to pressure auditees to give 
greater attention to addressing the issues raised in a more timely fashion (PAEC, 2014a).  
In 2014, in accordance with sections 14 and 33 of the Parliamentary Committees Act 2003, the 
PAEC undertook follow-ups of eight selected PA reports as “particularly large numbers of 
VAGO recommendations have been ignored” (MP3). For the purpose of those follow-ups, MPs 
reviewed auditees’ responses to PAs and requested updates from auditees on the status of 
implementation actions (PAEC, 2014a). One of the major findings from data provided by MPs 
was that responses sometimes lacked detail about specific actions auditees intended to take and 
the timeframe for carrying them out. Additionally, MPs found that some of the intended actions 
set out in auditees’ responses differed from the actions that auditees took in practice. This is 
generally considered to be of no consequence as long as the alternative action addresses the 
substance of the recommendation. However, the PAEC identified instances where 
organisations had taken alternative actions that only partially addressed the substance of the 
recommendation (PAEC, 2014a). With regards to these findings, MPs took the position that 
PAs resulted in an accountability loop, in which auditees were hiding between different layers 
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of accountability relationships (see section 6.3) in the hope that they would not be seen to be 
failing to implement recommendations despite having accepted them (PAEC, 2014c, p. 22): 
“All of this was part of an accountability loop. Recommendations were accepted, 
we came back later to have a look and see what happened and we were able to find 
out what was going on. Not everything that is a recommendation can be dealt with 
in a quick and timely way, because sometimes departments have other things to do 
rather than just respond to the Auditor-General’s […] recommendations. But 
again, that is a reason that can be explained, and that is a reason where there can 
be dialogue and discussion.”  
In the same vein, the AG at that time commented as follows (PAEC, 2014c, p. 4):  
“If the agency accepted the recommendation but it has not yet been implemented, it 
must have an adequate explanation which it can provide. This is the essence of an 
accountability framework; it is the essence of an accountability framework 
throughout the entire Westminster system.” 
Where MPs considered that further investigation was needed, they held parliamentary hearings, 
where auditees were summoned to give evidence and justify their (non)actions upon 
recommendations (PAEC, 2012, 2014a, 2014e, 2014f, 2014i).  
8.5.2 Parliamentary hearings 
Parliamentary hearing transcripts provide evidence of MPs intensely scrutinising auditees’ 
responses to performance auditors and to extensively put them under pressure for not acting 
accordingly on recommended changes. The intensity of parliamentary investigations is 
outlined and emphasised in the following extract from a transcript of a parliamentary hearing 
held in 2014 (PAEC, 2014j):  
“In defending the approach that is currently being adopted, is the department 
prepared to simply sit here and say that you just disagree with the Auditor-
General’s recommendations? […] Because you keep saying, ‘Well, we have this 
and we have that’, but the Auditor-General’s evidence has been quite clear. I do 
not want to verbal VAGO, but they are saying, in the document in front of me, that 
the response provided by the department to the matters that have been raised in the 
report are in various aspects not adequate. So, are you saying that in your view 
they are adequate, or are you saying that you are going to amend what is happening 
at the moment in order to deal with the criticisms from the Auditor-General?” 
(PAEC, 2014j, pp. 10-1) 
“I just want to tease out the comments […] where you say some work has been 
undertaken to address the recommendations but much work remains. […] I think it 
is fair to ask why that would be the case given that the audit was delivered in 
November 2009 and we are close enough to four and a half years on from that. I do 
not think it is an unreasonable expectation to imagine that most of those 
recommendations at least ought to have been implemented by now. Can you take 
us through why it is that only some work has been undertaken to address four-and-
a-half-year-old recommendations and much work remains undone?” (PAEC, 
2014h, p. 3) 
Parliamentary hearings are generally considered by auditees as worrying and serious events 
and have been referred to as “the star chamber because you either sink or swim” (A29). 
Nevertheless, from auditees’ perspectives, parliamentary hearings constitute an “incredibly 
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challenging but probably useful exercise” (A9) that exert pressure on auditees to justify their 
(non)actions and thereby enhance accountability: 
“It sorts of adds to the pressure […], it adds accountability and that you have to be 
sure that you got a defensible position. Because you have to be able to sit there and 
articulate on the record in the parliamentary transcript and say, ‘Well, we didn’t 
do this because…’ or ‘we took part of the action, but we didn’t have the second 
part, because (…)’.” (A27) 
Parliamentary hearings were described by auditees as a political accountability mechanism that 
exerts institutional pressure along the hierarchical chain (see section 6.3):  
“The way Parliament works […] effectively that would flow down through the 
minister. The minister would then be holding the department to account and PAEC 
would always say ‘well, we’re going to come back and hold more public hearings 
if we need to’.” (A9) 
Some auditees explained that parliamentary hearings are often targets of substantial media 
attention which in turn attracts public interest. Parliamentary hearings are therefore 
substantively more serious and political than VAGO’s PA investigations as emphasised by 
MP4:  
“We can pressure in a different way than VAGO. VAGO performance auditors can 
only pressure through their reports. […] If VAGO says that you, as a department, 
have been negligent, it’s going to end up in the newspaper. However, when 
committee members investigate things become more serious.”  
Opposing views have also been expressed by auditees who argue that MPs do not have the 
power to enforce implementation actions. From their perspective, all MPs can do is to hold 
auditees publicly accountable and draw public and media attention to identified inefficiencies. 
Some claimed to not consider parliamentary hearings as useful. They admitted that as soon as 
the hearings are over, they usually return to their routine actions. Several auditees claimed that 
parliamentary hearings generally serve political purposes. More precisely, parliamentary 
hearings were described “as a battlefield in a political campaign” (A25), which makes auditees 
feel like the “ping-pong” between the opposition and government of the day: “[t]he two 
political parties are fighting a war above your head and using you and your staff as an issue” 
(A27). Auditees often view PAs as part of a political game between the government of the day 
and the opposition, in which “VAGO performance auditors are pushing some sort of agenda” 
(A19). As a matter of fact, auditees appear to consider that PAs are often used by opposition 
members as an accountability instrument where it suits the political interest of the opposition. 
These concerns expressed by auditees were confirmed by opposition members who claim that 
whenever a critical PA report is released, they will use that to publicly blame the government 
of the day.  
For performance auditors, parliamentary hearings play a meaningful role to underline the 
significance of recommendations and to put auditees under pressure to take action upon them. 
In a parliamentary hearing held in 2014 the AG at that time claimed: 
“[T]the point about this hearing is that these recommendations were made and the 
recommendations have not yet been implemented in full, certainly to my 
satisfaction.” (PAEC, 2014c, pp. 11-5)  
MPs view their follow-up inquiries and hearings as an extension to their scrutiny role and share 
the view that both follow-up inquiries and hearings complement VAGO’s PA work (PAEC, 
2014a). From the review and analysis of public hearing transcripts, it became clear that it is 
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particularly during the parliamentary hearing in which the reasons for auditees’ non-
implementation of recommendations are outlined and discussed with MPs. From auditees’ 
responses to MPs’ questioning, it becomes evident that auditees take the opportunity to outline 
the institutional environment within which they operate and explain how it can often restrict 
them in their actions to respond to performance auditors’ suggested changes.  
8.6 Chapter Conclusion 
Findings have shown that the intent and culture of the AG and performance auditors influence 
auditees’, MPs’ and journalists’ perceptions of PA usefulness. Whether auditors intend to 
improve public performance and adopt a stakeholder-oriented approach or seek to improve 
their own media profile by publicly blaming auditees, appears to significantly influence the 
outcomes of PAs. The headline-hunting attitude is perceived as a rather ineffective approach 
by auditees and MPs as it often does not just lead to hostile relationships between auditors and 
auditees, but also undermines auditees’ confidence in VAGO’s PA practice and therefore, 
decreases auditees’ perceptions of the usefulness of PAs. However, from journalists’ 
perspectives, performance auditors’ media-orientation facilitates better PA outcomes through 
the public accountability process. How stakeholders perceive the usefulness of PAs also 
depends on the quality of audits, not the quantity, as well as on the focus of PAs.  
Journalists’ articles are a key channel of information and serve as a strong medium through 
which accountability is exerted. Lavi (1999), Kells (2011a), and Bringselius (2014) 
acknowledged in earlier studies that the media potentially reinforces accountability 
mechanisms. Other authors like Bovens (2006, 2010), have underlined that the media is gaining 
power as an informal forum for political accountability. This has been confirmed by 
interviewed MPs who claimed to occasionally blame auditees and exert pressure on them 
through the media. The media as an informer and issue raiser enhances the accountability of 
the public sector by making performance issues transparent and available for everyone. 
Moreover, media coverage is said to have the potential to trigger the conduct of PAs. Similar 
findings were made by Parker and Jacobs (2015) who discovered that media coverage of public 
performance issues informs the AG about PA topics.  
The pressure upon auditees to implement recommendations increases once MPs use PA reports 
to hold auditees accountable. From MPs’ perspective, the actual impact of PAs lies in their 
capability to hold auditees to account. It is through this accountability mechanism that 
performance improvements in audited organisations can be achieved. Also, MPs and 
performance auditors consider parliamentary accountability processes such as hearings or 
follow-up inquiries as mechanisms that facilitate the impact of PAs. The study found that 
performance auditors’ only recourse is to expose public performance issues to MPs.   
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9 Perceptions of organisational change and response strategies  
9.1 Introduction 
From the analysis of documents, survey results and interviews it became evident that auditees 
implemented a variety of changes recommended by performance auditors. The dimensions of 
those changes range from incremental to substantial. As demonstrated in the sub-sections of 
this chapter, some changes have been perceived as more useful than others by relevant key 
stakeholder groups. Addressing RQ3, this chapter investigates to what extent PAs have been 
perceived as useful in terms of induced changes. Auditees, as the recipients of performance 
auditors’ recommended changes, have reportedly experienced different types of changes that 
are of varying dimensions and magnitude. Depending on the type, dimension and magnitude 
of changes, auditees expressed different perceptions of the usefulness of those changes. 
Findings emerging from this study show that depending on auditees’ perceived usefulness of 
recommended changes, auditees have developed response strategies that range from taking 
preventive actions to openly rejecting recommended changes.  
Supported by the theoretical NIS concepts of legitimacy, organisational change and 
rationalised myth, the following sections elaborate on the kinds, dimensions and magnitude of 
changes and stakeholders’ perceived usefulness of changes. The forthcoming section further 
provides auditees’ rationales and justifications for accepting, implementing or strategically 
reacting recommended changes.  
9.2 Dimensions of changes 
VAGO (2012a) considers the implementation of changes by auditees as impact. According to 
VAGO (2014b, 2015a, b and c) it is the induced changes resulting from PAs that contribute to 
substantial improvements of the economic performance of audited organisations and their 
efficiency and effectiveness in delivering programs and services, thereby adding value to the 
Victorian public sector (VAGO, 2010c, 2015c). Asking auditees about the type of experienced 
changes, survey participants were provided with a predefined list of organisational changes 
based on the researcher’s review of previous PA studies as well as analysed documents and 
reports. Survey responses then helped the researcher to develop and scope interview questions 
revolving around organisational changes. In interviews with auditees, the researcher further 
discovered changes not mentioned in the survey questionnaire. Figure 5 reveals that changes 
most often experienced were Changes in staff training and Increased budgetary allocation to 
the audited policy area.  
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Figure 5: Changes implemented by public sector organisations 
 
In interviews, auditees emphasised that changes in staff training had significant impact. More 
precisely, according to A2, changes in staff training and changes in IT and accounting systems 
– further elaborated on below – were among “the very big changes” (A2). Changes in staff 
training required employees to be retrained and reauthorised and, additionally, to provide status 
updates on their training progress every two years. Due to the magnitude of this kind of change, 
it was referred to by A2 as “almost like a ground up reform, [..] a big deal”. This interviewee 
further added that changes in staff training have had major positive impacts on his/her 
organisations’ culture, the work flow between different working groups, and the reporting lines 
between management levels. With regards to the latter, interviewed auditees experienced 
improvements in accountability mechanisms between varying management levels inside the 
organisation. Auditees explained that after recommended changes have been acted on, they 
perceived their responsibilities as well as their relationships within the organisation to be 
defined more precisely, which in turn, allows them to structure their daily tasks, prioritise 
important tasks and to execute them more efficiently and effectively. Overall, performance 
auditors’ recommended changes regarding staff training have led to improved performance of 
auditees’ management practices through the allocation of direct accountability to individual 
auditees or to groups of auditees within the organisation. 
As indicated by survey results, this study has further found that PAs impact on the allocation 
of government resources to public programs and services (VAGO, 2016d; see Figure 5). The 
PAEC (2014g) reports that occasionally more funds are allocated to certain programs and 
services to enable those programs and services to better cater to the public’s needs. For 
example, as outlined by VAGO (2016d, p. 24), in its 2016–17 Budget, the government, “[…] 
allocated an additional $168 million to the Roadmap for Reform package for vulnerable 
children and families” following a PA. Another example is the Biosecurity: Lifestock PA, after 
which the government allocated more funds (VAGO, 2016d, p. 25): “[t]he government 
announced an investment of $25.6 million into the livestock and horticulture industries as part 
of its 2016–17 Budget (…).”  
The allocation of additional resources is, however, not only related to financial resources, but 
also affects human resources (see Figure 5). It is not uncommon for PAs to lead to changes in 
human resources, whereby the number of, for instance, carers and health workers is increased 
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(VAGO, 2016d). An example is the PA Access to Ambulance Services, which resulted in the 
government announcing “$151 million in funding to employ 340 extra ambulance staff, 240 in 
various regional areas, over the next five years (…)” (VAGO, 2011a, p. 11). PAs can evidently 
change how much funding as well as personnel, public sector organisations receive. In this 
regard, auditees asserted in interviews that the allocation of additional resources due to PAs 
significantly affects how effectively and efficiently public sector organisations provide 
programs and services. Hence, depending how much additional funding or human resources 
were allocated to public organisations, the organisational changes resulting from additional 
resources were either incremental or extensive.  
Another kind of change that has been mentioned and underlined in survey results (see Figure 
5), parliamentary documents and VAGO annual reports as well as interviews, is the change in 
performance reporting (PAEC, 2014c; VAGO, 2013a). In analysed documents and 
interviews with auditees, particular emphasis was placed on the Performance Reporting by 
Local Government PA that led to the implementation of a new performance reporting 
framework for local government councils (VAGO, 2013a). The recommended performance 
reporting framework shifted the focus from reporting on inputs to reporting on outputs and 
outcomes (Victorian Government, 2012). This allowed auditees to shift their focus from the 
amount of resources allocated to certain programs and services to the examination of how 
effectively and efficiently those resources were used for the provision of services.  
The induced change in performance reporting further allowed for more transparency and 
accessibility of information for citizens who seek to obtain data about how much taxpayer 
money was spend on public sector services. In this regard, the induced change also enhanced 
auditees’ public accountability to citizens (see section 6.4). Interviewed auditees perceived the 
framework to have been particularly useful with regards to greater comparability of 
performance-related data among the different councils. According to auditees, the implemented 
change positively impacted on auditees’ ways of working by supporting them to more 
efficiently and effectively provide services and to improve their understanding of performance 
measures. In this regard, interviewed auditees spoke of learning effects that this kind of change 
has produced. 
In documents and interviews, relevant stakeholders have also reported changes in governance 
as a result of PAs. In 2014, the AG (cited in PAEC, 2014d, p. 2) at that time asserted that, 
“there have been substantive, positive changes to governance […].” Auditees confirmed that 
PAs have impacted on how local government councils, state government departments and other 
public sector organisations are governed. One example referred to by interviewed MPs and 
auditees when asked about changes related to audited organisations’ governance, was a PA on 
health services, Occupational Violence Against Healthcare Workers (May 2015) (VAGO, 
2016d). As a consequence of this PA, the government has delivered the following specific 
initiatives to tackle identified performance issues:  
▪ Funding new services; 
▪ improving government risk reporting; 
▪ developing a customised 10-year Mental Health Strategy; and 
▪ establishing a new team dedicated to the improvement of specific services (VAGO, 
2016d). 
As listed changes demonstrate, the PA led to a range of changes necessary to improve the 
governance framework of organisations subject to the PA. Accepting all recommended 
changes, auditees stated in their response to the AG that those changes will be treated as 
“organisational priority” (VAGO, 2015e, p. 47). Due to the multiplicity of induced changes, 
auditees perceived these changes to be intense and challenging. However, claims were made 
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that a “package of changes” (A30) that requires auditees to implement all suggested changes 
at once, is preferred over multiple individual changes that need to be adopted at different times. 
Referring to changes predefined in the survey questionnaire, in interviews the researcher 
probed whether auditees have experienced other types of changes. Thereupon, auditees 
explained that they have experienced significant changes in Information Technology (IT) 
and changes in accounting systems (see also VAGO, 2010c, 2014b). Auditees emphasised 
the importance of changes in IT systems, stating that this kind of change was necessary and in 
fact, welcome by auditees as organisations have been “operated out of spread sheets” (A2). 
Therefore, this kind of change was considered as an “opportunity for reform” (A2). 
Considering the adoption of new IT systems as necessary, auditees embraced performance 
auditors’ suggested change and implemented it accordingly although they were aware of the 
magnitude of the change and the associated workload.  
Emphasising the importance of implementing new accounting systems recommended by 
performance auditors, auditees explained in interviews that new accounting systems were long 
overdue since previous systems were out-dated. The investment required for the new 
accounting system was substantial, with staff-training sessions taking several days. The change 
in accounting systems reportedly led to more efficient processing of transactions. Moreover, 
as the new system is technologically more advanced and allows for the automation of 
accounting processes, it further decreased the margin for error, ultimately leading to risk 
mitigation and a decreased likelihood of the same mistakes occurring repeatedly.  
Auditees revealed that changes in IT and accounting systems were “huge” (A2) and “massive” 
(A19). Due to their magnitude, those changes were time-intensive, required considerable 
internal organisational restructuring and imposed additional workload on auditees. 
Nevertheless, these negative side effects were only temporary, and therefore considered as 
manageable by auditees. However, financial resources required to make such investments have 
had negative short-term effects on the budget of affected organisations. Referring to IT system 
changes, A2 stated: “24 million dollars for a new IT system, that is a big deal, that doesn’t 
happen overnight (…)”. Regardless of the costly implementation of new IT and accounting 
systems, auditees generally perceived those investments as “reasonable and feasible” (A1) 
arguing that once the investments amortised, organisations were operating more economically, 
efficiently and effectively.  
With changes in staff training and changes in IT and accounting systems being the exceptions, 
from interviews it emerged that auditees generally do not perceive recommended changes as 
revolutionary with regards to performance improvement but instead to be useful in leading to 
“incremental improvements” (A18). In this regard, several interviewees expressed claims such 
as: “we did not have to radically change anything, we just needed to make sure that we fix up 
whatever their findings were” (A1).  
Several local government auditees hold the view that PA work “doesn’t actually change 
anything within the organisation” (A19). In general, PAs do not have “any real grounding in 
making any real change or difference to a process” (A10). Similarly, state government auditees 
state that changes emerging from PAs do usually not contribute extensively to the efficiency 
and effectiveness with which state departments operate. Overall, according to A5 these changes 
have “created a bit of momentum” useful to make minor improvements but do usually not 
revolutionise the Victorian public sector. That most of the induced changes were not “mind-
blowing” (A10) and “haven’t changed the world” (A7) was also acknowledged by A15: 
“There’s nothing specifically that’s come out of performance audits that’s made 
such a dramatic change to our organisation. […] There’s never been anything 
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that’s come out of the VAGO reports that I’ve gone, ‘Wow! That is absolutely 
unexpected and will change the way we do business.’ […] It doesn’t mean that you 
don’t learn from them and you make adjustments, and we certainly do, but it hasn’t 
been world-beating stuff where we completely changed our processes.” (A15) 
A2 and A3 add that PAs generally give “a nudge to say ‘there is a problem there’.” From 
analysed reports, survey results and interviews it emerged that the dimension of recommended 
changes influences auditees’ perceived usefulness of those changes, and, in turn, their reactions 
to changes. How auditees react to recommended changes of varying dimensions is outlined in 
the following sections. Subsequent sections further elaborate on MPs’, performance auditors’ 
and journalists’ perceptions of auditees’ responses and reactions to changes. 
9.3 From auditees to MPs: recommendation usefulness  
Interviews with MPs have shown that they appear to be critical of whether performance 
auditors’ recommended changes actually lead to positive and valuable changes that verifiably 
improve the economic performance and lead to enhanced efficiency and effectiveness in 
audited organisations. MP3, for example, claims that not all recommended changes lead to 
valuable performance improvements:  
“I would say anecdotally that 50 per cent or more of the performance audits have 
contributed to improvement across the public sector, but there’s probably 50 per 
cent that don’t.” 
The interviewee further elaborated that recommended changes have not been as useful as 
expected because performance auditors have often had other intentions (PAEC, 2014c, d and 
e; VAGO, 2016d): some PAs have reportedly been designed to attract media headlines and to 
fuel the public debate (see sections 8.4 and 8.5), without the intent to improve audited 
organisations’ performance, as emphasised by MP5:  
“VAGO should look at improving the efficiency and the effectiveness of public 
administration in Victoria. I think there is a question mark about how those 
[performance] audits have been conducted in terms of delivering that outcome. […] 
I don’t necessarily think they’ve been used well in terms of improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of public administration.” 
From MPs’ perspectives, performance auditors’ limited focus on the three Es, is one of the 
reasons for auditees’ often perceiving a limited usefulness of recommended changes, thereby 
leading auditees to strategically react to recommended changes (see section 9.4). Indeed, 
survey results provide empirical evidence for auditees perceiving the usefulness of 
recommended changes to be limited. When asked in the questionnaire, whether they perceive 
recommended changes to be useful, 13.9% of respondents disagreed that changes leading to 
significant performance improvements eventuated (see Table 22). The same number of 
respondents (13.9%) does not perceive recommended changes to improve the effectiveness 
with which public services and programs are delivered. Moreover, 16.9% of auditees do not 
perceive suggested changes to lead to more efficient processes or to the better allocation of 
financial resources (see section 9.2). With respect to the objectives of PAs, interviewed 
auditees asserted that historically PAs have not always been driven by the three Es, and have 
therefore not had benefit for public sector organisations, citizens and taxpayers. 
“[T]he question is, has the money been spent well in the eyes of the people that the 
money was intended to assist? And that is, in my humble opinion, what the 
performance audit should be about. Is tax payers’ money being used in a way that 
it advances the interest of the people it was intended to assist? The question is [..] 
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if performance audits did that […] whereas I think auditors in the end run a bit 
scared.” (A11) 
When asked whether changes improved organisations’ performance with regards to the three 
Es, A11 expressed that PAs have “not changed the organisation’s operations to the better with 
regards to economic performance and efficiency”. To the researcher’s statement that VAGO’s 
PAs intend to improve public organisations’ economic performance, efficiency and 
effectiveness, A22 responded: “I don’t think that’s what they do at all.” One reason for the 
often limited usefulness of recommended changes as perceived by auditees, is the “missing 
adaptability” (A40) of “suggested changes that resemble mainstream recommendations made 
by performance auditors (…)” (A32).  
Against such contentions made by a relatively small number of auditees about PAs not being 
as useful as they could be, it is notable from survey responses that most auditees generally 
perceive recommended changes to improve organisations’ performance with regards to the 
three Es (see Table 22): 72.3% of respondents (strongly) agree that changes resulting from 
PAs improved the efficiency of public programs and processes, 60.0% of auditees (strongly) 
agree to the improved effectiveness in providing services and programs and more than half of 
the respondents (55.4%) (strongly) agree that induced changes resulting in the better allocation 
of financial resources. Overall, 66.2% of survey respondents claim that the changes their 
organisations implemented over the period under study have resulted in significant 
performance improvements. These findings were confirmed in interviews, in which auditees 
emphasised that PAs “do improve efficiency and effectiveness as a general rule” (A28). One 
interviewee provided an example of a useful change made to public sector traffic management. 
The implementation of the recommended change reportedly led to notable gains in form of 
commuters’ time saving in travel time. VAGO (2016d) adds that through the modification of 
only three sets of traffic lights, commuting citizens were able to save four minutes in morning 
traffic and six minutes in evening traffic.  
  
146 
Table 22: Usefulness of implemented changes 
Changes implemented by our organisation have 
led to… 
Min-Max SD D N A SA x̄ σ 
significant improvements in the overall 
performance. 
2–5 0.0% 13.9% 20.0% 60.0% 6.2% 3.8 0.8 
more efficient programs and processes. 2–5 0.0% 16.9% 10.8% 61.5% 10.8% 4.0 0.9 
more effective provision of services and programs. 2–5 0.0% 13.9% 26.2% 47.7% 12.3% 3.8 0.9 
better allocation of financial resources. 2–5 0.0% 16.9% 27.7% 44.6% 10.8% 3.6 0.9 
Note: SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = Neither agree nor disagree; A = agree; SA = strongly agree 
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From the engagement with local and state government auditees in interviews, the researcher 
noted that several auditees are not fully aware of the meaning of the terms efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy and do often not distinguish between them. As asserted by several 
auditees, the three Es “merge into one big concept, which targets performance improvement 
(…) nothing more, nothing less” (A11). Another auditee stated that PAs accelerate the 
processing and delivery of a range of public services and programs, while claiming that PAs 
did not lead to improvements in efficiency, effectiveness and economy. Only those auditees 
having extensive careers in the public sector and having experienced multiple PAs revealed in 
interviews their clear understanding of the definition of the meanings of the three Es and were 
able to relate them to changes they implemented as a consequence of PAs. Interviewed MPs 
claim to deliberately not use the terms efficiency, effectiveness and economy because they are 
used so frequently and interchangeably in publicly available reports and media articles that 
they have become almost meaningless. 
9.4 Assessing auditee response strategies 
When formally responding to performance auditors’ recommended changes, auditees are 
required to state whether they accept recommended changes or not, and if not, why not (VAGO, 
2015b). Auditees’ responses to recommended changes constitute a key accountability 
mechanism through which stakeholder groups are informed about the status of acceptance and 
implementation of changes (VAGO, 2015a). As subsequent sections demonstrate, findings 
from this study reveal that auditees do not always clearly state whether they implement 
recommended changes. In fact, this study has found that auditees often deliberately employ 
strategic responses in an effort to deal with the pressure posed by performance auditors, MPs 
and journalists. Performance auditors and MPs disclosed that they are intrigued by the 
strategies auditees employ after performance auditors have left audited entities (PAEC, 2014c). 
Elaborated on this below, different strategic responses by auditees were identified through the 
researcher’s analysis of documents, survey responses and interview transcripts. It emerged that 
auditees’ strategic responses to recommended changes are significantly influenced and 
channelled by auditees’ perceived usefulness of those changes. 
9.4.1 Preventive actions taken by auditees 
Survey results and interviews with auditees have shown that changes are not only implemented 
after PAs but might indeed be adopted before performance auditors’ arrival. This, according 
to interviewed auditees is often due to the fact that PAs generally endorse changes that auditees 
were planning to implement anyway. Hence, as indicated by survey results tabled below (see 
Table 23), expected visits by performance auditors encourage auditees to take preventive 
actions. Standard deviation values imply that auditees’ responses vary significantly: while a 
total of 30.3% of respondents (strongly) disagrees with increasing compliance with legislation 
prior to PAs, 31.9% of auditees (strongly) agree that they undertake such preventive actions. 
With regards to the preparation and provision of more detailed information on organisations’ 
performance, the researcher found that 68.2% of respondents claim to undertake preventive 
actions to be better prepared for the PA process, whereas 16.7% deny doing so. Responses 
concerning the preventive implementation of more efficient and effective practices vary 
significantly, with 36.3% of respondents taking respective actions and 40.9% claiming not to 
undertake changes prior to the commencement of PAs.   
In interviews, it was confirmed by several auditees that the PA function “does influence 
behaviour” (A5) and occasionally triggers auditees’ preventive implementation of change:  
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“I think the process of performance auditing […] does ensure that we are 
continually assessing our performance and improving our efficiency and 
processes.” (A15)  
Due to the likelihood of public sector organisations, their programs or services becoming 
targets of PAs, auditees asserted that they often examine the organisation’s performance asking 
“‘what do we need to start with now’ so that by the time that’s being audited we’ve got a better 
story to tell” (A5). According to auditees, taking preventive actions is often useful to avoid 
“being nailed by performance auditors” (A27) and assists auditees to create an image that 
signals to performance auditors public sector organisations’ compliance with relevant rules and 
their delivery of high-quality services to the public. Particularly in state government 
departments, the undertaking of preventive actions appears to be common practice. Due to their 
frequent interaction with performance auditors, state government auditees have claimed to 
“know what they [performance auditors] are searching for and […] make changes 
accordingly” before the PA commences (A11). Local government auditees, who emphasised 
to have limited interaction with performance auditors, explained that they “don’t get a chance 
to pre-prepare” (A10).  
Table 23: Preventive actions taken by auditees 
Possible visits by performance 
auditors lead out organisation 
to take preventive actions, 
such as: 
Min-
Max 
SD D N A SA x̄ σ 
Increasing compliance with the 
laws and regulations. 
1–5 3.0% 27.3% 37.9% 27.3% 4.6% 3.0 0.9 
Producing more detailed 
information regarding the 
organisation’s performance. 
1–5 1.5% 15.2% 15.2% 57.6% 10.6% 3.6 0.9 
Implementing more efficient 
and effective management 
practices. 
1–5 12.1% 28.8% 22.7% 33.3% 3.0% 2.9 1.1 
Note: SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = Neither agree nor disagree; A = agree; SA = strongly agree 
MPs expressed concerns about auditees taking preventive action. Following interviewed MPs, 
auditees often provide interim solutions for performance issues before PAs commence, with 
the intention to avoid critical inquiries by performance auditors. Whether auditees intend to 
take real measures after the conduct of PAs, is however, uncertain. Therefore, instead of taking 
preventive actions, MPs consider it crucial for auditees to take corrective actions, whereby 
causes of performance issues are resolved and recurrence of those issues is prevented. 
9.4.2 Acceptance and implementation of recommended changes  
Propositions made by Hamburger (1989) and Johnston (1988) that most of the basic, low-level 
changes (see section 7.4.3) are generally accepted, has been confirmed by interviewed 
auditees:  
“It’s a question of how significant the something is and in most cases, it’s not hugely 
significant. So, I’d say, ‘oh, yeah, we’ll do that,’ because it really doesn’t have 
much impact on anything.” (A33) 
The acceptance of those low-level changes increases the recommendation acceptance rate and 
allows auditees to convey the image of acting appropriately to other stakeholder groups. MPs 
and performance auditors agree that the crucial condition for PAs to have positive impact in 
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form of performance improvement is the implementation, not the acceptance of recommended 
changes.  
This study has further found that auditees consider performance auditors’ suggested changes 
as offering opportunities to request additional funding. A8 stated that performance auditors’ 
recommended changes often require auditees to “seek funding to undertake work that has been 
recommended as part of the audit”. More precisely, auditees respond to performance auditors 
by making the acceptance and implementation of recommended changes dependent on 
additional funding. A22 explained that if recommended changes require investments “you can 
make a case to government saying ‘not enough money’, ‘we need resources’, and other things.” 
Expressing the need for more funding to address identified performance issues, auditees may 
exert pressure on the government signalling that they will only be able to make required 
changes if they receive additional financial support. In that way, recommended changes 
provide an opportunity for auditees to put government under pressure as exemplified by A25:  
“The government can’t hide behind not funding local government enough when the 
auditor-general comes out and says, ‘Here’s this really big issue and here’s where 
the councils are at’ and it’s pretty easy to see that not all councils are able to fund 
their [..] needs.” 
Interestingly, although auditees do not feel accountable to VAGO performance auditors as they 
cannot instruct them to implement recommended changes (see section 6.2), several auditees 
emphasise that recommendations are mandatory and that changes must be implemented. A16, 
for instance, explained that the council treats the implementation of recommended changes as 
mandatory “because of where they’re coming from and what their head of power is”. When 
recommended changes are not implemented, auditees risk “making an enemy from a very 
powerful organisation” (A25). In this context, A33 further added that “you got to have a really 
good reason for not accepting the recommendation because it’s the Auditor General”. It is not 
unusual that performance auditors elevate issues to the political sphere, “where things turn out 
very bad if exposed to the public and when the media gets hold of it” (A31). Hence, according 
to auditees there is “strong pressure on agencies to accept the findings of the Auditor-General” 
(A8).  
For the reasons outlined above, it is not surprising that at the receiving end of a PA report, 
auditees claim to generally accept recommended changes, “no matter how silly the 
recommendation” (A9). A33 contends that although some recommended changes are “just 
completely unrealistic”, auditees often accept them in order to avoid further PAs. Emphasising 
that the AG holds power to exert institutional pressure on auditees through his/her reporting 
line to parliament and his relationship to the media (see sections 6.3 and 6.4), several auditees 
claimed that sometimes “following the path of least resistance” (A6) by simply accepting 
recommended changes is the most reasonable and sustainable way of gaining and maintaining 
legitimacy from performance auditors. In response to probing during interviews regarding 
whether accepted changes have actually been actioned, auditees revealed that in the past they 
often ended up not implementing them. This constitutes a form of responding to recommended 
changes referred to as hidden disagreement that is often accompanied by delaying tactics. 
9.4.3 Hidden disagreement and delayed implementation of changes 
According to VAGO (2010c), auditees are not required to always agree to performance 
auditors’ recommended changes. If auditees provide reasonable justifications for their non-
acceptance, performance auditors will accept that auditees “respectfully disagree with 
recommendations from time to time” (VAGO, 2010c, p. 8). According to interviewees, instead 
of expressing their opinion to auditors about recommended changes not considered as useful, 
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auditees often choose to “silently disagree” (A11) with suggested changes while appearing to 
publicly accept them. Providing justifications for their hidden disagreement with recommended 
changes, interviewed auditees reasoned that performance auditors’ suggested changes “don’t 
impact as much as you think they would” (A19). That is because suggested changes often do 
not target organisation-specific performance issues (see also section 7.4.2). In interviews, 
auditees underlined that in order to have the desired effects, induced changes need to be aligned 
with the cultural framework and the organisations’ objectives and work processes.  
Several local government auditees complained about recommended changes being too generic 
and not targeting council-specific inefficiencies and performance discrepancies. A7 recalls that 
performance auditors often apply the “cookie cutter” to local government councils in an 
attempt to apply a “one-fits-all” approach by providing sector-wide recommendations for 
changes that all Victorian councils are supposed to follow (see section 7.4.2). As stated earlier, 
the problem is that those recommendations are not applicable to every council due to the 
differences in size, culture, structure and performance. Being “tarred with the same brush” 
(A23) by performance auditors affects local government auditees’ perceptions of PA 
usefulness and occasionally leads to auditees giving assent to the implementation of 
recommended changes without the intention to act on them.  
Evidence emerging from analysed documents and interview transcripts has shown that in 
situations where auditees agree to adopt changes without intending to act on them, one strategy 
often employed is delaying implementation actions (VAGO, 2010b and c). The delay in 
implementation of recommended changes is often expressed by auditees’ responses such as 
“we support the recommendation […] we currently have a team reviewing the identified issues” 
(A12). It was observed by performance auditors that auditees sometimes did not act upon 
recommended changes with three and a half to four years elapsing since changes were 
recommended (PAEC, 2014c). That the implementation of changes is not always timely was 
emphasised by the AG in public hearings in 2014 (PAEC, 2014c, p. 19):  
“I am detecting a string of audits [..] where it seems to take a very long time for the 
recommendations to be brought into play.” 
Given that auditees have accepted recommended changes in the first place, performance 
auditors expect them to either have completely actioned the changes to full extent, to have 
substantially completed the implementation, or at least to have good explanations in place for 
not having acted upon them in a timely manner. This, according to auditors and MPs, “is the 
essence of an accountability framework; it is the essence of an accountability framework 
throughout the entire Westminster system” (PAEC, 2014c, p. 4).  
Auditees’ excuses for non-implementation have not always been explicit (PAEC, 2014c). As 
noted by MP2, auditees often claim that the PA “was very helpful, very proper” and that they 
“implemented things as contained in the table attached”. MPs usually rely on auditees’ assent 
to implement changes in line with provided timelines. As those timelines are often long, MPs 
“don’t sit there waiting for them to tick off” (MP2) but instead move on to the next issue, only 
to realise years later that auditees have taken no action to implement recommended changes. 
MP2 who claims to have been involved in multiple PAs and public hearings related to PAs, 
describes his/her negative experience with auditees giving their assent to recommended 
changes. This form of hidden disagreement, according to the interviewee, is a tactic commonly 
used, particularly among state government auditees:   
“[Y]ou read the response from the secretary: ‘yes, yes, oh Thanks, it’s a marvellous 
report’ and they do nothing. […] Basically, the departments were giving the fingers 
to the parliament and [were] nodding and then just ignoring it.” (MP2) 
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“We get them there as a witness and say ‘okay, this is what the Auditor-General 
said, this is what he ordered you to do and now, what have you done?’ And they 
say ‘look this is our timeline and we are going to make this and that change’ but 
that’s nonsense. The public servants are very good at that and I don’t want to be 
too critical but I’m just over it. […] So, as you can see in their responses, it’s a very 
nice way of putting it […] the department would be like ‘oh yeah, it’s just terrible, 
thank you so much for your help. Yes, yes, we’ll get on to all this and we’ll get on 
to all that’ and as soon as the door shuts and the performance auditor leaves the 
building, they throw the report in the bin. That was the really strong feeling I got. 
And so, they said ‘oh yes, yes, yes we accept the recommendation’ and in the end 
they couldn’t care less. […] I shouldn’t sound so cynical but having sat through 
hundreds of these. I am just disgusted because as a Victorian taxpayer I am not 
getting value for my money.” (MP2) 
MPs and journalists, who frequently review PA reports, recognised that those reports 
repeatedly list the same performance issues and related correcting recommendations. 
According to interviewed MPs and journalists this indicates that recurring issues are not 
resolved but are instead deferred. MP2 criticises auditees for their irresponsibility demonstrated 
by their inaction to solve issues repeatedly highlighted by performance auditors: 
“From where I sit I’m seeing recurring themes. […] I’m hearing the same thing 
over and over again. […] You would find 8 or 10 [PA] reports that the Auditor-
General has done and they are still finding massive deficiencies, quite often 
deficiencies of the same nature. They didn’t solve these issues over years.” 
Auditees’ strategic use of hidden disagreement and delaying tactics has also been noticed by 
MP5, who explained that when auditees were confronted in parliamentary hearings by 
performance auditors and MPs inquiring “this issue was raised five years ago. What have you 
done about it?”, auditees’ responses were  
▪ “the person responsible for that is no longer with us”,  
▪ “we’ve had organisational changes”, or  
▪ “the nature or our business has altered”.  
These excuses, according to the MP, are often times too broad, unjustified and unsupported by 
facts. Following MPs, it is these recurrent issues that emphasise the importance of 
parliamentary hearings (see section 8.5.2), which publicly blame auditees for their inaction on 
recommended changes (PAEC, 2014b; VAGO, 2012a). In interviews, auditees argued that if 
they tactically delay implementation actions, recommended changes may become factually 
irrelevant as the government of the day may change after elections or when, for instance, a new 
minister is appointed. More precisely, as soon as there is a change in the government of the 
day, with the newly elected party pursuing a different political agenda, recommended changes 
are “dead and buried” (A33). Among MPs there is strong awareness that auditees occasionally 
tactically delay implementation actions in the hope that changes previously recommended 
become irrelevant:  
“state department people generally outlast members of parliament and committees 
[…] because it’s a dynamic environment. […] So, they very often give that assent 
to the recommendations but what really happens that’s the question.” (MP2) 
From MPs’ perspectives, auditees view the parliament as a “temporary thing” (MP2) while 
they view themselves as a “permanent thing” (MP2). Seeing MPs coming and going, auditees 
agree to recommended changes without the intention to adopt change. Apart from employing 
delaying strategies, evidence has shown that as a consequence of perceiving suggested changes 
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to be incompatible with their organisational culture and to be of limited usefulness, auditees 
often decide to decouple induced changes from their daily operations. 
9.4.4 Decoupling of recommended changes 
Although interviewed auditees did not use the term decoupling they referred to situations where 
“processes have been put in place that nobody ever made use of” (A12). Auditees stated two 
main reasons for the decoupling of recommended changes from the organisations’ daily 
operations: one reason is based on the auditees’ assumption that if performance auditors believe 
that their suggested changes were implemented, they are less likely to return for follow-up 
audits or more PAs as asserted by A11: “[n]ormally, you can avoid endless repeat audits if the 
audit office thinks that you’re taking their recommendations seriously.” Closely related to this 
motive, another reason reported by auditees is that by pretending to be operating appropriately, 
auditees can avoid being publicly blamed in media articles and being summoned by MPs to 
appear at parliamentary hearings. With regards to the latter, A31 highlighted that “to please the 
Auditor-General is key because if the Auditor-General is happy, parliament is happy and we 
don’t need to worry.” The act of decoupling evidently legitimates auditees’ actions and 
prevents them from being held accountable by performance auditors, the media and parliament.  
9.4.5 Open disagreement and resistance to change 
Overall, interviews with auditees suggest that performance auditors are unlikely to tolerate 
auditees’ open disagreement with recommended changes. Instead, performance auditors react 
to auditees’ rejection of recommended changes by exerting additional pressure through 
drawing media attention to critical PA reports (see sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.4). While some 
auditees, particularly those with limited PA experience, appear to be more reluctant to disagree 
openly with performance auditors and instead, tend to hide their disagreement (see section 
9.4.3), several interviewed auditees with extensive PA experience appear to be comfortable 
with openly expressing their disagree with performance auditors: “We just couldn’t reach 
agreement. So, we just agree to disagree” (A27). Nevertheless, openly disagreeing with 
recommended changes is considered making it more difficult for auditees to deal with 
performance auditors’ future investigations that are likely to increase in number and become 
more critical:  
“[T]here’s an unspoken risk for agencies that if they don’t align and they don’t 
accept the recommendations then they’re going to get more performance audits or 
the audits are going to become more hard-hitting.” (A9) 
In this regard, auditees expressed that they were aware that if they decide to openly disagree 
with recommended changes, they basically “set themselves up to be a piñata in front of a 
parliamentary committee” (A11) (see section 8.5.2). Providing reasons for their open 
disagreement and resistance to performance auditors’ recommended changes, several auditees 
claimed that although performance auditors “should be the supporter of innovation” they often 
prevent auditees to taking risks and thereby act as a “killer of innovation” (A7) that stifles the 
creativity in the public sector. Instead of making public sector programs and services more 
efficient, economic and effective, PAs often “take away the speed” (A7). Expressing doubts 
about PAs improving public sector performance with respect to the three Es, A22 adds that  
“performance audits have made things take longer, be harder, and really slow 
things down. So, in an attempt to make things more efficient, in fact, it’s heading 
exactly the opposite way.” 
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Along with such statements, auditees emphasised that if performance auditors continue to 
prevent public sector organisations from being innovative and entrepreneurial, PAs are “never 
going to make step change, never going to make big change for the public sector” (A7). 
Moreover, with regards to resistance to change, auditees asserted that PAs occasionally enter 
policy areas although the AG is not authorised to comment on policy issues. In such situations, 
auditees emphasised that they do not hesitate to openly disagree with and resist recommended 
changes.  
9.5 Chapter conclusion 
Evaluating stakeholders’ perceived usefulness of changes recommended by performance 
auditors, this chapter has shown that varying opinions are presented among study participants 
with regards to induced changes leading to the enhancement of audited organisations’ 
effectiveness, efficiency and economic performance. While several auditees declared that PAs 
do positively affect public sector performance and occasionally enhance accountability, 
contrary opinions have also been expressed by auditees who contended that PAs usually do not 
achieve the aim of improving economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Another relevant finding 
of this study that emerged in this context is that several auditees appear to not have a clear 
understanding of the meaning of the terminology. 
Proponents of changes leading to improvements claimed to have experienced minor as well as 
major changes. It was contended that minor changes generally lead to incremental 
improvements, whereas complex, reform-like changes have led to significant long-term 
performance improvements. Major changes perceived as most useful by auditees were related 
to staff training, IT and accounting systems. Auditees who hold negative views of the 
usefulness of changes leading to performance improvements explained that several induced 
changes have had adverse effects. These include stifling innovation and slowing down 
processes, with consequent dysfunctional impacts on public sector organisations. MPs further 
expressed their concerns about recommended changes not always being focused on the three 
Es. More precisely, it was argued that half of PAs do not lead to performance improvements. 
Evidence has shown that following the path of least resistance is a strategy generally 
considered by auditees as a way of obtaining and maintaining legitimacy from performance 
auditors. More precisely, giving assent to the implementation of changes without the intention 
to act on them is a common strategy employed by auditees. To recommended changes not 
perceived as useful, auditees often respond with hidden disagreement, delaying tactics and 
decoupling to evoke the image of acting upon them. Such strategies allow auditees to obtain 
and preserve legitimacy while avoiding countless follow-up enquiries and additional PAs.  
Delaying implementation actions up to the date at which political elections are held, 
occasionally gives auditees the opportunity to avoid the adoption of changes in situations where 
the newly elected government pursues a different political agenda and disregards 
recommended changes made previously. Further emerging from the above analysis is auditees’ 
strategy of making the acceptance and implementation of recommended changes dependent on 
additional funding. In that way, recommended changes provide an opportunity for auditees to 
put government under pressure. 
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10 Discussion and conclusion  
10.1 Introduction 
Chapter 10 concludes this research study. In the following sections the three RQs are revisited 
and it is demonstrated how corresponding findings address the research objective of this study. 
The overall objective of this research study was to develop a conceptual map that summarises 
key stakeholder groups’ interpretations of PA impact. Achieving this objective necessitated the 
identification and assessment of key stakeholder groups’ accountability relationships in the 
institutional environment of PA practice in Victoria. With the intention to contextualise the 
subsequent assessment of stakeholders’ interpretations of PA impacts (chapters 7, 8 and 9), 
chapter 6 provided insights into stakeholders’ perceived accountability relationships and, 
thereby, set out the conditioning context that influences auditees’ interpretations of impact.  
For the investigation and examination of PA impacts, a theoretical framework of NIS as a 
macro theoretical perspective was chosen that embeds the selected dimensions of managerial, 
political and public accountability relationships. Following Guthrie and Parker’s (1999), 
Power’s (2003), and Jacobs’ (1998) call for examining the socially constructed PA practice in 
its institutional environment, this thesis viewed PA activities as an institution influenced by its 
key stakeholders at the field level. With the help of the theoretical concepts of legitimacy, 
rationalised myths and organisational change borrowed from the NIS literature, the researcher 
has interpreted and explained accountability relationships and PA impacts and impact-
facilitating factors identified by participating key stakeholders.  
Data-gathering and analysis involved the collection and examination of different sets of 
documents and an online survey questionnaire together with extensive in-depth interviews. To 
achieve the research objective, an interpretive approach was required. The employed method 
allowed participating key stakeholders to express their ideas in their own way and captured and 
preserved the richness of participants’ ideas through the use of quotations that give them a 
voice in the presentation of empirical findings. Findings emerging from quantitative and 
qualitative data were triangulated, facilitating a set of validated topics that address the RQs. 
The large amount of rich data has facilitated the development of a conceptual map that draws 
from the extensive empirical to highlight the most significant findings.  
After an account is rendered with respect to how this study’s overall research objective has 
been addressed, this chapter continues with a summary that has three different aims. Firstly, it 
draws conclusions from the most significant findings presented in chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
Secondly, it identifies and presents the contributions of this research study to the extant PA, 
accountability and NIS literatures and discusses their additions to and divergences from those 
literatures. Thirdly, it summarises implications for PA practice and policy that have emerged 
from the empirical findings of this study. Lastly, factors that potentially limited this research 
are discussed and avenues for future research are proposed.  
10.2 Key findings from this research study 
It was the central objective of this research study to develop a conceptual map capturing 
relevant key stakeholder groups’ PA impact interpretations. Based on the rich empirical 
evidence reflecting auditees’, performance auditors’, MPs’ and journalists’ perspectives, this 
study makes major contributions to the understanding of PA impacts and the factors facilitating 
such impacts. Most significant findings are elaborated in subsequent sections. 
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10.2.1 Interconnected accountability relationships in the institutional environment of 
performance auditing in Victoria 
While PAs pursue a performance improvement function, it is the accountability mechanisms 
fuelled by different dimensions of accountability relationships, that facilitates it. State 
government auditees described the accountability mechanism to be the facilitator for enhanced 
efficiency, effectiveness and economic performance and thereby provide empirical evidence 
for contentions made by Barrett (2001), Lonsdale et al. (2011) and Barzelay (1997) who 
identify accountability as a vehicle for performance improvement. Journalists have reportedly 
observed real change to be made as a consequence of PAs exercising accountability. 
Perceptions provided by interviewed MPs who refer to the accountability mechanism as the 
crux of PAs, and journalists, who emphasise that accountability is the foundation and sine qua 
non for PAs to leading to positive change, and therefore, to have impact, also provide evidence 
for the accountability mechanism to facilitate PA impact (see also Mulgan, 1997; Sharma, 
2007; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a). While these findings conform to findings by Reichborn-
Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018, p. 17) who conclude that “what matters when it comes to actual 
changes is accountability pressures”, this study goes one step further by defining the nature of 
impact-facilitating accountability dimensions and identifying dominant accountability 
relationships that facilitate the implementation of recommended changes. This study has found 
that some accountability relationships play a significantly more important role than others 
given that they have stronger influence on auditees’ implementation actions, and therefore on 
PA impact in form of induced changes.  
The analysis of documents, survey findings and interview transcripts provided empirical 
evidence for the existence of managerial (e.g. Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000), public (e.g. 
Parker and Gould, 1999) and political (e.g. Bovens, 2010) accountability relationships between 
stakeholders. Two different managerial accountability relationships illustrated in Figure 6 
were identified: the internal managerial accountability relationship between auditees and 
executives, and the internal managerial accountability relationship between auditees and 
internal audit committees. It emerged that managerial accountability relationships to the 
executive management of their organisations are regarded as highly significant by auditees. 
This perception held by auditees is conditioned by the fact that executive managers of public 
sector organisations assign accountabilities to individual auditees or groups of auditees for the 
implementation of performance auditors’ recommended changes. Through these assigned 
tasks, auditees are directly responsible for the timely and comprehensive completion of 
recommendation implementation activities (see Figure 7). As survey results demonstrated, it 
is the managerial accountability exerted by executives that is perceived as most effective by 
auditees in terms of performance improvements with regards to the three Es. Holding auditees 
directly accountable for their performance, executive managers establish a clear line of 
accountability within public sector organisations to which Bemelmans-Videc (2007) refers as 
internal managerial accountability. This line of managerial accountability between auditees and 
executives, as illustrated by Figure 6, is extended to the internal audit committees. 
The identified managerial relationship between auditees and internal audit committees is of 
significant importance as auditees evidently feel accountable for reporting their 
recommendation implementation progress to internal audit committees. In this regard, what 
this study discovered is that whether, and if so, to what extent the managerial accountability 
relationship between auditees and internal audit committees facilitate the implementation of 
recommended changes (see Figure 7), depends on whether internal audit committees actively 
oversee and monitor auditees’ implementation actions. In other words, internal audit 
committees that actively exert managerial accountability by holding auditees accountable for 
  
156 
their performance in regard to their recommendation implementation activities, effectively 
facilitate PA impact. From performance auditors’ and MPs’ perspectives, probing and well-
informed internal audit committees enhance auditees’ accountability for performance, i.e. 
managerial accountability. MPs and performance auditors even claimed that only if managerial 
accountability mechanisms between internal audit committees and auditees are in place, PAs 
can have impact in form of the adoption of recommended changes.  
With regards to auditees’ relationships with performance auditors, this study has found that 
auditees do not feel accountable to performance auditors given that performance auditors do 
not hold constitutional power to enforce the implementation of PA recommendations. For this 
reason, auditees expressed a view that they do not feel obliged to implement recommended 
changes. Despite their negation of being accountable to performance auditors, auditees are 
aware of the AG’s and performance auditors’ power to elevate performance issues and issues 
resulting from auditees’ inaction on PA recommendations to higher levels in the hierarchical 
political accountability chain. As performance auditors directly report to parliament and are 
accountable to MPs, they derive a requisite informal power from their political accountability 
relationships with parliament (see Figure 6), of which auditees are aware. The relationship 
between auditees and performance auditors can therefore be described as diagonal 
accountability to which Bovens (2007, p. 460) refers to as “accountability in the shadow of 
hierarchy”. 
This study has found that it is due to performance auditors’ ability to elevate identified 
performance issues via the political accountability chain, that auditees perceive the requirement 
to obtain legitimacy from performance auditors. Such findings conform to conclusions drawn 
by Broadbent and Laughlin (2003), Gendron et al. (2001), Mulgan (1997), English (2007), 
Funnell (1994) and Funnell and Cooper (1998), who refer to auditors as legitimacy sources.  
Further evidence for auditees’ legitimacy-seeking behaviour was provided by survey results 
and interviews with auditees that demonstrated that auditees often implement changes before 
performance auditors commence the audit. In this regard, it needs to be emphasised that 
particularly state government auditees claimed to undertake preventive actions in order to give 
the impression of operational probity. Thereby auditees attempt to mitigate the risk of being 
publicly criticised by performance auditors. In contrast to state government auditees, local 
government representatives, however, considered that they lacked opportunity to pre-prepare 
for PAs. Such statements were justified by their limited exposure to PAs, and therefore limited 
experience and understanding of PA activities (see section 10.2.2.2).  
Auditees also seek legitimacy from performance auditors by accepting PA recommendations 
although they often do not have the intention to act upon them. As outlined in chapter 9, 
auditees employ varying strategies and tactics to make performance auditors believe that 
recommended changes will be implemented. By adhering to the prescriptions of the 
rationalised myth of PA usefulness, auditees pretend to perceive recommendations as useful 
by accepting them in order to convey the image of acting appropriately. Such findings 
underline what Meyer and Rowan (1977) outlined in their pioneering work on rationalised 
myths: actors conform to rationalised myths to gain legitimacy and thereby protect themselves 
from having their conduct questioned. 
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Moreover, these findings conform to conclusions drawn by Power (2003), who asserts that 
auditing has a legitimacy-producing function, whereby legitimacy is imported (see also 
Gendron et al., 2007). Auditees participating in this study evidently seek to import legitimacy 
through their provision of positive responses to performance auditors’ recommendations. The 
researcher’s conclusion that the relationship between performance auditors and auditees is 
based on legitimacy-seeking behaviour rather than on accountability is aligned with 
contentions made by Black (2008), who asserts that legitimacy is not necessarily dependent on 
accountability relationships and that actors may seek legitimation from relevant sources 
without feeling accountable to those sources. From this research study it became evident that 
auditees’ legitimacy-seeking behaviour enables them to perform their routine activities, avoid 
continuously repeating PAs and frequently being questioned by performance auditors. In 
conclusion, this study has found that auditees’ legitimacy-seeking behaviour is one of the 
rationales that facilitates auditees’ acceptance of recommended changes, even if these are often 
only symbolically implemented. 
Against contentions made by authors of previous studies on accountability relationships (e.g. 
Sinclair, 1995) that political straight-line accountability relationships do not reflect what 
happens in practice, this study has found that auditees perceive their political accountability 
relationships as important. More precisely, auditees identified political accountability 
relationship to ministers as dominant accountability relationships in the PA context. Their 
perceptions are supported by statements that ministers have institutional power to exert 
pressure on auditees to implement recommended changes. Auditees’ perceived importance of 
their direct – what Sinclair (1995) coins as straight-line – political accountability relationship 
to ministers is reflected in survey results, which show that auditees perceive to be more 
accountable to ministers than to MPs and members of the PAEC.  
Such claims were further substantiated through interviews with auditees from which it became 
evident that the institutional environment of the Westminster system defining the lines of 
reporting anchored in the public accountability framework, facilitates auditees’ perceptions of 
being predominantly accountable to ministers. This study found that with respect to the 
implementation of organisational change, the importance of political accountability is 
outstanding. Auditees emphasised that the only ones who can enforce the implementation of 
recommended changes are ministers to whom auditees feel politically accountable (see Figure 
7). Hence, it emerges from this study that the political accountability dimension determining 
the relationship between auditees and ministers, facilitates the adoption of organisational 
changes. While auditees described their political accountability relationships to ministers as 
number one relationship arguing that ministers are the only actors who can enforce the 
implementation of recommendations, they also refer to the importance of their political 
accountability relationship to MPs, which they described as highest standard of accountability 
in political terms. Although emphasising the importance of their relationship to MPs, which is 
amongst others conditioned by MPs institutional power to summon auditees to appear at 
parliamentary hearings, auditees contend that their relationship to MPs is channelled through 
ministers, and therefore, constitutes an indirect accountability relationship. This is amongst 
others due to parliament’s incapacity to direct auditees to act on performance auditors’ 
recommended actions and their inability to exert control and to impose sanctions on auditees 
as argued by Mulgan (1997). 
Further, this study reveals that in the PA context, auditees view their indirect political 
accountability relationship with MPs to be limited to the political term of the government of 
the day. This is regarded critically by MPs, who expressed to be aware of auditees considering 
the parliament as a temporary thing and themselves as a permanent thing. For the 
accountability framework underpinning the institutional environment of the Westminster 
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system, auditees’ attitude may constitute significant problems with regards to the usefulness 
and effectiveness of PAs for generating positive impact. From interviews it emerged that 
auditees often delay the implementation of recommendations with the intention that those 
recommendations become irrelevant if the political agenda changes due to changes in the 
government of the day (see also section 10.2.2.5). Based on such findings, this study concludes 
that the political accountability relationships between auditees and MPs are of indirect and 
temporary nature.  
Performance auditors are politically accountable to the PAEC and through the PAEC to MPs 
(see Figure 6). Performance auditors’ political accountability relationship to Parliament is 
grounded in performance auditors’ reporting of performance issues via PA reports (see also 
section 10.2.2.3). Both, MPs’ perceived usefulness of PA reports as source of information and 
performance auditors’ perceived usefulness of parliamentary follow-ups and hearings as source 
of institutional pressure condition those stakeholders’ perceptions of their accountability 
relationships as being complementary. Given that the institutional environment of the 
Westminster system in Victoria does not provide performance auditors with institutional power 
to enforce the implementation of recommendations, it is performance auditors’ only recourse 
to expose performance issues to Parliament in form of PA reports. In this way, performance 
auditors actively channel accountability by elevating performance issues to the political sphere. 
This thesis has found that through this process of politicising performance issues, performance 
auditors also indirectly channel and enhance public accountability by informing MPs and the 
media and thereby assisting those stakeholder groups to publicly blame auditees and holding 
them accountable. Ultimately, this process leads to a better informed public, to which 
performance auditors feel accountable (see Figure 6). 
With regards to performance auditors’ perceived public accountability relationships to citizens 
and taxpayers (the public), this study concludes that it is performance auditors’ rationale to 
foster a better understanding of the performance of the public sector among citizens and 
taxpayers. Interviewed journalists perceive their roles in the Victorian public sector to be 
aligned with those of performance auditors. The only accountability relationships journalists 
identified is their public accountability relationship to citizens and taxpayers. Journalists 
reportedly seek to fuel the public debate by reporting on critical performance issues identified 
and raised by performance auditors in PA reports (see Figure 7). They are aware that the 
performance issues they raise facilitate the political accountability mechanism, through which 
MPs, particularly opposition members hold auditees to account. Thus, contentions made by 
Bringselius (2014), Kells (2011a) and Lavi (1999) that the media reinforces the accountability 
mechanism is confirmed by findings in this study. Moreover, while this study also confirms 
claims made by Bovens (2006, 2010) that the media is gaining power as forum for political 
accountability, findings have further shown that the media takes on the role as facilitator for 
political accountability as well as public accountability.  
With regards to the media’s role as facilitator of public accountability, analysed data has shown 
that auditees do not feel accountable to the media but consider it necessary to obtain legitimacy 
from the media due to journalists’ role as an issue raiser and conduit for the public opinion as 
referred to by Parker and Jacobs (2015) and Blume and Voigt (2007). The rationale identified 
by this study for auditees to obtain legitimacy from the media is that being perceived by 
journalists as operating appropriately helps auditees to prevent receiving attention from other 
stakeholders. Journalists emphasised their perceived importance of their accountability to the 
public. They portray themselves as managers of the public debate who release PA findings into 
the public domain and mediators between relevant key stakeholder groups.  
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It emerged from this study that auditees do not perceive to be directly accountable to the public. 
More precisely, although acknowledging their accountability for the spending of taxpayers’ 
money, auditees participating in this study claim to not feel directly accountable to citizens and 
taxpayers. Nevertheless, auditees expressed the desire and need to be perceived by the public 
as operating appropriately. Stating that it is important for them to obtain legitimacy from the 
public, auditees justify that their legitimacy-seeking behaviour is encouraged by the desire to 
be perceived by citizens as providers of high-quality public services and programs that benefit 
the public. A lack in legitimacy obtained from the public may result in an accountability 
mechanism through which auditees are held accountable by the public through their 
representatives, the MPs and the media (see e.g. Mulgan, 1997; Alon, 2007; Kells, 2011a; 
Hepworth, 1995).  
The institutional environment of the Westminster system and its public sector accountability 
framework prescribe that performance auditors serve the needs of the public and therefore be 
accountable to the public (PAEC, 2010b). In the context of this study, performance auditors 
place great emphasis on the public accessibility of PA reports, and thus, PA findings and 
recommendations. VAGO’s online presentation of PA findings and its emphasis on the 
importance of the dissemination of PA findings and recommendations provide evidence for 
performance auditors’ accountability relationship with the public. Parker et al. (2018) made 
similar findings: the authors found that several Australian AGs, instead of relying on 
parliament and the media as distributors of PA reports and disseminators of PA findings and 
recommendations, promote the direct engagement with the public.  
This research study has identified accountability relationships of managerial, public and 
political dimensions between relevant key stakeholders. As demonstrated earlier in this section, 
the analysis of documents, survey results and interview transcripts disclosed dominant 
accountability relationships, which were perceived as substantially important by participants, 
as certain dimensions of accountability relationships occasionally facilitate PA impact in form 
of organisational change (see section 10.2.2.6). With regard to the existence of dominant 
accountability relationships, this study confirms contentions previously made by Bowerman 
(1996) and Lonsdale (2008) that different accountability relationships exert different levels of 
influence depending on how stakeholders perceive the status of other stakeholder groups. 
Overall, what this study has found is that in the PA context, direct accountability relationships 
are perceived as more significant in terms of the ability to facilitate changes in audited 
organisations, than accountability relationship that have been defined as being of indirect 
nature. These findings confirm contentions made by Mulgan (1997, p. 28) who claims that 
“accountability requires a direct authority relationship within which one party accounts to a 
person or body for the performance of tasks or functions conferred”. From such findings it 
becomes evident that concerns expressed by MPs gain momentum: MPs identified an 
accountability loop, in that auditees managed to strategically ignore many of the recommended 
changes performance auditors provided. According to MPs, the multiple accountability 
relationships present in the public sector allow auditees to employ their strategies and to hide 
behind the accountability mountain, the different layers of accountability relationships. When 
auditees perceive the accountability relationship to be indirect, less concern and relevance is 
given to the need to justify their performance, to act in accordance with the other stakeholder 
party’s needs and to meet the expectations of the other stakeholder party.    
Lastly, empirical findings have made it clear that accountability relationships between relevant 
key stakeholder groups are interwoven and interrelated. These findings validate arguments 
raised by Parker and Gould (1999) and Stewart (1984), that the accountability mechanism in 
the public sector, which involves different stakeholder groups, stems from the complementarity 
  
161 
of different dimensions of accountability relationships. In this study context, auditees described 
themselves as managerially accountable to their executives (see Figure 6), who are 
accountable to ministers and through ministers to MPs. Thus, this study concludes that those 
managerial accountability relationships are politicised through the hierarchical chain of the 
Westminster system. In the final instance, MPs and journalists make sure that the public is 
informed of auditees’ performance. While it appears that direct managerial accountability 
relationships are the strongest mechanism through which public sector performance 
improvement can be generated, it also became clear that the political accountability 
relationships between stakeholders, occasionally reinforce the managerial accountability 
mechanism by engaging parliament and parliamentary committees that hold ministers 
accountable for performance-related issues.  
10.2.2 The conceptual map: stakeholder interpretations of performance audit impacts 
and impact-facilitating factors  
Exploring relevant key stakeholder groups’ impact interpretations was the primary focus of 
this study. Addressing RQ2 and RQ3, chapters 7, 8 and 9 offered an interpretational account 
of what key stakeholders interpret as PA impact and impact-facilitating factors. Identified 
impacts and impact-facilitating factors considered as most notable by the researcher are 
presented in forthcoming sub-sections. From this study, a total of five impact-facilitating 
factors emerged that enable PAs to have impact:  
(1) Intent and culture of AGs and performance auditors 
(2) Relationship between performance auditors and auditees   
(3) PA reports and recommendations 
(4) Stakeholder’s perceived usefulness of PAs  
(5) Implementation of recommended changes 
In this study, the only significant impact as defined by key stakeholders, is organisational 
change. Figure 7 illuminates how the identified impact-facilitating factors ultimately enable 
PAs to lead to organisational change. As the figure shows, several impact-facilitating factors 
are interrelated and influence each other. The illustration reflects stakeholders’ interpretations 
of impact-facilitating factors emerging from the PA process (see chapter 7), impact-facilitating 
factors emerging from interaction with other key stakeholders (see chapter 8), and induced 
organisational changes (see chapter 9) and is therefore built around the findings chapters. The 
illustration further shows that specific accountability relationships of different dimensions (see 
chapter 6) have been identified as impact-facilitating factor. In following sections, the 
researcher offers explanations and elaborations on the conceptual map. Findings hold profound 
implications for PA practice and policy, which are outlined in section 10.4.  
10.2.2.1 The intent and culture of Auditor-Generals and performance auditors  
Findings from this study show that the intent and culture of AGs and performance auditors 
influence auditees’, MPs’ and journalists’ perceptions of PA usefulness and interpretations of 
PA impact. In interviews, study participants identified the headline-hunting attitude and 
stakeholder-friendly attitude as two different approaches applied by performance auditors. 
Depending on the adopted attitude, performance auditors’ intentions and culture towards PA 
practice differ, which, in turn, affects their engagement with stakeholders, their language in PA 
reports as well as their recommended changes (see Figure 7). 
This study concludes that the culture and intent of AGs and performance auditors are important 
elements. Whether auditors have the intention of improving public sector organisations’ 
performance by adopting a stakeholder-oriented approach or seek to improve their own profile 
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in the media by publicly blaming auditees, significantly influences the conduct and outcomes 
of PAs. The headline-hunting attitude is perceived as a rather ineffective approach by auditees 
and MPs as it does not only lead to hostile relationships between auditors and auditees (see 
section 10.2.2.2), but also undermines auditees’ confidence in VAGO’s PA practice and 
therefore, decreases auditees’ perceived usefulness of PAs (see section 10.2.2.4). Journalists 
on the other hand, welcome performance auditors’ media-oriented headline-hunting approach 
arguing that it is performance auditors’ job to publicly expose public performance issues. 
Journalists’ encouragement of performance auditors to release critical PA reports is 
conditioned by their high levels of self-interest: critical PA reports provide journalists with 
relevant issues on which to report.  
Journalists and auditees appear to have contradicting opinions: from auditees’ perspectives, 
performance auditors who adopt a stakeholder-friendly approach, whereby they intend to build 
better relationships with auditees and attempt to identify opportunities for improvement instead 
of applying the mindset of a negative audit being the inevitable outcome, produce more useful 
PA findings and provide recommendations that lead to positive organisational change (see 
section 10.2.2.6). These findings are congruent with conclusions made by Gendron et al. 
(2007), who argue that the role performance auditors take on significantly influences how 
auditees perceive PA reports and recommendations (see section 10.2.2.3) and how they react 
to those. Öhman (2015) and Morin and Hazgui (2016) made similar findings. The authors 
stated that auditees hold more positive perceptions of performance auditors who act as change 
agents and modernisers that encourage audited organisations to implement improvements, 
whereas auditees have negative perspectives about performance auditors that take the role of 
headline-hunters.  
Morin (2003) and Morin and Hazgui (2016) refer to performance auditors who adopt a headline 
hunting approach seeking to publicly blame auditees via the media as punishers. Although 
auditees and MPs interviewed for this study did not perceive performance auditors as 
punishers, evidence has shown that performance auditors occasionally make use of media 
attention. As argued by Kells (2011a), this headline-hunting attitude, is, however, not always 
undesirable as press coverage has, in the past, evidently triggered auditees’ recommendation 
implementation actions. Findings of this study confirm such contentions: performance 
auditors’ approach to attract media interest cause auditees to adopt performance auditors’ 
recommended changes. The effect of the media was also underlined by journalists, who 
concluded that they consider performance auditors’ headline-hunting attitude as a requirement 
for PAs to lead to significant positive change in the public sector. From journalists’ 
perspectives, performance auditors’ media-orientation facilitates better PA outcomes through 
the public accountability process. While media attention per se does not improve audited 
organisations’ performance, its press coverage does so indirectly by channelling the public 
accountability mechanism. Auditees’ implementation actions are triggered by their need to 
obtain legitimacy from the media in order to be perceived as appropriate by parliament and the 
public. Hence, this study concludes that the media, as noted by Van Loocke and Put (2011), 
exerts political-legitimising impact.  
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Figure 7: Key stakeholders’ interpretations of PA impact and impact-facilitating factors  
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This study further found that intent and culture applies on both sides: performance auditors can 
only make valuable contributions to audited organisations in form of suitable, practical and 
tailored recommendations when auditees provide relevant audit evidence, are self-disclosing 
and consider PAs as a valuable and useful exercise. Auditees only perceive PAs as useful if 
performance auditors adopt a stakeholder-friendly approach and engage with auditees in an 
open and honest way, which fosters positive relationships in the long term. Overall, it is 
concluded that the intent and culture of AGs and performance auditors have a trickle-down 
effect, which impacts on the PA process, the relationship between performance auditors and 
auditees, key stakeholders’ perceived usefulness of PAs, the materiality of PA reports and 
recommendations, and consequently, the implementation of recommended changes (see 
Figure 7). 
10.2.2.2 Auditor-auditee relationship 
This study offers empirical evidence for the intent and culture of AGs and performance auditors 
influencing the way performance auditors and auditees engage, the quality and quantity of audit 
information auditees provide and how auditees react to PA findings and recommendations. A 
stakeholder-friendly approach adopted by AGs and performance auditors evidently fosters 
positive relationships between auditees and performance auditors often leading to auditees 
providing performance auditors with required audit evidence as well as additional helpful 
information. This enhances the quality of PA outcomes by allowing performance auditors to 
form grounded judgement on audited organisations’ performance based on sufficient evidence. 
In turn, performance auditors’ recommendations are more targeted and tailored to the audited 
organisations’ needs and more compatible with audited organisations’ operations (see section 
10.2.2.3). In general, auditees are more receptive to performance auditors who actively engage 
with auditees before, during and after the PA process and perceive their relationship to 
performance auditors to be built on trust, respect and honesty. Antagonistic relationships 
between performance auditors and auditees prevent PAs from leading to positive performance 
improvement.  
Findings from this study have identified different levels of engagement between performance 
auditors and state government auditees and performance auditors and local government 
auditees before, during and after the PA process. State government organisations as opposed 
to local government councils are performance audited frequently, often with multiple PAs 
conducted in the same state government organisation at the same time. Because of their 
frequent exposure to and interaction with performance auditors, state government auditees have 
substantial understanding of the objectives of PAs and adopt a strong audit culture. In other 
words, state government auditees are familiar with undergoing PAs and used to being held to 
account by performance auditors. State government auditees acknowledged that they make use 
of the frequent engagement by discussing PA findings and recommendations with performance 
auditors before the final PA report is tabled (see section 10.2.2.3).  
Moreover, it was found that state government auditees are occasionally involved in shaping the 
PA scope whereby they support performance auditors in narrowing down the focus of PAs, 
whereas local government auditees claim to have very limited influence – if at all – on the PA 
scoping procedure. Local government auditees often feel excluded from the planning of the PA 
process. Findings have emphasised the importance of the scoping procedure for the conduct of 
the PA process. In this study, the scoping has been identified as factor that facilitates impact as 
it influences the PA focus and thus PA findings and recommendations (see Figure 7). 
Effectively, the scoping of the PA affects the efficacy of PAs. Local government auditees’ 
perception of being eliminated from the scoping procedure does not only affect their 
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relationship with performance auditors but further influences their perceptions of PA 
usefulness (see section 10.2.2.4).  
From this study it emerged that performance auditors frequently attend state government 
departments’ internal audit committee meetings. This, as this study has found, works 
satisfactorily for both auditors and auditees: auditees are made aware of organisational 
deficiencies, and performance auditors become familiar with and gain further insights into the 
state government departments’ processes and procedures. This study discovered that 
performance auditors’ attendance at internal audit committee meetings helps to target 
organisational issues more precisely and effectively and to make more suitable and tailored 
recommendations that are compliant with the departments’ structure and procedures and 
address particular needs of departments (see section 10.2.2.3). It is therefore not surprising that 
compared to local government auditees, state government auditees generally show less 
resistance to PAs and more often embrace PAs as useful performance improvement tool (see 
sections 10.2.2.4 and 10.2.2.5). The researcher noted that these findings contain elements of 
Power’s (1997, 1999) Audit Society: through their frequent interaction during and/or after PAs 
and their attendance at state government organisations’ internal audit committee meetings 
during which performance issues are openly discussed, performance auditors appear to make 
state government organisations more auditable. In other words, performance auditors subject 
to this study, construct auditability in state government organisations.  
Several findings outlined above address conclusions drawn by Pierre and de Fine Licht (2019) 
that the modus operandi employed by performance auditors has gravitated towards a more 
continuous dialogue with auditees. However, as this study has shown, there appear to be 
variances in the engagement between performance auditors and different groups of auditees. 
While performance auditors’ engagement with state government auditees appears to be 
ongoing and embraces the pre-audit scoping procedure, evidence gathering process and post-
audit discussion, the engagement with local government auditees is often limited to the 
communication and provision of audit information during PAs. Due to the limited engagement 
and communication with performance auditors, local government auditees demonstrate to be 
sceptical about the relationship with auditors, which affects the PA process in terms of open 
and honest conversations and the provision of audit evidence. Although some authors of 
previous studies accept auditees’ resistance and adversarial relationships between auditors and 
auditees as inevitable (e.g. Funnell and Wade, 2012), others argue that relationships between 
auditors and auditees build on mistrust may hamper the potential positive contribution of PAs 
(e.g. Morin, 2001; Alwardat and Benamraoui, 2014). Such assumptions were confirmed by this 
study: the scrutiny exerted by performance auditors is generally welcome by state government 
auditees, whereas local government auditees often feel called out by PAs and are more resistant 
to suggested changes. The researcher concludes that how much exposure auditees have to PAs, 
and therefore, how much engagement they have with performance auditors, affects the auditor-
auditees relationship as well as the perceived usefulness of PAs (see section 10.2.2.4).  
The infrequency of PAs at the local government level leads to those auditees having a limited 
understanding of the purpose and process of PAs although VAGO’s practice statement 
Performance auditing in Victoria is publicly available (see VAGO, 2017c). For instance, the 
researcher found that some local government auditees were not aware of PA reports being 
tabled in Parliament. This, in turn, has considerable influence on PAs capability to lead to 
positive change in the public sector (see sections 10.2.2.6).  
With regards to the relationship management between performance auditors and auditees, this 
study concludes that AGs and performance auditors often selectively adopt a stakeholder-
friendly attitude: while state government auditees experience stakeholder-friendly performance 
  
166 
auditors who are engaging, local government auditees perceive performance auditors to be less 
open. As illustrated in Figure 7, the intent and culture of AGs and performance auditors 
therefore clearly demonstrates to either negatively or positively affect how auditees perceive 
their relationships with performance auditors and whether they consider PAs as useful and 
recommendations as suitable and material. 
10.2.2.3 PA reports and recommendations 
All stakeholder groups agree that how much impact PAs have is conditioned by the nature of 
PA findings and recommendations summarised in PA reports. Performance auditors consider 
PA reports as accountability enhancing tools that foster parliamentary inquiries and public 
hearings and thereby support MPs in holding auditees accountable. MPs underline the 
importance of PA reports being in the public domain, visible to and accessible by everybody. 
According to MPs it not just the content of PA reports that potentially facilitate PA impact, but 
their power to exert accountability and to create a more transparent environment. In interviews, 
MPs emphasised that the specific focus is on the effectiveness, efficiency and economic 
performance of audited organisations. More precisely, PA reports, as described by MPs, are 
like magnifying glasses that zoom in on the particular performance issue, make the issue more 
transparent and visible for other stakeholder groups and hold those responsible for performance 
issues to account. Such findings are aligned with contentions made by Skærbæk and 
Christensen (2015) that PA reports are often utilised as a blame purification instrument by 
parliament and the media. Roberts and Pollitt (1994) establish that NAO’s PA reports assist 
MPs to discharge their accountability functions. From performance auditors’ and MPs’ 
perspectives, it is this accountability process facilitated by PA reports, that triggers 
performance improvement in audited organisations. This study has found that according to 
performance auditors, PA reports function as catalysts for change (see section 10.2.2.6). 
Therefore, performance auditors perceive PA reports to be an impact-facilitating factor that 
leads to the implementation of recommendations and thus triggers organisational change. 
Journalists are most favourably disposed towards the critical tone of many PA reports. From 
journalists’ perspective, the more critical PA reports are, the more effective they are in exerting 
accountability and the higher are the chances of being taken up by auditees and acted on in a 
timely manner. However, auditees revealed different views. As a matter of fact, this study 
concludes that auditees, when publicly blamed through media articles covering PA report 
findings, often react strategically while conveying the picture of acting in accordance with what 
has been suggested by performance auditors (see section 10.2.2.5). While this study confirms 
findings by Kells (2011a) that PA reports attract significant amounts of media attention, 
findings from studies by, for instance, Mayne (2007), Justesen and Skærbæk (2010) and Alon 
(2007), that press coverage of PA reports significantly affect auditees’ recommendation 
implementation actions, have not been confirmed by this research project. Instead, it was found 
that auditees, accepting the continuously negative press coverage of their performance, became 
accustomed to the critical media reporting and therefore reported not feeling excessively 
affected and pressured by critical media articles to implement performance auditors’ 
recommended changes. Nevertheless, as outlined earlier, media coverage potentially triggers 
auditees’ adoption of performance auditors’ recommended changes (see Figure 7).  
Generally, auditees who participated in the survey, consider PA reports as a valid basis for the 
internal discussion of performance issues and how to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness and 
economic performance of public sector organisations, their program or services. Referred to 
by Van Loocke and Put (2011) as conceptual impact, this study argues that PA reports have 
the capability of facilitating the long-term learning effects within audited organisations as 
contended by Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018). However, as findings from this study 
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clearly emphasise, the conditioning factor for PA reports to have such long-term organisational 
learning effects is that they are perceived as useful (see section 10.2.2.4).  
According to interviewed auditees, the tone and language used by performance auditors in their 
reports reflect their employed approach, i.e. stakeholder-oriented or headline-hunting. As this 
study has shown, it is, amongst others, the tone and language, that affects auditees’ perceived 
usefulness of PAs (see section 10.2.2.4) and thus the likelihood of recommended changes being 
implemented (see section 10.2.2.5). More precisely, what this study has found is that an overly 
critical reporting style adopted by performance auditors often leads to auditees ignoring and 
disregarding PA reports. From auditees’ but also MPs’ perspectives, the continuously negative 
reporting style may potentially have negative effects on the accountability process, as auditees 
are less likely to address findings and recommendations in a report written in sensational style. 
As concluded by previous studies by, for instance, Hatherly and Parker (1988) Reichborn-
Kjennerud (2013a and b) and Morin (2014), whether auditees consider PA reports as a useful 
point of departure to implement organisational changes, depends on their perceptions of the 
report quality, tone and general report materiality. Whether performance auditors adopt a 
critical headline-hunting approach facilitated by a sensational writing style and critical tone or 
employ a stakeholder-oriented attitude presenting PA findings without the intention to attract 
media headlines, has been found to significantly affect auditees’ perceptions of PA reports and 
the provided recommendations. According to auditees, organisational changes recommended 
by performance auditors who seek to attract media attention are not as feasible and 
implementable as those made by auditors who actively engage with auditees (see section 
10.2.2.1). Auditees and MPs agree that, how feasible, strategic, complex and useful 
recommended changes are, and the extent to which performance auditors are willing to engage 
with auditees in discussions around findings and recommendations, depends on the culture and 
intent of AGs and performance auditors.  
Asserting that they perceive PA recommendations as instruments used by performance 
auditors, MPs, and occasionally journalists to hold them to account and put them under pressure 
to implement changes, several auditees claim that recommendations can be considered as 
unspoken rule. Auditees’ perception of recommendations having rule-like status stems from 
the fact that PA findings summarise past events, in other words, what went wrong, whereas 
recommendations prescribe the measures to take in the future in order to make performance 
improvements. Nevertheless, as this study found, perceiving recommendations as rule-like 
requirements does not imply that auditees consider them as useful and feasible tools to improve 
their organisations’ performance. In fact, this study has found that auditees’ perceived 
usefulness of recommended changes depends on the kind and nature of recommended changes. 
Auditees distinguished between different types of recommendations, i.e. targeted, whole-of-
government, low-level and strategic recommendations. Whether recommendations are 
strategic or low-level, target a specific public sector organisation, service or program or intend 
to affect multiple audited organisations, their services and/or programs (whole-of-government 
recommendations) has a significant effect on auditees’ perceived usefulness of recommended 
changes and the implementation of those.  
Targeted recommendations have been perceived as more useful by auditees compared to 
whole-of-government recommendations. One of the reasons is that targeted recommendations 
specifically focus on the organisation-specific operations, services and programs. In other 
words, targeted recommendations take into consideration the culture and environment of the 
audited organisation. Local government auditees emphasise the importance of 
recommendations being compliant to audited organisations’ culture arguing that whole-of-
government recommendations fail to take into account the different sizes of councils, their 
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available resources and type of programs and service provided. Consequently, due to their 
vague and unspecific nature, whole-of-government recommendations are often perceived as 
unsuitable by local government auditees councils and are therefore often ignored or decoupled 
from councils’ daily operations (see section 10.2.2.5).  
Survey and interview data have shown that auditees perceive low-level recommendations to 
lead to incremental performance improvements only. As opposed to low-level 
recommendations, strategic recommendations aim at long-term performance improvements. 
Auditees as well as MPs perceive strategic recommendations that take the long-term objectives 
of audited organisations into consideration and allow auditees to be flexible in the 
implementation as more useful. Auditees see more value in strategic recommendations and are, 
therefore, generally more inclined to adopt them. Strategic recommendations, as emphasised 
by auditees and MPs, have evidently led to positive change. Nevertheless, it should be noticed 
that the implementation costs associated with strategic changes often exceed auditees’ 
available resources. For this reason, MPs argue that for recommendations to be implementable, 
they need to be practicable and feasible with regards to required resources (see section 10.4.2).  
Interviews and survey results showed that auditees perceive PA recommendations to be more 
useful and impactful if auditees are afforded the opportunity to discuss them with performance 
auditors. Such findings made strong arguments for the stakeholder-oriented attitude of 
performance auditors to be an impact-facilitating factor (see section 10.2.2.1). While it appears 
that state government auditees are provided the opportunity to comment on performance 
auditors’ preliminary recommendations in draft PA reports, findings reveal that local 
government auditees’ attempts to discuss recommended changes are often ignored by 
performance auditors, or they are not given the opportunity in the first place, even though 
VAGO’s PA practice statement states differently (see VAGO, 2017c). It is therefore not 
surprising that the majority of auditees questioning the materiality and practicality of PA 
recommendations are local government auditees. Given their frequent engagement with 
performance auditors, state government auditees claim to be able to influence what is reported 
by performance auditors. Such claims slightly differ from findings by Parker and Jacobs (2015) 
who conclude that auditees, according to performance auditors, only have limited influence on 
PA report contents. While Parker and Jacobs (2015) refer to auditees in general, this study 
found that there are significant differences in the level of influence state government and local 
government auditees exert on report contents. As emphasised earlier, performance auditors 
appear to be more stakeholder-oriented towards state government auditees than local 
government auditees.  According to Pierre and de Fine Licht (2019) the continuous engagement 
with auditees allows auditors to gain a better overview of the organisation audited and helps 
them to provide more tailored recommendations. 
In conclusion, the type of recommendations significantly affects auditees’ perceived usefulness 
of recommended changes, and therefore, their likely positive impact. Generally, auditees 
perceived recommendations to be more valuable and to have greater impact on the 
organisations’ improvement when they were given the opportunity to discuss 
recommendations with performance auditors. Findings from this study emphasise that it needs 
to be noted that only state government auditees claim to be provided with the opportunity to 
discuss preliminary PA findings and drafted recommendations, while local government 
auditees stated that they did not have influence over the PA conduct, the formulation of 
recommendations and drafting of PA reports.  
Moreover, this study provided empirical evidence for the need to consider the PA 
recommendations’ acceptance critically as highlighted by authors such as Desmedt et al. 
(2017), Hamburger (1988) and Johnston (1988) who argue that the ratio has several drawbacks. 
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As this study has found, auditees frequently claim to accept performance auditors’ 
recommended changes. Although it should be assumed with reasonable certainty that once 
accepted, recommended changes will be implemented, auditees participating in this study 
provided a range of strategic responses that indicate non-implementation. Strategies of 
delaying, decoupling and open disagreement, in ascending order, have evidently been used by 
auditees for a range of reasons discussed below.  
This study has found that from auditees’ perspectives, there is an unspoken risk for audited 
organisations to either be performance audited more frequently, or for PAs to become more 
critical and hard-hitting if auditees do not accept performance auditors’ recommended changes. 
As a consequence, auditees often decide to accept but delay implementation action when they 
do not perceive recommended changes as useful (see section 10.2.2.6). The rationale for 
delaying of recommendation implementation actions is that auditees expect recommended 
changes to become irrelevant once changes are made to the government of the day. Through 
delaying strategies, auditees silently disagree to performance auditors’ recommended changes 
without compromising their legitimacy obtained from performance auditors.  
Reviewed parliamentary reports and hearing transcripts as well as interviews with MPs 
provided evidence for auditees delaying implementation actions for more than three and a half 
to four years. Similar findings were made by Barrett (2012) who referred to the possibility that 
if auditees do not implement recommendations in a timely manner, but delay implementation 
practices, recommendations are often not addressed at all. Such findings, according to MPs, 
re-emphasise the significance of the accountability mechanism reinforced through the political 
accountability relationship between auditees and MPs in form of, for instance, parliamentary 
hearings that exert pressure on auditees to implement changes (see Figure 7 and section 
10.2.2.5). One major issue resulting from auditees’ delaying techniques is that issues identified 
by performance auditors are recurring given that they are not solved by auditees.  
Further, findings have demonstrated that implemented changes were gradually decoupled from 
formal operations of audited organisations when changes were not perceived as an opportunity 
for improving audited organisations’ efficiency, effectiveness and economic performance. 
Making other key stakeholders believe that they implemented changes and integrated those 
changes into their daily operations, allows auditees to avoid being held politically and publicly 
accountable by performance auditors, MPs and journalists. While the delaying strategy leaves 
it open whether auditees intend to adopt recommended changes at all, the decoupling strategy 
evokes the image of audited organisations operating appropriately. Hence, by employing the 
decoupling strategy, auditees manage to avoid or minimise conflict with other stakeholder 
groups while maintaining traditional organisational structures and procedures auditees are most 
comfortable with (see e.g. Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014a; Taut and Brauns, 2003; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977, Dillard et al., 2004; Scott, 2008, 2014).  
Such strategies appear to be popular among auditees participating in this study given that 
performance auditors, as explained by auditees, only seldomly make return visits to audited 
organisations to verify whether and to what extent recommended changes have been 
implemented. This provided further support for assertions made by Power (1997, 2003a) that 
auditees’ acceptance of PA recommendations often remains ceremonial. Moreover, from such 
findings it appears that auditees’ systematic resistance to implement performance auditors’ 
recommendations contributes to a wider sense of PAs in general fulfilling a ritualistic rather 
than substantive role in the public sector (Power, 1997).  
Funnell and Wade (2012) offered empirical evidence showing that PAs can provoke reactions 
from auditees that take forms of defiance and resistance leading to the active ignorance of 
suggested changes. Also, scholars like Morin (2001) and Van der Meer (1999) found that 
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auditees occasionally reject performance auditors’ recommendations if those are not 
considered as useful. While previous studies provide limited insights into the reasons for 
auditees’ rejection of recommended changes, findings from this study shed light on the 
rationales behind auditees’ disagreement to recommended changes. From interviews with 
auditees, the researcher concludes that the main reason for auditees’ open disagreement with 
and rejection of performance auditors’ recommended changes is that some changes were 
perceived by auditees as hindering them from adopting an entrepreneurial approach and stifling 
innovation with regards to how public organisations operate and provide services. Referring to 
such recommendations as killer of innovation, auditees argued that such recommendations slow 
down public processes and the provision of programs and services instead of making them 
more efficient, economic and effective. Hence, recommended changes that are not perceived 
as useful and do not bear potential to improve the audited organisation’s performance but have 
reverse effects, trigger auditees’ open disagreement.  
These findings confirm conclusions drawn by Power (1996, 1997, 2000) that PAs and 
recommended changes arising from those do not always achieve performance improvements 
with regard to the three Es but bear the potential for stifling organisational entrepreneurship 
and hindering innovation instead of fostering it. Interviewed auditees’ explanations further 
provide evidence for Kells’ (2011a) ‘anti-innovation critique’ of PAs, which argues that PAs 
sometimes reduce public sector efficiency and effectiveness.  
This study concludes that in comparison to previous studies that assessed auditees’ responses 
to performance auditors’ changes in other country-contexts, auditees representing audited 
organisations in Victoria are more willing to openly disagree to and reject performance 
auditors’ recommended changes. Referring back to one interviewee’s comment that the 
Auditor-General can’t tell us what to do but our ministers can (see section 6.3) and claims 
made by auditees that the parliament cannot enforce the implementation of recommendations 
or sanction auditees, this study concludes that the institutional environment facilitates auditees’ 
strategic reactions. Studies by Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014a), for example, have outlined that 
due to the Norwegian parliament imposing sanctions on auditees, auditees implemented 
changes even though they did not agree to them. In contrast, findings from this study have 
shown that auditees do not perceive MPs to be stakeholders able to exert institutional pressure 
with regards to the enforcement of the implementation of recommended changes. Such findings 
re-emphasise that recommended changes only have desired positive impacts if they are 
perceived as useful by auditees (see Figure 7). In respect thereof, what this study identified is 
the need for comprehensive debates and discussions between auditees and performance 
auditors about the kind of recommendations made in the first place and the materiality and 
feasibility of those recommendations (see section 10.4.2). 
10.2.2.4 Key stakeholders’ perceived usefulness of performance audits 
Previous studies by Morin (2001, 2004), Funnell et al. (2016), Raudla et al. (2016) and 
Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a, 2014a) addressing PA impacts, conclude that PAs are more 
likely to have positive impact on audited organisations when they are perceived as useful by 
auditees. Thus, auditees’ perceived usefulness of PAs has been defined as impact-facilitating 
factor (see also Van Loocke and Put, 2011). While prior studies refer to the perceived 
usefulness as impact-enabling factor, they do not clearly state what triggers PA usefulness as 
perceived by auditees and other stakeholder groups. This in-depth study shed light on auditees’ 
as well as performance auditors’, MPs’ and journalists’ perceptions of PA usefulness. As 
presented below, it was found that stakeholders’ perceived PA usefulness depends on a variety 
of factors that differ among key stakeholder groups.  
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This study concludes that from auditees’ perspectives, unless PA recommendations pass 
auditees’ usefulness assessment (see Figure 7), changes are not implemented. It was found that 
auditees’ perceptions of PA usefulness are dependent on their culture and attitude towards PAs. 
According to auditees, applying a positive culture towards PAs means that organisations 
demonstrate willingness and encouragement to improve their performance and to consider PAs 
as value-adding learning opportunity. Particularly state government auditees demonstrated a 
greater inclination towards a positive attitude toward PAs compared to local government 
auditees. These differences are due to different levels of relationships between state 
government auditees, local government auditees and performance auditors (see section 
10.2.2.2). Moreover, state government auditees perceive PAs as particularly useful because 
they provide an opportunity to request funding from the government if additional resources are 
required to implement recommended changes.  
On the contrary, for local government auditees PAs often came as a surprise, which has 
frequently led to complicated and adversarial relationships between auditors and auditees. 
Because local government auditees do not have the frequent exposure, they find it much more 
troubling and challenging to be performance audited (see section 10.2.2.2). Additionally, local 
government auditees often do not see the value in PAs, as to them performance auditors appear 
to be insufficiently knowledgeable of local government duties and services and programs 
councils provide due to their lack of engagement and communication. Such findings re-
emphasise that the frequency of exposure to PAs and interactions with performance auditors 
play a significant role in PA activities. 
Whether auditees consider PAs as useful further depends on the focus of PAs. From this study 
it emerged that auditees, MPs and journalists perceive PAs to be useful only if they are targeted 
towards the improvement of the efficiency, effectiveness and economic performance of public 
sector organisations. According to auditees and MPs, however, performance auditors have 
occasionally shifted the focus of PAs towards policy issues. Concerns voiced by auditees and 
MPs about performance auditors’ focus on policy-issues add to the doubts expressed by Pollitt 
and Bouckaert (2004), Funnell (2004) and Gendron et al. (2007) that performance auditors are 
not involved in public sector policy-making. Although the Audit Act 1994 prevents VAGO 
performance auditors from questioning the merits of public sector policy, which is also 
frequently stressed in VAGO’s publications, findings point out that PAs occasionally enter the 
political sphere.  
As outlined earlier, PAs are considered as useful by auditees when those changes are practical 
and implementable, culturally compatible with the organisations’ operations, within the 
framework of available resources (financial and personnel) and considered necessary and 
inevitable by auditees. These findings further provide evidence for contentions made by 
Egeberg and Trondal (2011), who refer to perceptions as frames for action. In other words, 
only if perceptions are positive, they will lead to actions. For this study context that implies 
that PAs in general, and PA recommendations in particular, need to pass what March and Olsen 
(1989) and Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018) refer to as compatibility test. 
Consequently, recommended changes do not only have to be focused on performance 
improvement with regards to the three Es, but must also be compliant with the culture of 
auditees and their perceptions of what is appropriate. If that is not the case, auditees are likely 
to resist change or employ different strategies (see section 10.2.2.3).  
With regards to the usefulness of PAs, auditees emphasised that the increasing amount of PAs 
they experienced over the years (see Appendix 1), does not necessarily lead to better PA 
outcomes. On the contrary, increasing numbers of PAs appear to lead to limited perceived 
usefulness and reportedly create audit fatigue among auditees. Such findings confirm 
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contentions made by Power (1997) who describes the ever-increasing amount of audit 
inspections as audit explosion. As this study indicates, the side-effect of large numbers of PAs 
that are often unspecific and untargeted is that from auditees’ perspectives, they seem to 
decrease in efficacy and significance.  
MPs consider the PA objective of performance improvement as significant, however, regard 
the enhancement of accountability as the primary objective of PAs. From MPs’ perspectives, 
the usefulness of PAs emerges from those audits being the arms and legs of the accountability 
process in the public sector, which allows MPs to receive an in-depth overview of public sector 
organisations’ performance (see section 10.2.1). From MPs’ perspectives, for PAs to improve 
public performance, they need to hold those responsible for performance inefficiencies 
accountable. Although, according to MPs, in the past, PAs have not always had positive 
impacts, as only 50 per cent of PAs have been successful in improving audited organisations’ 
efficiency, effectiveness and economic performance, MPs consider PA activities in general as 
useful as they facilitate the accountability mechanism in the Victorian public sector.  
Journalists generally share MPs’ views of PAs being a tool to facilitate the accountability 
mechanism in the public sector. Journalists see the contribution of PAs in performance auditors 
holding auditees’ feet to the fire and blaming them publicly for not providing better public 
services and programs. According to journalists, exerting accountability is what makes PAs so 
useful. This study therefore concludes that the main rationale for MPs and journalists to 
perceive PAs as useful is that performance auditors foster the mechanism of holding 
accountable those responsible for performance inefficiencies, and thereby present an extension 
of the scrutiny role generally performed by the Victorian parliament (see section 10.2.1).  
Based on such findings, it can be argued that the PA objective of performance improvements 
in terms of the three Es is not fully recognised as rationalised myth by all key stakeholder 
groups operating within the organisational field of the institution of performance auditing. That 
PAs have not always focused on improving the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of 
audited organisations has also been concluded in previous studies by, for instance, Johnsen et 
al. (2001). Auditees from Norwegian local government councils interviewed for the purposes 
of their study contended that PA objectives to improve councils’ performance with regards to 
the three Es have only partially been achieved. Similar conclusions were drawn by Parker and 
Jacobs (2015) who found that in the Australian country-context PAs have not always focus on 
all three Es. 
This study comes to the conclusions that the adoption of recommended changes is strongly 
conditional on their perceived usefulness of such changes (see Figure 7). When auditees do 
not perceive recommended changes as useful, they employ strategies to pursue their own 
interest whilst conveying the image of complying with the interest of other stakeholders. More 
precisely, this study found that auditees cover recommendations’ useless-ness via a variety of 
strategic actions (see section 10.2.2.3). The identified strategies employed by auditees are a 
reflection of the incompatibility of those changes with audited organisations’ culture. While 
Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2015), Raudla et al. (2015), Torres et al. (2016) and Morin 
(2014) have referred to auditees’ perceived usefulness of recommended changes as an indicator 
of the likely effective implementation of such changes, this study concludes that auditees’ 
perceived usefulness is the preconditioning factor that determines whether changes are 
implemented.  
10.2.2.5 Factors triggering the implementation of recommended changes 
Performance auditors consider the ripple effect as important impact-facilitating factor that 
allows PA reports and recommended changes therein to have impact beyond their direct reach 
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(see Figure 7). This study has provided empirical evidence for the ripple effect triggering 
action by auditees who have not been the direct target of PAs. Asking themselves how would 
that impact us?, several auditees reported that they frequently review and monitor PA reports 
and act upon PA recommendations therein, provided that they are relevant for the organisation. 
Auditees do not necessarily implement changes recommended in the context of PAs of other 
organisation because they have the genuine desire to improve their organisations’ performance, 
but in order to convey the image of acting appropriately by implementing suggested changes. 
Such procedures do not only legitimate auditees’ actions in the eyes of performance auditors, 
but also protect them from potential future PAs. It therefore emerges from this study that the 
ripple effect is triggered by auditees’ intention and desire to obtain legitimacy from 
performance auditors. Overall, this study concludes that it is not necessarily the PA conducted 
on a specific organisation, service or program that has impact, but the PA on other organisations 
delivering similar programs and services.  
Such findings demonstrate that auditees’ attitude towards PA practice conforms to Michael 
Power’s Audit Society. By implementing recommended changes made in the context of PAs 
that auditees were not subject of, they make their organisations more auditable by self-
assessing their organisations’ performance (Bowerman et al., 2000). Stephens and Bowerman 
(1997) label public sector organisations’ occasional self-assessment of their activities as 
compulsory benchmarking (see also Bowerman et al., 2000). The ripple effect has to date not 
been defined as impact-facilitating factor and is therefore considered as one of the new findings 
emerging from this research.  
Moreover, VAGO follow-up audits were identified as impact-facilitating factor (see Figure 7). 
Performance auditors and MPs provided the views that VAGO follow-ups trigger auditees’ 
acceptance of recommended changes by holding them accountable for inaction on 
recommendation implementation activities. Described by MPs as important part of the public 
accountability framework of Australia, follow-up audits enhance the accountability of auditees 
for their responses to recommendations. Similarly to Brookes and Pariser (1995) who state that 
without performance auditors’ follow-up actions, auditors would make the same 
recommendations year after year, MPs interviewed for this study expressed that over years, 
several PAs have identified the same or similar public sector performance issues. MPs 
emphasise that without VAGO follow-ups, auditees would consistently ignore recommended 
changes.  
From auditees’ perspective, it is not good practice by performance auditors to simply repeat 
PA recommendations in their follow-ups in the attempt to reinforce them. Barrett (2011) made 
the assertion that follow-ups are not effective if they constitute inquiries of repetitive nature 
which solely re-emphasise recommended changes. Auditees’ analogy of follow-ups of 
recommendations being like relabelling old wine in new bottles demonstrates that auditees 
participating in this study adopt a sceptical view. Furthermore, auditees expressed doubts about 
the usefulness of VAGO’s self-assessment follow-up survey. Local government auditees 
reported to often receive automated online surveys that require auditees to self-assess their 
implementation activities. Such initiatives may lead to higher recommendation acceptance 
rates, however, do not guarantee the implementation of recommended changes. According to 
auditees the self-assessment survey is rather ineffective as it does not allow for discussions 
around the reasons for non-implementation. This study concludes that for the reasons outlined, 
follow-up audits are not always as effective as proclaimed by authors of previous PA studies 
(see e.g. Put and Turksema, 2011; Brooks and Pariser, 1995; Morin, 2008). 
While authors of previous studies propose that parliamentary follow-ups and hearings have 
political-legitimising impacts (e.g. Van Loocke and Put, 2011; see also Sharma, 2007; 
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Hepworth, 1995; Lonsdale, 2000, 2008), this study made contrary findings that show that MPs 
intervention and support can potentially enhance the efficacy of PAs (see Figure 7), but are 
not considered as PA impact per se. From MPs’ perspectives, PAEC follow-up inquiries and 
hearings offer assurance to the Victorian public that Parliament undertakes its scrutiny role of 
monitoring public sector performance. Through parliamentary follow-up inquiries and 
hearings, MPs exert accountability and draw journalists’ attention to PA findings. Mulgan 
(1997) emphasises the scrutiny function of parliamentary committees as most effective aspects 
of parliamentary work. Also, from this study it emerged that by bringing public criticism to 
bear on departments and their ministers, MPs exert an accountability function, which puts 
auditees under pressure to improve their operations. Auditees, however, clearly emphasised 
that similarly to performance auditors, MPs do not have institutional power to enforce the 
adoption of recommended changes.  
Contrary to previous studies by, for instance, Van Loocke and Put (2011) who refer to media 
coverage as political-legitimising impact, and Morin (2008) and Reichborn-Kjennerud and 
Vabo (2017), who provide empirical evidence for press coverage spurring auditees into action 
to implement changes, this study has found that auditees’ implementation actions are not 
directed by press coverage but can be facilitated by it. Hence, while former studies identified 
press coverage as impact, this study concludes that press coverage serves an impact-facilitating 
function triggered by auditees seeking legitimacy from the media (see Figure 7 and section 
10.2.1). Several auditees claimed not to feel severely affected by press coverage. One reason 
identified in this study for auditees’ perceived limited impact of media coverage is the 
ongoingly critical press coverage of public sector performance issues. Auditees gave the 
impression of having become resistant to the continuously critical media reporting.  
10.2.2.6 Organisational changes 
All key stakeholder groups relevant for this study have identified organisational changes as PA 
impacts. In interviews, journalists, for instance, referred to real change as impacts of PAs. 
Also, performance auditors strongly emphasised that the adoption of recommended changes 
has positive impact on audited organisations. Thereby, they have confirmed conclusions drawn 
by Lonsdale (1999) and Funkhouser (2011) that PAs only have impact if they lead to positive 
changes in audited organisations.  
For this study, the NIS concept of organisational change helped the researcher to identify 
known as well as unknown forms of changes and to examine their magnitude and likely impact. 
Against contentions expressed in previous studies that revolutionary changes are often ignored 
or rejected by auditees (see e.g. Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014a), findings emerging from this 
research demonstrate that organisational changes in staff training, IT systems and accounting 
systems considered as complex, reform-like and of significant magnitude have been 
implemented due to their perceived usefulness. While changes in staff training were previously 
identified in research studies by, for example, Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017), in 
interviews, auditees identified changes in IT systems and accounting systems, two changes not 
identified and examined in previous PA literature.  
Although described as huge changes, that were challenging to implement, all three types of 
changes (staff training, IT systems and accounting systems) were perceived as useful and 
impactful due to several reasons. For instance, the change in staff training was considered as 
useful as it brought positive change to the culture of the organisation by enhancing the work 
flow between different working groups. Thereby, work processes were not just made more 
efficient and effective but also the accountability between different parties within organisations 
was enhanced. Changes in staff training were further described as having long-term learning 
effects. 
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Further, the substantial contribution of adopted IT changes was emphasised by auditees who 
contended that such changes were welcome, and in fact, timely and necessary given that former 
systems were outdated. Therefore, auditees embraced this change as an opportunity for reform. 
Similarly to changes in IT systems, experienced changes in accounting systems have been 
described by auditees as long overdue. Despite of the investment required for the 
implementation of this type of change, auditees eagerly implemented what was proposed by 
performance auditors. Auditees reported that effectively this change has led to long-term 
improvements by making transaction processing more efficient by automating the recording of 
transactions (see chapter 9).  
Overall, it appears that the timeliness and perceived urgency of changes in IT and accounting 
systems as recognised by auditees, influence their considering respective changes to be useful 
and feasible and therefore meriting implementation. Interviewed auditees clearly stated that 
although being of significant magnitude and causing several challenges, the major changes in 
staff training, IT systems and accounting systems, have been perceived as most useful. Such 
findings contrast with conclusions drawn by authors of previous studies who reason that 
extensive and complicated changes are often rejected or ignored due to their perceived 
complexity (see e.g. Hamburger, 1989; Johnston, 1988) and that auditees usually tend to adopt 
changes regarded as low-hanging fruit (e.g. Van Loocke and Put, 2011; Hatherly and Parker, 
1988; Desmedt et al., 2017). 
While auditees referred to changes in staff training and changes in IT systems and accounting 
systems as being exceptionally useful and impactful, they have described several other changes 
of lower magnitude as being of limited usefulness. The reasons stated are that minor changes 
have not been as urgent and timely as those changes categorised as major. Incremental changes, 
as reported by auditees, required them to fix up identified issues but do not make a major 
difference with regards to their performance. Thus, minor changes do not revolutionise audited 
organisations. Minor changes referred to by auditees are, amongst others, allocation of 
government resources and changes in governance.  
While findings from this study do not provide empirical evidence for revolutionary or radical 
changes that according to Greenwood and Hinings (1996) transform business units or entire 
organisations and bring along immense structural changes, auditees have identified major 
changes that appear to be located somewhere between the opposing end points of the 
continuum, i.e. incremental and frame-breaking change. Although described as huge and 
reform-like, auditees claimed to have been able to manage the implementation of such major 
changes without facing significant complications. Incremental changes have reportedly helped 
auditees to undertake what Greenwood and Hinings (1996) consider as fine-tuning of existing 
structures and processes within the organisations. Such changes have, however, been perceived 
as less useful compared to major changes as they were not considered as being urgent and 
timely. 
This study has also found that induced changes have had negative effects: instead of being a 
driver for improved performance, accountability has often been a breaker of innovation by 
either slowing down or hampering innovation and entrepreneurship in the public sector in 
Victoria, thereby diminishing or impeding organisational performance. Rather than fostering 
performance improvements, PAs have reportedly taken away the speed from audited local 
government councils. Further, performance auditors’ repeated reporting of negative findings, 
particularly when performance auditors directly engage with the media, resulted in auditees’ 
aversion to taking risks. Such findings reflect conclusions made in earlier studies by Raudla et 
al. (2015) and Van Loocke and Put (2011) that PAs do not necessarily lead to positive impacts 
but can indeed have adverse effects on audited organisations. These findings further emphasise 
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contentions made by Morin (2001) that it should not be taken for granted that PA generally 
made positive contributions to public sector performance.  
While previous studies have referred to changes in general and have only touched on the 
dimensions of changes to a limited extent (see e.g. Desmedt et al., 2017; Morin, 2008, 2014; 
Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo, 2017), this study has elaborated on the different dimensions 
and the magnitude of specific changes. As findings have shown, the types, dimension and 
magnitude of changes significantly influence auditees’ perceived usefulness of such changes, 
and therefore their decision of whether those changes are implemented or not. Overall, 
addressing RQ3, this study concludes that auditees’ perceived usefulness of changes depends 
on whether auditees consider recommended changes as timely, necessary and valuable. Major 
changes have had significantly more positive impact than minor changes. 
10.3 Contributions to the literatures 
Forthcoming sections provide a brief summary of the key contributions this study makes. 
Thereby, it is outlined how the overall research objective has been addressed. In this regard, it 
is described how the conceptual map developed by the researcher contributes to the extant PA 
literature. Moreover, the focus is on key contributions this study makes to the accountability 
and NIS literatures. 
10.3.1 Key contributions to the extant performance audit literature  
Both practitioners and researchers have recognised and emphasised the importance of better 
understanding PA impacts and the various different factors that potentially trigger such impacts 
(e.g. Hatherly and Parker, 1988; Kells and Hodge, 2009; Morin, 2008; Parker et al., 2018; 
Kells, 2011b). Efforts to identify and categorise PA impacts have been undertaken by authors 
of previous studies. However, those studies have been somewhat limited in their research focus, 
methodology and theoretical application. Overcoming the limitations of previous studies that 
capture the perceptions of single stakeholder groups such as auditees or performance auditors 
(e.g. Morin, 2003; Gendron et al. 2007), or examine dyadic stakeholder groups relationships in 
the PA context (e.g. Morin, 2004 and 2014; Funnell and Wade, 2012), this study illustrates in 
the form of a conceptual map, what the PA impact and impact-facilitating factors are in the 
PA context of Victoria from the perspectives of multiple key stakeholder groups.  
While the conceptual map captures auditees’, performance auditors’, MPs’ and journalists’ 
definitions of factors facilitating PA impact, (i.e. induced organisational changes), the map 
further demonstrates how the different factors are interconnected and influence one another. 
This is a major contribution of this study. More precisely, the conceptual map reveals that in 
order to have positive impact, recommended changes need to pass the filtering of auditees’ 
judgement of whether those changes are useful. In other words, for PAs to have positive impact, 
recommended changes must be regarded as having the potential to improve the efficiency, 
effectiveness and economic performance of audited organisations and must be perceived as 
useful by auditees, which presupposes that recommended changes are aligned and compliant 
with the culture of audited organisations.  
A considerable number of impact-facilitating factors was identified that appeared to sensitise 
auditees’ perceptions of PA usefulness. AGs’ and performance auditors’ intent and culture (see 
section 10.2.2.1), auditees’ frequency of exposure to PAs affecting relationships between 
performance auditors and auditees (see section 10.2.2.2), the materiality of PA reports and kind 
of PA recommendations (see section 10.2.2.3) are some of the factors that directly influence 
auditees’ perceived usefulness of PAs and therefore determine whether organisational changes 
are implemented. Moreover, illuminating the (dominant) accountability relationships and 
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legitimacy relationships between relevant key stakeholder groups, the conceptual map 
illustrates the conditioning context for PAs to have impact.  
Overall, this study contributes to PA literature by developing a conceptual map that provides a 
multi-perspective interpretation of PA impacts. Furthermore, it makes a significant 
contribution by adding to the literature the perceptions and interpretations of parliamentarians 
and journalists, two stakeholder groups that have not been subject of extensive PA research. 
Moreover, drawing on strategic responses by auditees, findings from this study also re-
emphasise contentions made by Morin (2001), Power (2003a) and Bowerman et al. (2000) that 
PAs often serve no purpose, are empty ritualistic forms of auditing and swallow up taxpayers’ 
money without adding value for citizens. Findings emerging from this study that address the 
often limited usefulness of PAs justify the implications provided in section 10.4 on how to 
potentially improve PA practice. 
10.3.2 Key contributions to the extant NIS and accountability literatures 
This study further makes theoretical contribution to NIS and accountability literatures. More 
precisely, this study contributes to the understanding of how the relevant institutional 
environment shapes the formation of managerial, political and public accountability 
relationships. Viewing accountability relationships through the lens of NIS allowed the 
researcher to identify the dynamics of managerial, political and public accountability 
relationships in the PA context and to elaborate on the effects such accountability mechanisms 
have in the PA environment. The focus on the organisational field level helped the researcher 
to identify and elaborate on different levels of engagement and interactions between 
stakeholders. For instance, it was found that the engagement and interaction between local and 
state government auditees differs significantly, which, in turn, affects their perceptions of PA 
usefulness and their interpretation of PA impact. 
At the field level, all three relevant accountability dimensions, (i.e. managerial, political and 
public accountability) were identified (e.g. Sinclair, 1995; Bovens et al., 2014; Parker and 
Gould, 1999; Luke, 2010). Empirical evidence has shown that some of the present 
accountability relationships have a dominant character. For example, findings from this study 
emphasise the importance of the managerial accountability relationship between auditees and 
their internal audit committees. This managerial accountability relationship has been found to 
be of substantial importance with regards to auditees’ implementation of organisational change. 
More precisely, it is the oversight and monitoring function that internal audit committees 
execute when exerting managerial accountability, that is of particular importance.  
Auditees referred to their managerial accountability relationships to executives as well as 
political accountability relationships to ministers as direct accountability relationships. With 
respect to the political accountability dimensions, it has been demonstrated that ministers, who 
hold institutional power to influence auditees, are able to spur auditees into action. While the 
direct political accountability relationship to ministers appears to be of great significance with 
respect to auditees’ implementation of organisational change, auditees’ indirect political 
accountability relationship to MPs defined as being of temporary nature seems to be less 
important. Such findings contribute to definitions of the political accountability dimension 
provided by Sinclair (1995) and Mulgan (1997) and managerial accountability dimensions 
provided by Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) and Parker and Gould (1999). Moreover, these 
findings demonstrate that the examination of dimensions of accountability relationships 
through the lens of NIS helps to better understand the factors that shape the formation of 
accountability relationships (see e.g. Ryan et al., 2002). In this regard, this study concluded 
that direct accountability relationships, whereby the accountor exerts direct influence on the 
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accountee, are of dominant nature. It is therefore not surprising that certain managerial and 
political accountability relationships have been referred to as impact-facilitating factors (see 
Figure 7).  
10.4 Implications for performance audit practice and policy 
The conceptual map contributes to PA practice by providing mutual understanding among all 
key stakeholder groups of what each group considers as impact. In forthcoming sections, the 
researcher provides practical implications for auditees and performance auditors. These 
implications are based on the findings that emerged from this study. 
10.4.1 Implications for auditees 
This study offers helpful information for auditees with regards to performance auditors’, MPs’, 
and journalists’ perceptions of accountability relationships, PA usefulness and their 
interpretations of impact. Insights into how other key stakeholders perceive auditees, their 
actions and reactions, and what they expect from auditees may assist auditees to reconsider and 
revise their approach to PAs. Based on the identification and examination of strategies and 
tactics employed by auditees when confronted with performance auditors’ recommended 
changes, the researcher provides a number of suggestions to auditees who believe that their 
organisations may benefit from improved responses to performance auditors and better 
engagement with other stakeholders. More precisely, this research study advises auditees to 
a. encourage performance auditors to involve auditees in preliminary PA discussions 
and briefings; 
b. clarify at the beginning of the PA what the auditors’ expectations are and what 
auditees expect the PA to achieve; 
c. engage with performance auditors throughout the PA process in order to avoid 
recommendations to be tabled in reports that are not feasible; 
d. improve the quality of responses to PA recommendations in order to allow 
performance auditors to better assess the recommendations auditees consider as 
difficult to implement; 
e. present their action plans in a more precise, detailed and comprehensive manner in 
order to allow performance auditors and MPs as well as the public and media to 
keep track of auditees’ implementation actions. This procedure helps to close the 
accountability loop; 
f. draw performance auditors’ attention to recommendations that are considered as 
not feasible and suggest amendments to be made to such recommendations; 
g. review and screen reports and recommendations of PAs targeting other 
organisations and implement actions where suitable (facilitate the ripple effect); 
h. inform internal audit committees about PA outcomes, status of recommendation 
implementation and timelines of implementation actions. 
10.4.2 Implications for performance auditors 
By capturing the perceptions of auditees, MPs and journalists about PAs in general, their 
usefulness and impacts, this study offers supportive information to performance auditors in 
conducting PAs and engaging with all relevant key stakeholder groups. Suggestions made 
below potentially support performance auditors in identifying auditees’ strategic responses to 
PAs and counteracting them. Actions suggested to performance auditors for successful 
communication and interaction with auditees may assist them to build better relationships with 
auditees and, thus, to discourage auditees to react strategically. The researcher’s implications 
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further support performance auditors to create greater awareness of their roles within the 
organisational field they operate in. In turn, such awareness among other stakeholders, may 
lead particularly auditees to be more receptive to the contribution performance auditors can 
make to their organisations. The researcher’s suggestions address the three categories of (1) 
engagement and interaction with auditees, (2) planning and scoping of PAs, (3) PA report, (4) 
nature and feasibility of recommended changes, and (5) follow-up audits. 
1) Research findings have shown that positive relationships between performance auditors 
and auditees positively affect the potential impact of PAs. Thus, the researcher suggests 
that performance auditors should 
a. encourage more frequent interaction and engagement with auditees (particularly 
local government auditees) to improve their perception of PAs in general and 
positively affect their culture and attitude towards PAs; 
b. ensure that auditees, particularly local government auditees have a better 
understanding of the PA process and objectives of PA activities;  
c. foster engagement and consultation with auditees during the PA process in order 
to formulate practical recommendations tailored to audited organisations’ 
specific needs. 
2) Planning and scoping of PAs. Performance auditors should: 
a. make the PA scoping process more transparent for auditees to be able to better 
prepare for the audit and make available required information and documents 
to performance auditors; 
b. request auditees’ feedback at the scoping stage to allow for better targeted PAs 
that have more potential to achieve performance improvement with regards to 
the three Es; 
c. focus more on the investigation into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
of public sector organisations’ performance instead of entering areas regarded 
as public policy; 
3) Performance audit report. Performance auditors should: 
a. be more pointed in their criticisms outlined in PA reports and should map out 
in more detail identified improvement opportunities instead of criticism for 
failure; 
b. use concise language in the PA report and formulate PA findings and 
recommendations clearly; 
4) Nature and feasibility of recommended changes. Performance auditors should: 
a. pursue more engagement with auditees at the early stages of formulating 
recommendations to ensure that recommendations are considered feasible and 
useful by auditees in order for recommendations to be implemented;  
b. recommend changes that are compatible with audited organisations’ culture; 
c. recommend changes that target specific programs/services and/or audited 
organisations’ needs; 
d. recommend changes that are timely and considered necessary by auditees;  
e. recommend changes that outline in more detail how to make performance 
improvements; 
f. recommended changes that are feasible, implementable and within the 
resourcing framework of audited organisations; 
g. recommended changes that encourage auditees to be innovative rather than 
hampering their ideas; 
5) Post PA (follow-up). Performance auditors should: 
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a. improve the efficacy of follow-up audits by returning physically to the audited 
organisations instead of sending self-assessment follow-up inquiries in form of 
a survey tool. 
Many of the researcher’s practical implications involve suggestions of how to improve the 
formulation and provision of recommended changes. This has been given particular importance 
provided that auditees emphasised that they would perceive PAs as more useful and would be 
more willing to implement changes, and, most significantly, benefit from real change, if PAs 
were more targeted and specific in their findings and recommended changes. 
10.5 Limitations 
This section emphasises the limitation this research study faced. In this section, the following 
three limitations are addressed: 
1) choice and application of the theoretical framework; 
2) design and administration of the data collection and analysis of the data; and 
3) focus on a single jurisdiction. 
The theoretical limitations will be outlined first, followed by methodological limitations this 
study was confronted by. Some of these limitations have already been identified and addressed 
in chapter 4 and chapter 5. In previous chapter, the researcher further outlined how those 
limitations were mitigated. For these reasons, this section only focuses on theoretical and 
methodological limitations that were not discussed previously and are awaiting further 
elaboration. Apart from theoretical and methodological limitations, this research was also 
restricted through the focus on a single jurisdiction. Although not a case study, this research 
focused on the institution of PAs conducted by VAGO, which is constrained by its institutional 
environment including political and legislative factors in Victoria.  
Addressing the first limitation of this study, the researcher noted that NIS and selected 
institutional concepts supplemented by accountability dimensions has proven to be a useful 
theoretical framework through which to interpret the comprehensive and complex data set. 
However, NIS in combination with preselected accountability dimensions is not the exclusive 
means to gain better understanding of the phenomenon of the PA function and its impacts. In 
fact, previously conducted studies have investigated PA impacts through the lenses of 
evaluation and organisational learning (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo, 2017), actor network 
theory (Justesen and Skærbæk, 2010), impression management (Morin and Hazgui, 2016) and 
organisational influence processes (Morin, 2014). Few PA studies adopted individual concepts 
borrowed from institutional theory. Funnell and Wade (2012) and Reichborn-Kjennerud 
(2014a), for instance, applied Oliver’s (1991) strategic responses to institutional responses.  
However, recognising the interaction and relationships between key stakeholder groups as 
significant parameters for PA impact, the investigation of such impacts necessitated the 
examination of the organisational field level within which stakeholders interact. This defined 
organisational field level is shaped by the boundaries of the institutional environment of the 
Victorian public sector. The elaboration on PA impacts and accountability relationships 
between key stakeholder groups required to view PA activities in the bigger picture context. 
Regarding the theoretical lens adopted by this research study, the researcher underlines that the 
choice of the theoretical framework influenced questions asked in the survey questionnaire and 
interviews (see Appendices 2 and 3). More precisely, questions were structured around 
stakeholder groups’ accountability relationships. Hence, it is important to note that if the 
phenomenon of PA practice had been viewed and examined through different dimensions of 
accountability relationships (e.g. professional accountability), or alternative theoretical lenses 
mentioned above, findings of this study may look different. 
  
181 
The second limitation revolves around the research design employed by this study and the data 
analysis. By adopting different methodologies, the researcher accepted limitations arising from 
each as explained in chapter 5. Qualitative data collected for the purpose of this study partly 
derived from stakeholder interviews. A total of 43 participants were interviewed, of which the 
majority were auditees. In order to obtain a balanced view from interviewees, the researcher 
carefully considered the representation of interviewees of all levels of government. The 
employed snowball sampling technique helped to identify those auditees who experienced PAs 
and are therefore familiar with the PA process and its intended outcomes. As this study is 
qualitative in nature, it did not intend to identify representatives of all public sector 
organisations in Victoria that undergo PAs. Rather, this research study sought to capture the 
rich experience of interview participants who were frequently involved in PAs.  
At this point it also needs to be acknowledged that the perspectives of performance auditors 
were captured through a detailed analysis of documents and reports that VAGO creates and 
releases into the public domain. It needs to be noted that findings from this study may have 
been different if performance auditors had been interviewed. Nevertheless, the researcher 
considered exploring and apprehending performance auditors’ perceptions solely through 
documents as suitable provided that the change of the AG in 2016 has triggered a major 
transformation of VAGO staff, which also affected VAGO’s PA department. As new VAGO 
PA staff only commenced undertaking audits in 2016, their experiences would not have been 
relevant for this study, which focuses on the time period of 2009-2015.  
The collection of predominantly qualitative data, particularly interview data, gives rise to 
interviewer-induced bias. To minimise this concern, an interview guide listing interview 
questions and probe questions was developed before the commencement of interviews. While 
in qualitative interview research it is unlikely to completely eliminate the risk of researcher 
bias, this risk was mitigated through the involvement of the supervisor team. Qualitative 
research methodologists suggest involving additional researchers in order to reduce the 
subjectivity of the single researcher. Although in this study, the close involvement of additional 
researchers was not an option, the researcher continuously liaised with her supervisor team 
discussing emerging findings. Researcher bias due to subjective interpretation of interview data 
was further reduced through the support of other sources of evidence that supplemented 
interview data. Quantitative survey data and documentary evidence were instrumental to 
provide a more balanced view.  
Third, this research is limited to PAs conducted by VAGO performance auditors. Thus, the 
institutional environment under study including its political, legal and social aspects and key 
stakeholder groups’ relationships were unique to the study of the PAs in Victoria. Hence, as 
findings of this study emerge from the analysis of PA activities in Victoria only, the researcher 
is cautious not to overgeneralise findings. In fact, the researcher acknowledges that due to the 
differences in legislative frameworks, the PA mandate, and social and political environment, 
findings of this study may not be fully applicable or attributable to other Australian AGOs. 
Further, different AGOs in Australia may interpret the PA mandate differently (Hatherly and 
Parker, 1988; Parker et al., 2018). Although there are no doubts that the conceptual map is 
helpful for other Australian jurisdictions, it must be noted that such findings emerged from an 
investigation into PA as an institution in the institutional environment of Victoria. Another 
aspect that restricts the researcher in her claims of the conceptual map to bear relevance for 
other jurisdictions, is the time period under study, i.e. the financial years of 2009 to 2015. 
Future research studies addressing earlier, or later timeframes may draw different conclusions.  
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10.6 Avenues for further research 
In the course of this research study a number of topics emerged that suggest potential directions 
for future research in the PA field. One of the many findings that emerged from this research 
study is that managerial accountability relationships between auditees and public sector 
organisations’ internal audit committees play a significant role for auditees’ recommendation 
implementation actions and, thus, for PAs to have impact. However, findings have also 
demonstrated that not all public sector organisations have appropriately functioning internal 
audit committees. In this regard, it was highlighted by VAGO performance auditors and MPs 
that internal audit committees are often not informed by auditees about PA outcomes and 
recommendations, which, in turn, hinders PAs’ ability to have positive impact on audited 
organisations. Hence, further investigations into the significance of the monitoring and 
oversight roles of internal audit committees and their effects on auditees’ recommendations 
implementation actions would be worthwhile in order to explore the reasons for some internal 
audit committees not performing as well as others.  
Another major finding of this study is the difference between the relationships performance 
auditors hold with state government auditees and local government auditees. The two groups 
of auditees evidently hold different perceptions of the usefulness of PAs in general, and 
performance auditors’ approach and engagement with auditees, specifically. While this 
research study found that one of the reasons for the difference in auditees’ perceptions at 
different government levels is the frequency with which they are exposed to PAs and 
experience interaction with performance auditors, future research is needed to explore this 
issue in greater depth. When exploring performance auditors’ rationales for engaging to a 
greater extent with state government representatives as opposed to local government auditees, 
future studies should take into consideration the institutionalised concept of auditors’ 
independence. 
Previous comparative PA studies, for instance, by Hatherly and Parker (1988) and Glynn 
(1985), have evaluated PA activities and processes in Australian jurisdictions. Since the 
publication of those studies more than 30 years ago, it can reasonably be assumed that the PA 
mandate in most Australian states has since developed and improved. While this study 
contributes to the PA practice in Victoria, there is a need to investigate the status quo of PA 
work and its impacts in other jurisdictions and to draw comparisons between states. Both the 
theoretical framework and the research design employed by this study should allow scholars 
to replicate this study. The applied theoretical framework taking into consideration the 
institutional environment of VAGO PAs and the employed research design combining the 
benefits of qualitative and quantitative research, offer a strong framework for the examination 
of public sector PA issues. Comparative studies of stakeholders’ accountability relationships 
and interpretations of PA impacts across jurisdictions in Australia would add further value to 
PA practice and literature. Such studies could also apply a wider range of accountability 
dimensions, including, for instance, professional accountability. The value of such comparative 
studies is that they are likely to yield insights into different AGOs’ best-practices in regard to 
the PA process with the potential to provide learning effects to AGOs.  
This study also has opened the gates for further research on PA practice in different country-
settings. Adopting the theoretical framework and research design used for this study, 
prospective comparative studies across countries could be undertaken. A previously conducted 
comparative quantitative study by Torres et al. (2019) compared PA practices and impacts 
between European SAIs and RAIs. To that purely quantitative study, perspectives and 
interpretations captured through a mixed-methods research design such as the one employed 
in this research could be added, intended to contribute to perceptions of PA practice at a global 
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level. These suggested avenues for further research are only a selection of ideas for further 
research that emerged from the many findings of this study.    
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Performance audits across Australia (2000–2015) 
 2000/ 
2001 
2001/ 
2002 
2002/ 
2003 
2003/ 
2004 
2004/ 
2005 
2005/ 
2006 
2006/ 
2007 
2007/ 
2008 
2008/ 
2009 
2009/ 
2010 
2010/ 
2011 
2011/ 
2012 
2012/ 
2013 
2013/ 
2014 
2014/ 
2015 
2015/ 
2016 
Sum 
‘09/‘15 
ACT 15 10 10 3 9 8 8 6 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 47 
NSW 11 14 13 12 15 15 14 11 7 14 12 9 8 13 11 11 78 
NT 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 2 2 3 4 20 
QLD N/A N/A N/A 10 10 5 9 9 6 9 7 7 11 10 13 13 70 
TAS 5 5 4 6 9 7 9 8 7 9 10 7 7 7 6 6 52 
VIC 7 9 9 9 10 8 13 29 26 26 30 37 28 28 25 29 203 
WA 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 0 2 5 3 7 8 9 9 2 43 
ANAO 46 46 47 57 57 50 51 44 45 47 54 52 52 51 49 35 340 
Source: Data derived from relevant AGs’ annual reports.  
Note:  The South Australian Auditor-General Office has not to date produced stand-alone performance audit reports.  
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Appendix 2: Online survey questionnaire 
The following section asks for your professional background: 
Please state the area in which you are currently employed. 
o Education and Training  
o Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources 
o Health and Human Services 
o Environment, Land, Water and Planning  
o Justice and Regulation 
o Premier and Cabinet 
o Treasury and Finance  
o Other (please specify)  
What is your current position? 
o Top/senior management 
o Middle management 
o Other  
In how many performance audits have you been involved throughout your career? 
o 1 – 4 
o 5 – 9 
o 10 – 14 
o 15 – 19 
o more than 20 
Please indicate in which of the following performance audits you have been involved (you can 
choose multiple options) 
o Performance audit of a particular program 
o Performance audit of a particular system 
o Performance audit of a whole organisation 
o Other (please specify) 
o None 
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The following section is concerned with the contribution of performance audits to your organisation. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
Performance audits... Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
highlight inconsistencies in my organisation’s 
operations. 
     
influence the ministers decision-making process.      
prompt major unexpected changes.      
endorse changes that our organisation planned to make 
anyway. 
     
The following section is concerned with your perceptions of performance audit impacts. Please indicate 
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
Possible visits by performance auditors lead our 
organisation to take preventive actions, such as:  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagre  
Agree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Increasing compliance with the laws and regulations.      
Producing more detailed information regarding the 
organisation’s performance.  
     
Implementing more efficient and effective 
management practices. 
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When it is possible to anticipate the findings of 
auditors… 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagre  
Agree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
we undertake corrections during the audit process.      
we prefer waiting for the performance audit report 
before undertaking corrections.  
     
 
Performance audits have stronger effects on our 
organisation when auditors… 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagre  
Agree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
demonstrated a collaborative style during the audit 
(e.g. communicated in an open manner). 
     
take into consideration our comments made during the 
audit. 
     
take into consideration our disagreement on audit 
findings and conclusions. 
     
correct factual errors based on our disagreement with 
audit findings and conclusions. 
     
encourage us to comment on their recommendations.      
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Recommendations made by auditors… 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagre  
Agree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
usually result in performance improvements of our 
organisation. 
     
generally reach the source of the problem.      
are often theoretically useful but difficult to apply.      
have a stronger effect on our organisation when 
auditors consult us before recommendations were 
developed. 
     
 
Performance audit reports… Strongly 
disagree 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagre  
Agree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
are unbiased.      
serve as a valid basis for an internal discussion.      
reach conclusions that are adequately supported by 
relevant facts. 
     
are used by auditors as an opportunity to pressure us to 
move from discussion to action. 
     
are used by Parliamentarians/members of the Public 
Accounts and Estimates Committee (PAEC) to 
pressure us to move from discussion to action. 
     
are used by Parliamentarians/PAEC members to hold 
us to accountable. 
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Follow-up audits… Strongly 
disagree 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagre  
Agree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
encourage us to respond to audit recommendations 
made by auditors. 
     
strenghten the overall effect performance audits have 
on our organisation. 
     
 
What kind of changes have been implemented in your organisation as a result of performance 
audits? You can choose several options: 
o Amendment of existing laws or regulations. 
o Adoption of new laws or regulations. 
o Changes in internal control and risk management. 
o Changes in strategies, planning or performance management. 
o Changes in management or organisation. 
o Changes in reporting. 
o Changes in human resources (additional recruitment, layoffs, changes of workplace) 
o Creation of new work groups or reform of existing groups. 
o Changes in staff training. 
o Increased budgetary allocation to the audited policy area. 
o Other (please specify). 
o No changes have been made to our organisation 
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Changes implemented by our organisation have led 
to...  
Strongly 
disagree 
disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagre 
Agree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
significant improvements in the overall performance.      
more efficient programs and processes.      
more effective provision of services and programs.      
better allocation of financial resources.      
 
The reasons for not making changes as 
recommended by auditors were: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagre 
Agree 
  
Strongly 
Agree 
It was too early to make the suggested changes.      
No financial resources were available for the  
implementation of the suggested changes. 
     
The performance audit report did not present the facts 
accurately. 
     
Suggested changes have not been perceived as useful.      
Challenges identified by auditors were known before 
and measures were already been put in place to correct 
them. 
     
We were not responsible for making the changes.      
We devised an alternative strategy to deal with the 
concerning issue. 
     
if other, please specify...      
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The following section is concerned with the consequences of media interest in performance auditing. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
As a consequence of media interest the following 
occurred: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagre 
Agree 
  
Strongly 
Agree 
Media attention towards services provided by our 
organisation leads to the initiation of (a) performance 
audit(s). 
     
Media interest fosters the performance audit’s success.      
Press coverage forced us to implement changes 
recommended by auditors.  
     
 
The following section is concerned with the consequences of Parliamentarians’/PAEC members’ 
interventions. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
Parliamentarians/PAEC members involved in 
performance audits... 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagre 
Agree 
  
Strongly 
Agree 
create a sense of urgency within our organisation to 
react to auditors’ recommendations by initiating public 
hearings.  
     
create a sense of urgency within our organisation to 
react to auditors’ recommendations by initiating 
follow-up audits. 
     
make further relevant recommendations that address 
and monitor progress against auditors’ 
recommendations. 
     
accelerate implementations of concrete measures to 
correct the problems raised by auditors. 
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In order to answer the final question, please insert a number from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree) that best represents your perception for each of the stakeholder groups. Note: you can use the 
same number for several stakeholder groups. Make sure that you write a number under all the 
stakeholder columns. 
Scale 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
Please scale from 1 (strongly disagrees) to 5 (strongly agrees) the relevance of each stakeholder in 
assisting your organisation to reach the following objectives: 
Question Key Stakeholders of Performance Auditing 
Through 
performance 
audits the 
stakeholder… 
Victorian 
Auditor-
General’s 
Office  
(VAGO) 
Parliament 
of Victoria 
Public 
Accounts and 
Estimates 
Committee 
(PAEC) 
Ministers of 
the Victorian 
State 
Government 
Executive 
Management 
of your 
organisation 
Media Citizens 
exerts 
pressure on 
our 
organisation’s 
performance. 
       
assists us to 
achieve more 
efficient 
outcomes (i.e. 
deliver better 
programs for 
the given 
level of 
financial and 
human 
resources). 
       
assists us to 
reach higher 
levels of 
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effectiveness 
(i.e. 
achieving 
intended 
goals of 
provided 
programs). 
assists us to 
make better 
economic 
decisions (i.e. 
reduction of 
the costs of 
resources 
used for a 
program 
while 
maintaining 
program 
quality). 
       
assists us to 
improve the 
overall ability 
of our 
organisation 
to reach its 
strategic 
objectives 
and its 
mission. 
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If there is any other aspect in terms of performance audit impacts that you would like to share, please 
use the box below. 
[   ] 
 
 
Dear Participant,  
Thank you for your valuable responses. If you have an interest in performance auditing and its impacts, 
would you like to detail with us your perspective, in a follow-up interview? 
We would appreciate your support. 
All of your information and interview responses will be kept confidential. 
o I agree to take part in follow-up interviews. Please provide your email address. 
o I prefer not to participate in interviews. 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. If you have any queries please do not 
hesitate to contact me by telephone (03 9925 5542) or email (jana.schmitz@rmit.edu.au).  
If you would like a summary of the findings sent to you, please write your email address here: […]
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Appendix 3: Interview questions  
Interview questions for auditees: 
Demographic Questions 
1 How long have you been in your current position in this organisation?  
2 How many performance audits have you experienced (approximately)? 
3 Tell me about the nature of your involvement with performance audits.  
Usefulness of Performance Audits 
4 Tell me about your opinion on performance audits. Do you regard them favourably or 
unfavourably? 
5 How would you describe the atmosphere within your organisation when there is a 
performance audit forthcoming?  
Performance Audit Impacts 
6 From your experience, what are the impacts of performance audits?  
7 Can you outline any organisational responses to performance audits that have occurred 
during the audit process? 
8 Have you experienced any follow-up audits conducted by VAGO auditors and/or 
PAEC members in relation to performance audits?  
9 What types of organisational responses to auditors’ recommendations have you 
witnessed? 
10 How could the usefulness of performance audits be improved? What are your 
suggestions? 
Changes made to Audited Organisations 
11 What are the types of changes you have seen recommended by performance auditors?  
12 Can you give your overall assessment of the feasibility of those changes?  
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13 What motivates or does not motivate your organisation to comply with suggested 
changes?  
Accountability Relationships 
14 To whom do you feel your organisation is more accountable?  
a Parliamentarians/PAEC  
b  ministers 
c top management of your organisation 
d VAGO performance auditors 
e public  
f media 
g other 
15 To what extent do(es) this/these relationships influence your organisation’s 
performance? 
16 Do you feel that any change happens during performance audits in ‘to whom’ your 
organisation is accountable and ‘for what’ it is accountable? 
Interview questions for MPs: 
Demographic Questions 
1 How long have you been in your current position as a MP/PAEC member?  
2 How many performance audits have you observed or reviewed (approximately)? 
Usefulness of Performance Audits 
3 What are the challenges you experience when involved in performance audits? 
4 Do you interact with auditees? What are the occasions (e.g. follow-up audits)?  
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5 What is the nature of your interactions with VAGO performance auditors (before, 
during and/or after the performance audit process)? 
6 Why do you think performance auditing is relevant in the Victorian public sector?  
Performance Audit Impacts 
7 What are the results the PAEC expects to achieve through performance audits? 
8 According to which criteria does the PAEC define performance audit topics?  
9 In your opinion, how do performance audits impact on public sector organisations, their 
programs and systems?  
10 How does the PAEC assess the impacts of performance audits?  
11 To what extent does the PAEC pay attention to VAGO performance auditors’ 
recommendations published in performance audit reports?  
12 What are the PAEC’s selection criteria when deciding on which performance audits to 
follow-up?  
13 To what extent do follow-up audits intensify the impacts of performance audits?  
Changes made to Audited Organisations 
14 What types of changes do VAGO performance auditors generally suggest to audited 
organisations? 
15 How do(es) this/these type(s) of change(s) address the PAEC’s expected results of 
performance audits?  
16 How could the usefulness of performance audits be improved? What are your 
suggestions? 
Accountability Relationships 
17 To whom do you feel the PAEC is more accountable? 
a ministers  
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b public  
c Parliament 
d VAGO 
e media 
f other  
Interview questions for journalists: 
Demographic Questions 
1 For how long have you been involved in writing about public sector? 
2 In your profession as a journalist, to what extent are you interested in public sector 
performance audits in Victoria?  
Usefulness of Performance Audits 
3 What types of public sector issues have you most often written on?  
4 What is/are the most relevant aspect(s) of performance auditing currently debated by 
politicians?  
5 According to which criteria do you select the performance audits on which you report? 
6 Which sources do you use when identifying and writing on public sector issues?  
7 When writing about performance audits, do you have in mind a specific audience?  
Performance Audit Impacts 
8 What reactions to your reports on performance audits do you expect from the 
Parliament and its committees, the government, the public sector in general, citizens 
and other readers?  
Changes made to Audited Organisations 
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9 What changes have you observed in the public sector as a consequence of performance 
audits? 
Accountability Relationships 
10 From your experience in reporting about performance audits, which relationship(s) can 
you identify among public sector organisations, auditors, ministers, Parliament/PAEC, 
media and citizens?  
11 What role do you feel the media plays in holding public sector organisations 
accountable for their actions?  
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Appendix 4: Interview participants 
No. Date Code Stakeholder group Duration of interview (min.) 
1 04/2017 MP1 Member of Parliament 59:13 
2 04/2017 A1 SG Auditee 40:04 
3 04/2017 A2 SG Auditee 51:02 
4 04/2017 A3 SG Auditee 51:03 
5 04/2017 A4 SG Auditee 44:00 
6 04/2017 A5 SG Auditee 46:44 
7 04/2017 A6 OT Auditee 56:01 
8 04/2017 A7 LG Auditee 53:25 
9 04/2017 A8 SG Auditee 40:11 
10 04/2017 A9 SG Auditee 61:33 
11 04/2017 MP2 Member of Parliament 55:39 
12 04/2017 A10 LG Auditee 62:00 
13 04/2017 MP3 Member of Parliament 54:55 
14 04/2017 A11 SG Auditee 44:47 
15 05/2017 A12 SG Auditee 37:44 
16 05/2017 A13 LG Auditee 29:11 
17 05/2017 A14 OT Auditee 69:42 
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18 05/2017 MP4 Member of Parliament 33:53 
19 05/2017 A15 LG Auditee 42:42 
20 05/2017 A16 LG Auditee 44:43 
21 05/2017 A17 SG Auditee 54:57 
22 05/2017 A18 SG Auditee 47:14 
23 05/2017 A19 LG Auditee 46:11 
24 05/2017 J1 Journalist 35:28 
25 05/2017 A20 SG Auditee 38:45 
26 05/2017 A21 LG Auditee 43:27 
27 05/2017 A22 SG Auditee 44:09 
28 05/2017 A23 LG Auditee 45:04 
29 05/2017 A24 SG Auditee 63:38 
30 05/2017 A25 LG Auditee 58:26 
31 05/2017 A26 LG Auditee 34:49 
32 05/2017 A27 SG Auditee 45:23 
33 05/2017 J2 Journalist 42:56 
34 06/2017 MP5 Member of Parliament  47:59 
35 06/2017 A28 SG Auditee 38:43 
36 06/2017 A29 SG Auditee 44:36 
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37 06/2017 A30 OT Auditee 42:34 
38 06/2017 A31 SG Auditee 51:35 
39 06/2017 A32 LG Auditee 38:49 
40 06/2017 A33 SG Auditee 61:22 
41 07/2017 A34 LG Auditee 48:06 
42 08/2017 J3 Journalist 41:58 
Average duration per interview 47:30 
Note: SG – State Government; LG – Local Government; OT – Other (e.g. associated entities39, public bodies, 
independent budget sector agencies, waste and resource recovery groups, etc.). 
 
 
39 Associated entities are private or non-for-profit organisations that deliver public sector services or programs 
through contracts. 
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Appendix 5: Recommendation acceptance rates 
FY Number of PAs  Number of 
recommendations  
Accepted  Partially accepted  Rejected  
2009/10 26 153 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2010/11 30 155 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2011/12 37 179 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2012/13 28 41140  386  94% 25 6% 0 0 
2013/14 29 48241 464 96% 16 3% 2 1% 
2014/15 25 217 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2015/16 29  145 139 96% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Sources: VAGO (2015a and b) and PA reports tabled and published between 2009 and 2016. 
 
 
 
40 During 2012/13 performance auditors made 214 recommendations that included 411 specific actions to implement. Some recommendations included multiple elements (see 
recommendations listed in PA reports; some of them include multiple dot points). VAGO treats these individual elements as separate recommendations (VAGO, 2015a).  
41 During 2013/14, VAGO made 482 recommendations. In addition, there were 180 outstanding recommendations from 2012/13 (VAGO, 2015b). 
